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Abstract 
 
We read symbolic representations of numbers like “24” across a multitude of contexts – 
as the name of a TV show, the answer to common arithmetic problems, a symbol for the 
linguistic expression “twenty-four”, among others – and utilize multiple systems of memory in 
order to appropriately interpret them. This thesis examines how these meanings of Arabic 
numerals are flexibly accessed, retrieved, and evaluated by healthy college-age adults. In order to 
dissociate these rapidly occurring processes, event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded while 
participants read common numerals in tasks that differed in the type and amount of numeral-
associated information that would need to be recalled.  
The first two experiments specifically looked at the evaluation of Arabic numerals in 
arithmetic contexts, and examined how the two cerebral hemispheres approach reading equations 
and evaluating potential answers. These experiments revealed similarities in how the 
hemispheres respond to contextually congruous and incongruous answers but differences in how 
they evaluate other aspects of provided answers. Specifically, the right hemisphere (and not the 
left) is sensitive to mathematical relationships beyond whether an answer is right or wrong.  
 The second two experiments assessed how relatively more automatic access of meaning 
during numeral reading is influenced by task goals (Experiment 3) or by item-level properties of 
numerals (Experiment 4). The results showed that the amount of meaning information that is 
relatively automatically accessed during numeral reading is similar (and small) across task, but 
that the information that can be deliberately or explicitly retrieved differs across item type 
depending on personalized ratings of familiarity. Additionally, the nature of what is 
automatically retrieved from semantics is at least somewhat malleable, because, whereas 
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Experiment 4 obtained effects similar in important ways to those observed during semantic 
retrieval for words, Experiment 3 did not.  
 Across all experiments, the results speak to a fluidity in the kind of information that can 
be brought to bear during numeral processing, depending on what sort of contextual support is 
provided and which types of evaluative processes are needed in order to perform the task at 
hand. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
Numerical cognition: basic number systems 
 What is the nature of the representational space for numerical knowledge? In the domain 
of numerical cognition, one of the largest theoretical distinctions is between a preverbal number 
system, which appears to be shared by humans and animals, and a verbal number system, which 
must be deliberately learned and allows for manipulation of numbers in more precise quantities 
(i.e., the system used during arithmetic calculation, to figure out how much to tip in a restaurant, 
etc). The common view of the preverbal system is that there is a distinction between small 
numerosities (1-3), which can be individually subitized accurately, and larger numerosities, 
which can be distinguished without using verbal counting skills only once the ratio between 
compared numerosities is sufficiently high (see, e.g., reviews by Brannon & Roitman, 2003; 
Spelke & Dehaene, 1999; and more recently by Gaber & Schlimm, 2015).  
 The (learned) verbal system is supported both by number words, used in counting, and, in 
written language, it is supported by symbols that are used as visual representations of numbers 
(called numerals), the most commonly used of these symbol systems being Arabic numerals 
(although Roman numerals function similarly). Numerals exist in an odd middle-ground for 
educated adults: they are not technically word forms, because their representations do not use 
letters that map onto phonemes, but they are also not quite pictorial representations either, both 
because their mapping to meaning is arbitrary and because there is no ambiguity in how their 
representation should be interpreted (i.e., a picture of a dog could indicate a specific dog, a 
generic dog, a living animal, etc., whereas the Arabic numeral “1” always maps onto the word 
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“one”). There is evidence that these numerals are increasingly independent of their 
corresponding verbal (word) representations as adults become more familiar with them, most 
notably in cases of preserved calculation abilities in patients with various forms of aphasia 
(Anderson, Damasio, & Damasio, 1990; Cipolotti, Warrington, & Butterworth, 1995; Rossor, 
Warrington & Cipolotti, 1995; Cipolotti, 1995). 
 
Numerical cognition: representation of learned numerical information in long-term memory 
 Descriptions of the cognitive representation of numerical information often invoke a 
number line analogy, with smaller numbers on the left and increasingly larger numbers to the 
right. Evidence in support of this idea comes from the SNARC (Spatial-Numerical Association 
of Response Codes) effect, which is found when participants compare pairs of quantities. If 
smaller quantities are on the right (incompatible with the hypothesized number line), reaction 
times are slower and accuracies are reduced relative to compatible arrangements of number pairs 
(where smaller quantities are on the left). This suggests there is a spatial structure to numerical 
(ordinal) information (Dehaene, Bossini & Giraux, 1993; Fias, Brysbaert, Geypens, & 
d’Ydewalle, 1996; reviewed in Fischer & Fias, 2005). However, there appears to be no evidence 
for this linear organization in the neurons of the brain, leading to suggestions that it is a strategy 
people invoke to lessen working memory loads (Núñez, 2011; Nieder, Freedman, & Miller, 
2002; reviewed in Gaber & Schlimm, 2015).  
 When participants judge and compare quantities of numbers, solve arithmetic problems, 
or assess correctness of provided answers, problems involving larger numbers are both slower 
and less accurate (e.g, Campbell & Graham, 1985). Explanations for this “number size” effect 
have varied in the decades following its discovery, with different theories implicating memory 
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itself, retrieval processes, and/or differences in strategy use across number sizes (Zbrodoff & 
Logan, 2005, review the chronological unfolding of theories in this domain). The suggestion 
most relevant for characterizing the cognitive structure of numerical representations has been 
that increasing number size has a negative effect on the precision of numbers in representational 
space (Dehaene & Changeux, 1993; Gallistel & Gelman, 1992; Zorzi & Butterworth, 1999; 
Cohen Kadosh, Tzelgov, Henik, 2008).  
 Larger numbers, then, are represented less well (or are less distinct in long-term memory) 
when compared to the more precise representation of smaller numbers. One causal explanation 
for this difference is that smaller numbers are encountered more frequently than larger numbers. 
Support for this notion comes from corpus findings that arithmetic problems involving smaller 
digits are more often used in textbooks than are problems with larger digits (Hamman & 
Ashcraft, 1986; Ashcraft & Christy, 1995).    
 When larger numbers are assessed, it is unclear to what extent the magnitude of symbolic 
numbers is represented holistically (“46” as a unit, Dehaene, Dupoux, & Mehler, 1990), with 
more continuous processing along a single number line (Reynvoet & Brysbaert, 1999), or 
whether the processing of these symbols involves decomposition into the tens place and a unit 
place (“46” as “4” and “6”) (McCloskey, 1992; Nuerk et al., 2001). 
 
Comparison:  Long-term semantic memory representation for words 
Much like the longstanding interest in how numerical knowledge is represented in long-
term memory, in the language domain, understanding the specifics of the structure of the long-
term semantic memory system for words has also been a topic of interest historically. Much of 
the most recent progress in this domain over the past two decades has taken advantage of 
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temporally sensitive, functionally-linked event-related potential (ERPs) components to better 
characterize semantic memory (reviewed in Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). A review of the 
methods that have been employed in this domain follows, in order to serve as a backdrop for how 
similar methods can be applied to symbolic number representations.  
 
N400 effects in language comprehension: general  
One fruitful approach for examining the structure of meaningful information in long-term 
memory has been by taking advantage of the response properties of the N400 component. The 
N400, so named for the timing of its negative-going peak just prior to 400ms post-stimulus 
onset, is elicited by potentially meaningful stimuli in any sensory modality, and it is temporally 
stable, appearing reliably in the same timewindow across stimulus modality and task contexts 
(Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). Its amplitude (amount of negativity at the peak) is related to the 
amount of new semantic information that must be accessed when presented with a given input. 
The simplest example of this is in comparisons between words (or word-like pseudowords, e.g., 
“LULP”) and jumbles of letters that do not resemble real words (“TXMR”). The N400 is larger 
in response to words compared to these character strings because words, when they are presented 
out of context, activate a lot of new information in semantic memory (especially when they 
resemble many other real words), whereas vowel-less character strings fail to make connections 
with as rich a semantic network (Rugg & Nagy, 1987; Holcomb, Grainger & ORourke, 2002; 
Laszlo & Federmeier, 2011; Laszlo & Federmeier, 2014). This relatively simple finding 
elegantly revealed one feature of the structure of semantic memory for written words – general 
orthographic structure of text, at least by 400ms, is more influential than the familiarity of the 
individual item.  
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This effect of orthography also reveals that N400 amplitudes reflect a coarser contact 
with semantic memory than is sometimes assumed to be the case. Given no prior context (i.e., if 
items are presented in an unstructured list), the N400 amplitude to an individual item does not 
necessarily reflect how meaningful that item itself is in long-term memory. That interpretation of 
N400 amplitude would predict that the meaningful acronym “DVD” should elicit a larger N400 
than a nonmeaningful but orthographically regular pseudoword like “DAWK” – in fact, the 
opposite is true. This is because N400 amplitude to a stimulus reflects an initial, messy, contact 
with semantic memory (which begins around 250ms post-stimulus presentation and peaks at 
400ms), and does not reflect what is ultimately retrieved from memory. Thus, during the first 
brush with semantic memory, an orthographically regular non-word makes contact with real 
words that look similar to it, eliciting a larger N400 than orthographically irregular items that 
have less confusability with neighboring items. In unstructured list contexts, the more delicate 
process of recognizing “DVD” as a specific item with which a viewer has experience is reflected 
on components other than the N400 (discussed later). 
However, within the class of orthographically regular words, frequency can also 
influence N400 amplitude: less frequent words result in higher amplitude N400s than do words 
that are higher in frequency (Smith & Halgren, 1986; Van Petten & Kutas, 1990; Rugg, 1990). 
There are at least two explanations for this finding, neither of which are particularly in conflict. 
Either low frequency words require more new semantic information to be activated (thus 
resulting in larger N400s for low frequency words), or high frequency words are more facilitated 
because of how regularly their semantics are retrieved (thus resulting in smaller N400s for high 
frequency words). This effect is sensitive to task effects – in cases where a particular semantic 
subcategory is operating as a target, frequency effects are attenuated, whereas cases where the 
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task is more neutral with respect to semantic content (e.g., having to read the words out loud), 
frequency effects are present (Fischer-Baum, Dickson, & Federmeier, 2014). Tasks themselves 
can therefore act as a context that influence N400 amplitude of a given stimulus.   
 
Contextual effects on N400: repetition effects 
More nuanced properties of semantic memory retrieval during word processing often rely 
on repetition effects to make inferences. Repetition designs, especially when there are multiple 
intervening items between repetitions, can be viewed similarly to tests of implicit memory. 
Specifically, the size of the reduction in N400 amplitude upon an item’s repetition can be 
interpreted as an indication of the extent to which the item was (recently) processed in semantic 
memory (i.e., more reduction implies more substantial semantic memory processing occurred). 
Put another way, when an item is still active in semantic memory, less new information about it 
must be brought to mind than when it was first presented to the system, and the N400 amplitude 
is therefore smaller on second presentation compared to first presentation. 
It was previously described that the amplitude on the N400 on initial presentation of 
wordforms in lists differentiates between words and word-like pseudowords (large N400 
amplitudes) and illegal strings of characters (smaller N400s) (Rugg & Nagy, 1987). When these 
items are repeated, both words and pseudowords are facilitated (smaller N400s) compared to 
their initial presentation – there is less new semantic information that needs to be accessed when 
they are seen a second time because of the processing that already occurred.  
Initial research suggested that strings of illegal characters did not have access to 
semantics because they did not show effects of repetition (Rugg & Nagy, 1987). However, it is 
the case that some strings of unpronounceable letters form an exception: acronyms. Meaningful 
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acronyms like “DVD”, which otherwise have small overall N400 amplitudes during first 
presentation (because they do not resemble real words), do show effects of repetition (Laszlo & 
Federmeier, 2007). The interpretation of this finding was that, unlike non-meaningful strings of 
letters, acronyms are able to make contact with existing representations in long-term memory, 
which promotes their retention in memory, and leads to their facilitation when they are presented 
a second time. A similar finding exists with visual items that participants do not have pre-
experimental exposure to: novel geometric shapes (“squiggles”), which sometimes might appear 
to be resemble a familiar object or creature. Shapes were categorized as familiar or unfamiliar, 
and repetition effects for each were measured within participants on the basis of their personal 
rating. When these effects were averaged across participants, it was found that only shapes that 
had been rated familiar (i.e., those which contacted existing semantic memory representations) 
elicited an N400 repetition effect (Voss, Schendan, & Paller, 2010).  
 Magnitude of repetition effects differ by length of lag, with the effect reducing in 
magnitude due to more time passing or due to more intervening items, as well as due to the depth 
of encoding required by the task, with effects being attenuated for a “shallow” task (just 
requiring detection of font size differences) compared to larger effects present for “deeper” 
encoding tasks like detection of particular semantic targets, or tasks that render otherwise 
forgettable items more relevant (Nagy & Rugg, 1989; Rugg, Furda, & Lorist, 1988; reviewed in 
Rugg & Doyle, 1994; Laszlo, Stites & Federmeier, 2012; cf, Bentin & Peled, 1990).  
In sum, the existence and magnitude of N400 repetition effects have a history of being 
used to make inferences about the nature of representations that are accessed in long-term 
memory and how well that information is retained over time. Such methods have never been 
systematically applied to numeral processing (e.g., is there a repetition effect for common Arabic 
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numerals like “24”?), but it seems likely that this relatively simple approach can also be 
informative for learning about the nature of how symbolic numbers are processed. 
 
Numerical cognition: arithmetic problem solving  
Educated adults can do more with Arabic numerals than assess individual digits for 
properties like magnitude – they can solve arithmetic problems, retrieving solutions through a 
series of operations or directly retrieving overlearned answers from long-term memory. 
Consistent with modern theories of semantic information in language representations, there is a 
(fairly dominant) model that during arithmetic fact retrieval, numerical information is accessed 
through spreading activations across a network of inter-related facts about arithmetic (Campbell 
& Graham, 1985; Campbell, 1987a; see reviews in Fayol & Seron, 2005; Brysbaet, 2005). 
At a behavioral level, this spreading of information leads to delayed RTs in verification 
tasks wherein subjects must respond to provided answers with a confirmation/rejection of the 
provided answer. In initial work using this task (instead of the production tasks that had 
dominated the literature), Campbell (1987b) observed delays in RT when participants needed to 
reject an answer as incorrect if that answer shared properties with the (not presented) correct 
answer. These associations between answer types in long-term memory are now understood to 
include confusions at the level of operation (e.g., delayed responses for 2 x 4 = 6, because 6 is 
the correct answer for the operation of addition; Winkelman & Schmidt, 1974; Zbrodoff & 
Logan, 1986), confusions at the level of digit (e.g., errors are typically consistent with the decade 
of the correct answer; Domahs, Delazer & Nuerk, 2004), and, finally, so-called table-related 
confusions in multiplication (e.g., 6 x 5 = 36 is difficult to reject because “36” is the correct 
answer for a different multiple of 6) (Stazyk, Ashcraft & Hamann, 1982; Campbell, 1987a,b). 
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This evidence is used to argue in support of a view of memory for symbolic numbers that is like 
a highly structured network, in contrast to earlier views that answer retrieval and verification was 
independent of other known arithmetic facts (Campbell & Graham, 1985, Campbell, 1987b). It is 
also the case that not all information is retrieved with the same level of ease; the problem-size 
effect, for instance, suggests that some parts of the network (involving smaller-numbered 
operations) are more accessible than other parts of the network (Campbell & Graham, 1985).  
There is also evidence for the use of strategies other than retrieval from a structured 
network to solve arithmetic problems (LeFevre et al., 1996), especially in developmental 
contexts (LeFevre, Smith-Chant, Hiscock, Daley, & Morris, 2003). Early models of decision 
making in verification tasks suggested that the processes involved took the form of “retrieve-
compare”, wherein an initial obligatory stage of answer retrieval was followed by answer 
comparison and response execution stages (Ashcraft & Battaglia, 1978). However, current 
behavioral evidence suggests that there are multiple routes to judging answer correctness in 
verification tasks, including the use of familiarity-based judgments (Zbradoff & Logan, 1990; 
Lochy, Seron, Delazer, & Butterworth, 2000; Campbell & Tarling, 1996), the strategic use of 
rule-based information like odd/even parity matching (Lemaire & Reder, 1999), as well as the 
use of direct comparison to retrieved answers (Ashcraft, Fierman, & Bartolotta, 1984).  
In general, the accumulated evidence suggests that behavioral results obtained in these 
verification tasks (i.e., delayed RTs) are the result of a sum of many internal cognitive processes, 
which leads to inferential difficulties. For example, are the reaction time delays due to conflicts 
at the level of responses or decisions, or are these memory confusions operating during even 
earlier stage of initial semantic long-term memory access? 
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 Investigations of the stages of processing involved in accessing long-term memories for 
arithmetic facts has been inspired by how language researchers used ERPs to approach similar 
questions in the domain of sentence processing, where there are also different kinds of 
comprehension difficulties as a result of the presentation of unexpected sentence-final words. A 
series of ERP findings will be reviewed, starting with an overview of the basic sentence 
processing literature and moving towards applications most relevant for addressing the question 
of why certain answers to arithmetic problems are harder to correctly reject as incorrect.  
 
N400 effects in sentence comprehension 
It is the case that, as coherent full sentences unfold, the N400 amplitude at each 
successive word linearly decreases on average. This implies that the amount of new semantic 
information that is revealed by each word is somewhat smaller than that of the previous word, so 
long as a sentence is unfolding such that it conveys a reasonable message (Payne, Lee & 
Federmeier, 2015; Van Petten & Kutas, 1990). By the final word of a coherent sentence, then, 
expected endings have very facilitated (small) N400 responses.  
When an unexpected word is encountered, it demands relatively more new semantic 
information to be accessed, and the N400 response is larger as a result. Although it is tempting to 
view this large N400 response to unexpected words as unusual, it is actually similar in magnitude 
to what might be seen in response to out-of-context single words that were provided no support, 
like words at the beginning of a sentence (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011).  
Beyond the extremes of expected versus unexpected sentence completions, the N400 
amplitude is more generally inversely related to the probability that participants would choose to 
end a sentence with the given item (a measure known as cloze probability). For example, given 
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the sentential context of, “He caught the pass and scored another touchdown. There was nothing 
he enjoyed more than a good game of _____”, the word “football” has a higher cloze probability 
than does the word “monopoly”. The N400 is consequently smaller (more facilitated) in response 
to the expected word “football” compared to the unexpected word “monopoly” (Federmeier & 
Kutas, 1999b). The most common account of this phenomenon is that it is due to the brain being 
more prepared to process the more congruous, expected input (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011).  
Even when words are matched for cloze probability, however, other factors can influence 
how prepared the system is to process them. For example, “baseball” is just as unexpected an 
ending as “monopoly” was in that example sentence (in norming studies, few to no people 
choose to end the sentence either way), but the N400 response to “baseball” is nonetheless 
reduced or facilitated compared to “monopoly”. The common explanation of this “related 
anomaly effect” is that this facilitation is the result of semantic overlap between the words 
“football” and “baseball” – they are related to one another in long-term semantic memory due to 
shared category membership (e.g., both are team sports involving athletics). Thus, even though 
“baseball” is technically unsupported by the context, it does not require as much new semantic 
information to become active as an unexpected item from a different, semantically unrelated 
category like board games does (Federmeier & Kutas 1999a; see also Thornhill & Van Petten, 
2012 for another case of N400 facilitation due to semantic relatedness).  
  
Late positive complexes in language comprehension and memory 
Following the N400, there are also often positive-going waveforms (generally referred to 
as making up the Late Positive Complex, LPC) that are typically larger in cases where some kind 
of additional cognitive processing (e.g., more memory retrieval) occurs. At the word-level, a late 
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positivity emerges after presentation of words that are more difficult to pronounce (e.g., “yacht”) 
relative to words that are more transparent in their spelling-to-sound correspondence (e.g., 
“saw”) when subjects are required to read the items out loud (Fischer-Baum et al., 2014). There 
is also an LPC in word repetition paradigms, with a larger LPC in response to repeated low-
frequency words compared to repeated high-frequency words (Rugg, 1990). During recognition 
paradigms in which subjects make old/new judgments on (potentially) previously seen items, 
those items correctly identified as old (often) elicit larger LPCs than do new items (e.g., Rugg & 
Nagy, 1989; Smith & Halgren, 1986; Van Petten & Senkfor, 1996).  
At the sentence level, there are larger LPCs in response to some kinds of unexpected 
endings and not others. In 2012, Van Petten and Luka reported that LPCs were present (if not 
reported) in approximately 33% of studies using sentence stimuli. Given the variety of eliciting 
conditions across the studies, how the LPCs were interpreted varies substantially at a mechanistic 
level, but it is generally agreed that positivities emerge when a stimulus is encountered that 
requires more extensive processing – for example, the retrieval of relatively more information 
from memory. There are also views that these later positivities are just a manifestation of the 
P300b, a component that emerges for task-relevant, probabilistically unexpected events and is 
linked to the updating of context (Donchin & Coles, 1988; Coulson, King & Kutas, 1998; 
Coulson, 1998).  
 
N400 effects across modalities, and earlier negativities 
 Given that these effects are interpreted at the level of semantics, which is defined fairly 
broadly to encompass any number of representational features, a reasonable question is how 
generalizable the findings are to other modalities. The answer seems to be that they generalize 
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well: sentences presented auditorily, and sentences that are completed with line drawings instead 
of words, replicate the general pattern with most facilitation for expected items, intermediate 
facilitation for unexpected items from the same category as the expected items, and least 
facilitation for unexpected items that are not from a different category (Federmeier & Kutas, 
2001; Federmeier, McLennan, de Ochoa & Kutas, 2002). However, these N400 effects often 
overlap or co-occur with other negativities that are more modality-specific in their functional 
properties. Even in word recognition studies there is a prior component, the N250, which is 
linked to processing at the orthographic, rather than semantic, level of analysis (e.g., Dickson & 
Federmeier, 2014). Similarly, in sentential completions and repetition designs using line 
drawings or pictures, the N400 congruity effect is preceded by earlier effects on a negative-going 
waveform that is often called the N300 (e.g., Federmeier & Kutas, 2001).  
Characterizations of the response properties of the N300 have reported that it patterns 
much like the N400, showing facilitation upon direct repetition or following semantic priming 
(Barrett & Rugg, 1990; McPherson & Holcomb, 1999). However, it has been more linked with 
the processing of higher-level object information than to the actual semantic content of the object 
per se (Schendan & Kutas, 2003; Schendan & Lucia, 2010). 
Additionally, although in sentential contexts it has been found to respond in a graded 
manner, with facilitation for semantically related picture endings compared to unrelated endings 
(Kutas & Federmeier, 2001), in designs wherein pictures are not presented following sentential 
contexts, the N300 has not been found not to be as sensitive to this level of semantics (e.g., in 
repetition priming, Holcomb & McPherson, 1999). The specifics of the negativities preceding 
the N400 are thus not as well defined as the N400 itself is, mostly because they appear under 
more restricted contexts (e.g., during picture viewing, face viewing, or during presentations of 
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stimuli to either visual field rather than in full central vision), but generally they are thought to be 
part of the overall attempt to take an input and connect it to knowledge of perceptual regularities 
(Federmeier, Kutas & Dickson, 2015 for a review of negativities preceding the N400 across 
modalities). 
 
Contextual effects in sentences and equations: direct comparison 
Researchers interested in the domain of numerical cognition have used the findings 
across modalities in the language and object recognition literatures as a model for how to use 
ERPs to answer their own questions about long-term memory access during arithmetic problem 
solving. Rather than having sentences set up a context, they instead have used arithmetic 
problems and examined the brain response across types of suggested answers (i.e., comparing 
correct, incorrect, and confusing answers instead of unexpected and expected sentence-final 
words). 
The question of how the effect of sentential congruity compares directly with the effect of 
answer correctness was addressed by one of the first studies to examine the ERP response to 
answers in the context of arithmetic problems (Niedeggen, Rösler, & Jost, 1999). In a within-
subjects design, the effect of congruity in sentences (responses to contextually 
expected/unexpected words) and the effect of correctness in numerical expressions (correct 
/incorrect answers to multiplication problems) were directly compared. They reported that both 
sentences and equations have a near-identical response pattern (N400 effects) when comparing 
effects of congruity in final words/answers.  
Studies of this kind have also looked at the response to incorrect answers that are known 
to be behaviorally confusing, which are conceptually similar to unexpected words that are 
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category-related (e.g., “baseball” when expecting “football”). As previously described, these 
table-related answers are derived by altering one of the existing operands in a multiplication 
problem. Given the operation “6 x 7”, the answer “36” is harder to categorize as being incorrect 
than is “40”, because “36” is the correct answer for the very similar operation of “6 x 6”. In 
ERPs, the related/incorrect answers elicited intermediate effects between correct and incorrect 
answers, including facilitation on the N400 compared to incorrect answers that were not related 
to the correct answer, so long as the incorrect/related answers were not too numerically distant 
from the correct answer (Niedeggen & Rösler, 1999; Niedeggen, et al., 1999). These results were 
interpreted as an indication that the semantic activation of correct answers spreads to 
similar/related answers at relatively early stages of processing (i.e., during initial contact with 
long-term memory), and that the source of associative confusions during production and 
verification is not only at downstream stages of responding and decision making.  
It should be noted, however, that this literature is currently undergoing some skeptical 
revisions. For example, Jasinski and Coch (2012) measured ERP responses to correct/incorrect 
solutions across all four major arithmetic operations. They reported a peak around 280ms 
(identified as belonging to the family of pre-N400 negativities like the N300) that was sensitive 
to answer expectancy (correctness), a P300b specific to correct answers (likened to target 
detection), and an LPC that was largest for incorrect answers and that they connected to 
plausibility assessment and double-checking. Notably, they did not find an N400 effect of 
correctness/expectancy. The authors argue that the previously reported N400-like effects might 
have been an artifact of using difference waves (which are generated by subtracting correct 
equation completions from incorrect ones) to identify the component (e.g., by Niedeggen, 
Rösler, & Jost 1999). Specifically, their claim is that the “N400”-looking effect was artificially 
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created through a mix of the P300 (larger positivity for correct answers) and N280 (larger 
negativity for incorrect answers) effects across conditions of correctness. Visual inspection of the 
original reports is consistent with this interpretation, although the plots are limited to few 
channels, and it is difficult to assess without full access to the original data.  
So what would this mean at a cognitive level? If the amplitude of the N400 is typically 
thought to reflect new semantic information becoming active, and if there is no difference on this 
component in response to different types of arithmetic answers, then it would seem to suggest 
that mathematical knowledge may be different from other kinds of general semantic information 
that gets accessed when meaningful items are being processed. The N280 might be more similar 
to the family of negativities seen prior to the N400 in picture-processing tasks like the N300, 
which also show effects of expectancy and congruity. Given that N300 effects are almost always 
directly followed by N400 effects, and that they often pattern in very similar ways, it is unclear 
what they would mean in isolation, especially given that their previous eliciting conditions have 
been in response to line drawings rather than symbolic numbers.  
More work is thus necessary to definitively characterize the waveforms of interest in 
order to better understand the cognitive mechanisms involved in arithmetic. This forms the 
motivation for Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 1, I will first attempt to replicate the original 
report of relatedness effects in arithmetic on the N400 component using modified stimuli and a 
more robust sample (the original reports used 12-16 participants). Experiments 1 and 2 will 
further examine these effects by exploiting differences in the neurobiological organization of 
brain structures involved in arithmetic processing versus language processing. Specifically, 
whereas there are well-known differences in how language processing unfolds across the 
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cerebral hemispheres, the potential for hemispheric differences is not typically considered in 
arithmetic processing.  
The evidence for these neurobiological differences in arithmetic and language processing, 
and how they can be applied to better distinguish between the ERP effects of interest, are 
reviewed below. 
 
Brain network in numerical cognition (arithmetic) 
In an early, foundational study of the areas of the brain involved in number processing, 
four critical tasks were compared: multiplication, subtraction, digit naming, and number (size) 
comparison. All four tasks commonly activated a bilateral fronto-parietal network (relative to a 
baseline letter naming control task), with the frontal part being attributed to working memory 
and executive control processes (not specific to arithmetic) and the parietal involvement more 
specifically attributed to number/mathematical processing (Chochon, Cohen, Moortele, & 
Dehaene, 1999).  
This fronto-parietal network engaged by arithmetic and number processing has been 
replicated many times, although more careful distinctions are now made between the 
intraparietal sulcus (IPS) activity and the activity in the superior parietal lobe (SPL) (see, e.g., 
Rosenberg-Lee, Chang, Young, Wu & Menon, 2011). One group applied TSM to the IPS and 
SPL of either cerebral hemisphere while participants solved arithmetic (multiplication and 
subtraction) problems, and they found both longer RTs and more errors as a result of TMS to 
either right or left IPS (but no effect of TMS to the SPL). Notably, the higher errors in 
multiplication were due to subjects providing table-related incorrect answers (Andres, Pelgrims, 
Michaux, Olivier & Pesenti, 2011). Since IPS activity being disrupted resulted in poorer 
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outcomes for both multiplication and subtraction, the processing performed in this region – in 
both hemispheres – was interpreted as serving a more functionally causal role.  
This largely bilateral fronto-parietal network for arithmetic stands in contrast with written 
language processing in two fundamental ways: first, the language-processing network is 
traditionally more left-lateralized, whereas the findings with arithmetic in the parietal lobe 
suggest more bilateral involvement, and secondly, language processing is generally associated 
with a fronto-temporal network (with the parietal lobe playing different roles in different 
accounts, e.g., Lau, Phillips, Poeppel, 2008; Price, 2012). 
Relatively little deliberate attention has been paid to hemispheric differences in 
arithmetic ability, but the many reports that do exist suggest there are substantial differences (cf., 
Andres et al, 2011). The precise nature of the capabilities of each hemisphere remains elusive 
because of differences in skills being tested (e.g., arithmetic knowledge, magnitude judgment 
abilities, processing of Arabic digits, dot pattern assessments) and because of differences in the 
methods used to derive inferences: lesions (e.g., Warrington, 1982), callosotomized patients 
(e.g., Funnel, Colvin, Gazzaniga, 2007), and visual field manipulations in non-brain damaged 
individuals (e.g., Katz, 1980; Klein & McInnes, 1988; Castro, Sumich, Premkumar, & Jones, 
2014).  
These findings, which uniformly suggest that differences exist (although they disagree 
about what the differences are), have not permeated the broader field of number cognition the 
way that processing differences across the hemispheres in language have. Although there has 
been no use of ERPs to study hemispheric differences in arithmetic processing, a review of 
language research in this domain will serve to demonstrate the utility of the approach of using 
ERPs to study hemispheric differences during long-term memory access. 
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Hemispheric differences in sentence processing: evidence from ERPs 
The known biases in language processing to the left hemisphere of the brain has 
motivated interest in examining hemispheric differences in sentence processing, and many of the 
previously discussed EPR effects at the level of both words and sentences have been found to be 
affected by manipulations that bias the hemisphere responsible for processing the input (e.g., at 
the sentence level, Federmeier & Kutas, 1999b, 2002; at the word level, Dickson & Federmeier, 
2014). This work employs the method of visual half-field presentation, which biases initial 
processing of an input either to the left hemisphere (stimulus presented to the right visual field, 
LH/RVF) or to right hemisphere (stimulus presented to the left visual field, RH/LVF). For a 
review of the efficacy of this technique and comparison to “split-brain” patient work, see Banich 
(2002). Interhemispheric transfer of some kind is likely. However, inferences typically rely on 
the presence/absence of effects across hemispheres, which are difficult to explain if one 
hemisphere is really communicating all of its information to the other. The information that does 
transfer from the stimulated visual field/hemisphere appears to be substantially impoverished.  
In order to compare how each hemisphere uses context to activate semantics for 
upcoming words, participants read the sentences that have been previously described in central 
presentation as normal (e.g., “He caught the pass and scored another touchdown. There was 
nothing he enjoyed more than a good game of _____”), but then the ending types (e.g., expected: 
“football”, unexpected but within-category/related: “baseball”, and unexpected/unrelated: 
“monopoly”) were lateralized to one visual field or the other, seemingly at random. Interestingly, 
the intermediate N400 facilitation for the unexpected/category-related items was only present in 
the LH/RVF condition. The RH/LVF showed no difference between the different kinds of 
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unexpected items. This was interpreted as suggesting that the RH does not activate the semantic 
network of the expected word prior to it being presented (Federmeier & Kutas, 1999b).  
When the lateralized completions to the same sentences were in the format of pictures, 
the same pattern of results across the hemispheres obtained: whereas the RH did not distinguish 
between types of unexpected items (related/unrelated), the LH did show N400 facilitation for 
category-related unexpected endings (Federmeier & Kutas, 2002). The N300 component did not 
show this effect of lateralization, instead showing facilitation for the category-related unexpected 
endings in both visual fields. The general conclusions from this line of work are that the 
hemispheres access semantics through different mechanisms during online sentence 
comprehension (for review, see Federmeier, 2007).  
The specific question being addressed in Experiment 1, then, is what happens when 
different types of arithmetic answers are presented in either VF. Do the findings of LH-specific 
facilitation for related items replicate, and, if so, on what particular ERP component (N300? 
N400? LPC?)? Given the anticipated results (i.e., that there will be some kind of difference 
across the hemispheres), Experiment 2 – a purely behavioral experiment – is then necessary to 
interpret the practical significance of the findings. 
 
Symbolic number processing out of arithmetic contexts 
So far, the proposed work seems to assume that the most interesting and relevant way to 
approach the study of the long-term memory representation of symbolic numbers is in the 
context of arithmetic processing. In daily life, this is probably not actually when adults most 
often encounter and use symbolic numbers. They are also used during more generic 
measuring/counting tasks (e.g., “2” spoons of sugar, denoting speed limits) or as unique 
identifiers (e.g., credit card numbers, confirmation numbers), among other contexts (e.g., sports 
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jerseys) that do not directly involve arithmetic calculations. When people view symbolic 
numbers in these other contexts, what is the nature of the representation being activated?  
It is clear from my prior work with word stimuli that the goal or emphasis of the task 
influences what properties of stimuli are brought to mind – i.e., only when participants actually 
had to name a word out loud were effects of spelling-to-sound regularity observed (in the form of 
an LPC to low-frequency irregular words like “yatch”). When participants were just reading the 
list of items to detect proper names, no LPC to these same items was observed (Fischer-Baum et 
al., 2014). Also, as previously reviewed, depth of encoding influences the size of repetition 
effects (e.g., Rugg et al., 1988). One particular finding was that items that typically fail to elicit 
repetition effects (non-meaningful strings of unpronounceable letters like “TXRM”), do elicit 
repetition effects when the task forces them to be assessed more carefully – in the case of Laszlo, 
Stites and Federmeier (2012), this was found by having participants perform a modified lexical 
decision task in which meaningful acronyms (which are also strings of unpronounceable letters) 
were a potential target.  
Taken together, one implication of these results is that symbolic representations of 
number like Arabic numerals should be able to elicit a repetition effect, when they are viewed in 
a list format one-by-one, although no studies to my knowledge have deliberately attempted to 
demonstrate this systemically. It is also possible that the overall magnitude of the effect might 
differ as a function of task. Notably, no one has tried to characterize the general properties of 
ERPs to these numerals outside the context of arithmetic problems. We already know that, under 
some contexts, there is an N400 effect of frequency in the ERP response to words. Of interest, 
then, is whether or not there a similar effect (on the N300, N400, or LPC) in response to 
numerals, instead sensitive to the amount of quality of experience an individual has with a given 
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numeral. These questions motivate Experiments 3 and 4, which will further explore how 
symbolic numbers are represented in long-term memory, but using a repetition design with 
multiple tasks instead of embedding numbers only in the context of arithmetic expressions. 
 
Summary and current studies 
In the event-related potential (ERP) literature on the processing of mathematical 
expressions, there is currently controversy over whether or not, or to what extent, their 
completions (the answers) are processed similarly to how final words are processed in sentences 
– with specific interest in whether effects of contextual congruity are on the N400 component or 
not. Additionally, in the broader literature of cognitive neuroscience there are reasons to suspect 
that mathematical skills and knowledge are distributed differently across the hemispheres of the 
brain than are the skills and knowledge relevant for language use. In particular, whereas 
language is generally dominated by left-lateralized regions in a fronto-temporal network, 
mathematics (and the more general “number sense”) seems to be more distributed across both 
hemispheres in a fronto-parietal network.  
In Experiment 1, therefore, the present work will test the boundaries of just how similar 
the processing of numbers in context is compared to words in sentences by biasing processing of 
numbers across the hemispheres (via visual half-field presentation) to see whether the patterns in 
each visual field/hemisphere that have previously been reported for word stimuli also appear for 
correct (expected) answers, incorrect (unexpected/unrelated) answers, and incorrect table-related 
(unexpected/related) numerical stimuli. 
 At a behavioral level, although there is substantial research on how answers to arithmetic 
problems are retrieved, there is seemingly no accompanying literature in healthy populations on 
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hemispheric differences in these particular skills. In language research, it is generally found that 
the left hemisphere “wins” when presented with verbal challenges of many kinds (e.g., Babkoff 
& Faust, 1988; Jordan, Patching, & Milner, 2000). In order to draw inferences about the results 
from the ERP findings, a basic behavioral measurement of skill assessment in the same task is 
useful. Thus, in Experiment 2, participants will be presented with the same materials as in 
Experiment 1, but will instead have their reaction times and accuracies measured. 
 When assessing the ERP response to Arabic numerals in context, there has rarely been 
joint consideration of the properties of the out-of-context numerals as potentially meaningful 
objects by themselves. This is in contrast with language research, which has a long history of 
focusing on out-of-context individual words (which nevertheless always have a broader task 
context).  From that work, the field knows that a number of properties influence the basic ERP 
response to words themselves, such as frequency and orthographic structure, and this knowledge 
allows researchers to make inferences about how word knowledge is organized in the brain. 
Similarly, effects of priming and repetition at the word level provide indications for how 
memories for these words are accessed and related to one another. Knowledge about how 
information associated with numerals is structured and accessed from memory is comparatively 
limited, and, in order to understand how such information is accessed in the context of 
expressions (Exp. 1-2), it is necessary to better understand the nature of how meaning processing 
unfolds for the out-of-context representations.  
Therefore, in Experiment 3, numerals will be presented in a repetition design in order to 
characterize the basic properties of responses to them. In word recognition studies, it is already 
known that both initial responses and repetition patterns differ across types of task. Participants’ 
attention will be therefore be focused at different levels of analysis of Arabic numerals: in a task 
	 24	
focusing on visual properties (the “matching” task), in a task emphasizing arithmetic fact 
retrieval (the “divisor” task), and in a task requiring conceptual magnitude assessment (the 
“quantifier” task). The results of Experiment 3 will in turn strengthen the interpretability of 
Experiment 1, in part because it will allow an examination of the ERP response to numerals 
without the presence of decision-related components (e.g., P300), as the critical task 
manipulations will always be on stimuli that are only seen after the initial, target number 
presentation. 
Finally, Experiment 4 will address the possibility of non-uniformity in numeral 
processing at an item level. The same basic design as Experiment 3 will be used (numerals 
incidentally repeating), except that participants will perform a familiarity judgment task (i.e., a 
“yes” judgment might be given because it is their apartment number). This allows for repetition 
effects on the N400 and other memory retrieval components (i.e., LPC) to be compared within a 
single task but across item types whose long-term memory representations might vary.  
  
	 25	
CHAPTER 2 
Experiment 1: Hemispheric differences in arithmetic fact evaluation as revealed by ERPs 
 
Introduction 
The most visible characteristic of the organizational structure of the human brain is that it 
is made up of two cerebral hemispheres. Although their cellular and broader neurobiological 
makeup is very similar, cognitive functions are often strongly lateralized to one hemisphere or 
the other, and this division of labor between the hemispheres seems to be an important principle 
of typical neural functionality. The first report of such cognitive lateralization –for language 
production in the left hemisphere – was integral to the foundation of neuropsychology as a field 
(Broca, 1865). Interest in lateralization of cognitive specialties has since expanded outside of the 
language domain, with research spanning broad topics such as hemispheric differences in 
sensitivity to different spatial frequencies (Sergent & Hellige, 1986; Christman, Kitterle, & 
Hellige, 1991), in attentional biases in global versus local features of an object (Martin, 1979), 
and in bottom-up versus top-down processing (Federmeier, 2007), among others. Here, our 
report will focus on another domain of research that has been devoting increasing attention to the 
processing mechanisms and abilities of each hemisphere: numerical cognition, and arithmetic 
processing in particular. 
An interesting analogy can be formed between sentence reading (language) and 
arithmetic expression reading (math), which might suggest shared underlying cognitive 
processes. Sentences are made up of subparts (words) that are systemically combined to convey 
a potentially coherent message, and, similarly, arithmetic equations are made up of subparts 
(numbers) with combinatorial symbols (+, %, x, -) that can be sensibly completed (e.g., 4 x 5 = 
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20) or not. At the same time, there is clear evidence that there are important differences in the 
neural systems that are engaged in these two processes: at a whole-brain level, whereas sentence 
and word reading is largely associated with fronto-temporal activity (Lau, Phillips, Poeppel, 
2008; Price, 2012), mathematical expression and number processing is more associated with 
fronto-parietal activity (Chochon, Cohen, Moortele, & Dehaene, 1999). Although the specific 
subregions involved seem to differ across math and language, it remains unclear to what extent 
the two share similar patterns of hemispheric lateralization overall, given the complexities of the 
subprocesses involved and the somewhat mixed evidence in the existing literature (described 
below). Therefore, the aim of this study is to use a combination of techniques novel to this field 
to examine the lateralization of function for arithmetic and to then compare it with prior results 
using the same techniques to study language lateralization. 
Within the domain of mathematical cognition, the dominant perspective is that 
lateralization of function and its relationship to language depends heavily on the numerical skill 
being tested (Dehaene & Cohen, 1995). If the skill is retrieval of exact facts from memory (e.g., 
during multiplication), then this has been linked to verbal abilities, and has been more associated 
with language processing and the left hemisphere. However, if the numerical skill being tapped 
is instead more about approximation or basic number comparison (e.g., judging the size of 
relative quantities), then there is less association with language, and, in turn, more association 
with bilateral function. The evidence for each of these claims follows, starting with the 
relationship between lateralization of language function and memorized arithmetic facts 
(typically multiplication), and then proceeding through the evidence that more general 
numerosity concepts can be independent of left-lateralized language abilities.   
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In the particular domain of mathematical expression processing, calculation impairments 
in patients with unilateral brain lesions have been relatively more associated with damage to the 
left hemisphere (Jackson & Warrington, 1986, Rosselli & Ardila, 1989; Ashcraft, Yamashita, & 
Aram, 1992). Furthermore, in patients with severed corpus collosums (i.e., “split-brain” 
patients), when the right hemisphere alone is forced to perform arithmetic, severe impairments 
are reported, particularly in multiplication (Gazzaniga & Smylie, 1984; Funnell, Colvin, & 
Gazzaniga, 2007). In contrast, the isolated left hemisphere is typically able to perform these 
arithmetic tasks above chance. When patients with left hemisphere lesions were specifically 
examined for extent and type impairments to their language and numerical skills, it was found 
that more severe language impairments were correlated with impairments in quantitative abilities 
– again, particularly for multiplication (Delazer, Girelli, Semenza, & Denez, 1999). This 
evidence forms the basis for the argument that arithmetic fact retrieval is dependent on left-
lateralized language processing abilities. 
That language processing, and production in particular, tends to be lateralized to the left 
hemisphere is one of the most well-known features of brain organization (e.g., Geschwind 
Levitsky, 1968). However, in many individuals, language production is instead lateralized to the 
right hemisphere (Binder et al., 1996; Bishop, 2013). For neurosurgeons, identifying the 
lateralization of language in a patient often forms a critical part of their presurgical assessment 
process, which is achieved through a procedure known as the Wada test (in which amobarbital is 
injected into each of the left and right carotid arteries in turn, to examine the abilities of the 
unaffected hemisphere, Wada & Rasmussen, 1960). An interesting question, then, is what 
happens to arithmetic skills when language is lateralized to the right hemisphere?  
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When patients for whom the lateralization of both language and arithmetic skills were 
both assessed, the lateralization of language influenced the arithmetic abilities of each 
hemisphere. Specifically, if language was left-lateralized, then the isolated right hemisphere was 
impaired at performing multiplication, whereas, if language was right-lateralized or bilateral, 
then the isolated right hemisphere was above chance at multiplication (Delazer, Karner, 
Unterberger, Wasler, Waldenberger, Trinka & Benke, 2005). This suggests that it is not just a 
coincidence that both language and arithmetic skills tend to be left-lateralized. Instead, they seem 
to track each other, either due to a shared reliance on a higher-level processing mechanism that 
itself tends to be lateralized, or because arithmetic skills actually depend on language abilities (as 
is suggested by the association between level of language impairment and level of arithmetic 
impairment). 
The most extreme versions of this conclusion – that, without language, there can be no 
arithmetic fact knowledge, and that the contralateral hemisphere has no involvement in 
arithmetic processing  – is unlikely and must still contend with evidence for dissociations 
between these abilities. For example, there is evidence from a TMS study that both hemispheres 
are causally involved in answer generation for multiplication problems (Andres, Pelgrims, 
Michaux, Olivier & Pesenti, 2011). There has also been a long history of reporting case studies 
of patients for whom language and arithmetic abilities are dissociable. In several cases of 
patients with semantic dementia, which is a progressive neurodegenerative disorder featuring 
loss of semantic memory (especially in word comprehension), there are reports of successful 
retention of some (or all) arithmetic skills (Diesfeldt, 1993; Cappelletti, Butterworth, & 
Kopelman, 2001, 2012; Crutch & Warrington, 2002). However, even in these reports, it is often 
the case that multiplication is the most impaired arithmetic ability when verbal memory is 
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compromised. Thus, although there is some evidence implicating right hemisphere involvement 
in production of multiplication problem answers, there seems to be a strong relationship between 
left hemisphere language abilities and the production of answers to multiplication problems. 
Outside of the domain of producing exact answers to arithmetic problems from verbal 
memory, and in the domain of symbolic and non-symbolic number comparison, the dependence 
on left-lateralized language abilities is much less apparent. Instead, there are reports that both 
hemispheres can compare symbolic numbers for their relative size (Colvin, Funnell, & 
Gazzaniga, 2005). Indeed, there is evidence directly linking developmental changes in 
subregions of the right hemisphere’s parietal lobe with successful acquisition of symbolic and 
non-symbolic magnitude judgment abilities (Holloway & Ansari, 2010), and evidence from TMS 
demonstrating that disruption of these right hemisphere areas results in lower performance on 
tests of automatic magnitude judgment abilities (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2007). 
Along with magnitude judgments, the right hemisphere also seems to be able to engage in 
generating answers to arithmetic problems through approximation or through step-by-step 
deliberative procedures. For example, the same left hemisphere lesion patients who can fail to 
report multiplication answers often retain explicit knowledge of arithmetic operations and the 
ability to deliberately apply this knowledge in addition and subtraction (e.g., Cohen, Dehaene, 
Chochon, Lehéricy, & Naccache, 2000). In one case study, errors in addition and subtraction 
were only small distances from the correct answer, suggesting that they were produced through 
tracking and manipulating conceptual quantities and magnitudes (Funnell, Colvin, & Gazzaniga, 
2007).  
In sum, it would appear that the right hemisphere’s numerical ability is limited to answer 
approximation and magnitude judgments, leaving the performance of exact recall of 
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mathematical arithmetic facts as the domain of the left hemisphere (Dehaene, Spelke, Pinel, 
Stanescu, & Tsivkin, 1999). However, there are still several aspects of this research field which 
remain relatively unexamined: (1) the specializations of the hemispheres seem to rely on skills 
that unfold under different timescales, but no time-sensitive neural measures are reported, and 
(2) the reports at the level of the hemisphere (i.e., in commissurotomized patients) rely on some 
kind of end-state explicit report from the participant, which renders failures to succeed difficult 
to interpret because it is unclear at what level of processing the failure occurred. In general, these 
gaps leave it ambiguous whether, for example, the right hemisphere generates exact correct 
answers and then undergoes another process that renders those answers difficult to access and 
report, or whether the right hemisphere simply is not a reliable independent source from which to 
generate the exact answers to multiplication problems.  
At present, since there are no studies using time-sensitive measures to understand how 
the processing of equations dynamically unfolds across the hemispheres, these questions remain 
open. Addressing this gap is critical given how quickly the answer evaluation process occurs – 
people are able to verify the correctness of simple arithmetic problems easily after less than a 
second of exposure to the problem, but whether there are differences in exactly when and how 
this occurs in each hemisphere is currently undetermined. Fortunately, a successful and 
productive technique for addressing this type of question has already been developed in order to 
answer similar questions in the language domain. 
Indeed, over a decade of research has combined visual half-field presentation with event-
related potentials (ERPs, a time-sensitive neural measure) to examine how the hemispheres 
differently apprehend words for meaning under different types of priming conditions (Kandhadai 
& Federmeier, 2010; Dickson & Federmeier, 2014) and different types of sentential contexts 
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(Federmeier & Kutas, 1999b; Wlotko & Federmeier, 2007). In the visual half-field technique, 
items of interest are presented to subjects lateralized to either visual field, which provides 
processing advantages to the contralateral hemisphere (i.e., items presented in the periphery of 
the left visual field will be preferentially apprehended by the right hemisphere, and vice verse for 
items in the right visual field). Although the hemispheres are still connected via the corpus 
collosum, such that interhemispheric communication will eventually be possible, the advantage 
afforded by direct stimulation is substantial and what information does become shared is both 
delayed and degraded (see Banich, 2002, for review).   
 Under central presentation conditions, a handful of studies have used ERPs to examine 
arithmetic processing as it unfolds, typically with an equation presented item by item, followed 
by an answer that is presented for verification (e.g., Niedeggen & Rösler, 1999, Niedeggen, 
Rösler & Jost, 1999; Jasinski & Coch, 2012). Researchers have then used this paradigm to 
examine the timecourse with which the provided answer’s fit to the prior equation is assessed, 
enabling them to answer questions about when and how the system appreciates that the answer 
was correct or incorrect. The present study’s approach will be to use this same procedure while 
also lateralizing the answers to either visual field in order to uncover possible differences across 
time in the hemispheres’ sensitivity to answer types in arithmetic problems.  
At present, there are no such studies using this approach to examine how the timecourse 
of mathematical answer evaluation proceeds within each of the two hemispheres. The current 
paper’s primary goal, then, is to begin to fill this gap in the literature by recording ERP responses 
to answers to multiplication problems when the processing is biased to either hemisphere. 
Multiplication was chosen as the operation since we wanted to draw comparisons with 
hemispheric differences in language comprehension, and this operation is most closely 
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associated with verbal language processing (as previously reviewed). Due to the relative novelty 
of the particular manipulations and stimulus set, we will also report the ERP responses to the 
same answers in standard, central visual presentation as well. 
Since no one has examined responses to any arithmetic problems with ERPs in either 
visual field before, we will describe what has been found in language studies in each hemisphere 
to provide a basis of comparison. In ERP studies of language processing, each of the 
hemispheres have consistently demonstrated that they can distinguish between expected and 
unexpected sentence-final words (Federmeier & Kutas, 1999a, Federmeier, Mai, & Kutas, 2005). 
If the verbal retrieval that occurs during multiplication is similar, then this suggests that both 
hemispheres might similarly be able to categorize correct from incorrect answers to arithmetic 
problems, counter to the current suggestion that only the left hemisphere has access to these 
exact answers.  
However, the effect of correctness might not manifest on the same component in 
arithmetic and sentence processing. In language studies, this effect is seen on a component linked 
to semantic memory access, the N400. It is unclear whether clear N400 effects obtain in 
arithmetic processing: although early work identified such effects as an N400, more recent 
studies have made a strong case that the effect is actually driven by a form of the P300, which 
instead reflects categorization and updating of working memory and is larger (more positive) for 
target items (Donchin & Coles, 1988; also see Jasinski & Coch, 2012; for an elegant re-
examination of the component identification in this paradigm; and, for an example of a typical-
looking target P300 response to correct answers when participants have sufficient time to 
generate the answer, see Fig. 2 in Domahs, Domahs, Schlesewsky, Ratinckx, Verguts, Willmes, 
Nuerk, 2007, and compare it to Fig. 1, when they participants have less time to prepare for the 
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answer). Even in cases where sensitivity on a negative-going component that resembles the N400 
appears to be the case, there is a following positivity that renders analysis of the prior negativity 
ambiguous (see Fig. 5 of Niedeggen, Rösler, & Jost, 1999, where only one scalp channel is 
plotted).  
Following this interpretation, we expect to see a P300 effect related to correctness and 
will be focusing on its amplitude and timing (which is linked to stimulus evaluation time and, as 
such, tends to correlate with reaction times) (Kutas, McCarthy & Donchin, 1977). A relevant 
first question to address, then, is whether both hemispheres categorize correct answers as correct 
(and distinct from incorrect answers that are more easily confusable with correct answers), and, 
if they do, whether this categorization completed at the same speed in each hemisphere, as 
indexed by P300 latency.  
Whereas basic appreciation of congruity seems to be similar across the hemispheres in 
language (and remains to be examined in the context of arithmetic), other manipulations on 
sentence-final completions have revealed striking hemispheric differences. In particular, 
subtypes of unexpected sentence final words are processed differently in the two hemispheres. 
When unexpected endings that came from the same semantic category as the expected ending 
(e.g., “apples” when the expected ending was “oranges”) were presented as well as unexpected 
endings that came from a different semantic category as the expected ending (e.g., “carrots", 
which are not as closely related to “oranges”), only under right visual field/left hemisphere 
(RVF/LH) presentation conditions was there facilitation on the N400 for the semantically related 
unexpected ending. In the left visual field/right hemisphere (LVF/RH), the unexpected, within-
category item (“apples”) was processed similarly to the across-category item (“carrots”), 
consistent with an interpretation in which only the left hemisphere pre-activated the semantics 
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including (and surrounding) the most expected final word. In sum, to the LVF/RH, both subtypes 
of unexpected items were distinguished from the expected items (and were not different from 
each other), whereas the RVF/LH distinguished between all three types of completions. 
In the interest of comparing these kinds of verbal memory processes across domains, it 
was of interest to include two types of unexpected (incorrect) answers, one which might be more 
related in long-term memory to the expected ending than the other. Drawing on the existing 
multiplication fact retrieval and production literature, which suggests that knowledge of 
multiplication answers is organized in a table-like fashion (wherein multiples of a given operand 
relatively more confusable with each other than with multiples of another operand), we included 
both table-related and table-unrelated incorrect answers, to be compared with correct answers. 
With this manipulation, incorrect related answers are correct answers for a different problem that 
shares an operand with the presented problem (e.g., given the problem setup “6 x 7”, an incorrect 
related answer would be “36”, the correct answer to “6 x 6”), whereas incorrect unrelated 
answers do have have property (e.g., given the problem setup “6 x 7”, an incorrect unrelated 
answer would be “40”, which is not evenly divisible by 6 or 7 but is still numerically close to the 
correct answer of “42”). In production studies, the most common type of error is this type of 
incorrect related answer (which also take longer to reject than the incorrect unrelated answers in 
verification paradigms), presumably because of their heightened confusability in long-term 
memory with correct answers (Campbell & Graham, 1985; Campbell, 1987). 
Neural evidence for how sensitive each hemisphere is to this type of manipulation in 
multiplication is limited, and in particular there is no literature (to our knowledge) on how 
patients who have undergone commissurotomies respond in their separate hemispheres to these 
answer types. If one takes the existing evidence to indicate that all multiplication fact knowledge 
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is relatively more left-lateralized, including table-relatedness, one might expect that a similar 
manipulation of subtypes of incorrect (unexpected) answers would find only RVF/LH 
differentiation between incorrect answers that are unrelated to the context generating the correct 
answer and incorrect answers that are highly related to the context generating the expected 
correct answer.  
Additionally, at a mechanistic level, the left hemisphere relatedness effect in language is 
often argued to reflect the pre-activation of the expected ending. If the same predictive 
mechanism is at play during arithmetic processing, then this reasoning would also predict a 
relatedness effect for arithmetic answers selective to the left hemisphere. On the other hand, 
some of what the right hemisphere has been argued to do in arithmetic tasks is more methodical 
and deliberative – breaking down the problems into steps since direct retrieval mechanisms seem 
not as effective (e.g., Funnell, Colvin, & Gazzaniga, 2007). This kind of processing could 
potentially also lead to a relatedness effect, but it would likely unfold more slowly across time. 
Thus, identifying when and how the hemispheres might differently distinguish between subtypes 
of incorrect answers forms not only an important inroad to relating lateralization during 
arithmetic processing with lateralization during language processing, but also will provide novel 
information about the nature of relatedness effects and contextual congruency in arithmetic 
processing in each hemisphere in general. 
Once again, the precise component that might show this differential effect across 
hemispheres is again unlikely to be the same in arithmetic and language. When incorrect 
unrelated answers have been presented in ERP studies in central vision, the majority of the effect 
manifests after the initial P300, in the form of a late positivity for incorrect unrelated items 
relative to incorrect related item. Again, initial reports of this identified the effect as arising on 
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the N400 and drew inferences about the structure of semantic memory for table-relatedness 
(Niedeggen & Rösler, 1999; Niedeggen & Rösler, & Jost, 1999), however, the co-occurrence of 
the P300 in the same timewindow renders the independent assessment of the N400 amplitude 
difficult. The bulk of the effect of relatedness is typically much later (see Domahs et al, 2007, for 
an example of a late relatedness effect). As such, the critical measure for sensitivity to the factor 
of relatedness is likely to be in comparisons of the size (or presence) of this late positivity in each 
hemisphere. 
Our findings will add important new knowledge about how each hemisphere represents 
mathematical knowledge and uses that information during online processing. If it is the case that 
both hemispheres are equally sensitive to answer correctness, then that would imply that the 
poorly performing right hemisphere (in patients with left hemisphere damage) is able to 
recognize the correct answer at some level, but then might be experiencing a bottleneck in 
communicating that knowledge externally (in contrast with the common interpretation that the 
right hemisphere on its own doesn’t contain this information). We believe this outcome is 
possible due to the large body of evidence that both hemispheres are sensitive to expectancy in 
language – albeit on a different ERP component. 
Also of great interest will be the pattern of sensitivity to answer relatedness. A finding 
that the left hemisphere is most sensitive to this variable would be consistent with the idea that 
multiplication facts are stored in a left-lateralized verbal memory store. However, given that this 
sensitivity in central vision has largely been seen on a late positive component rather than on the 
N400 (c.f., Niedeggen and Rosler, 1999, whose difference wave plots leave the exact 
componentry ambiguous), the direct linking of semantic memory, the left hemisphere, and 
relatedness seems unlikely in this paradigm. Instead, a late relatedness effect in the left 
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hemisphere might imply that the left hemisphere fully processes multiple levels of provided 
answers when assessing them. Interestingly, given that the right hemisphere has been linked with 
more algorithmic processing of arithmetic problems, it also seems possible that the right 
hemisphere could show relatedness effects. In combination with a lack of an effect for 
relatedness in the left hemisphere, such a finding would indicate that the right hemisphere plays a 
particularly important (and, as yet, underspecified) role in thoroughly analyzing answers. 
Our use of ERPs in this study affords us the ability to examine how each hemisphere 
apprehends and responds to answer types in real time, which will importantly permit us to make 
novel inferences and construct a broader understanding of hemispheric differences in the domain 
of arithmetic. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
Data were analyzed from 30 young adults who were recruited from the University of 
Illinois community and compensated with either course credit or cash ($10/hour). Participants 
consented in accordance with the Institutional Review Board of the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign. All participants were right-handed native monolingual English speakers (15 
female, 15 male) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and no early exposure to a second 
language, history of brain trauma, or current use of psychoactive medications.  Their mean age 
was 20.3 years old (Range: 18-23), and their mean laterality quotient on the Edinburgh 
handedness inventory (Oldfield, 1971) was 0.85 (Range: 0.45 - 1.00, with 1.0 indicating strongly 
	 38	
right-handed and -1.0 strongly left-handed). Nine participants reported having a left-handed 
biological family member. 
In order to reach our target of 30 participants, we collected data from a total of 33 
participants because three had to be dropped prior to analysis due to excessive noise either in the 
global recording or in an individual channel.  
 
Stimuli 
 Participants saw familiar multiplication problems presented sequentially on the screen 
(e.g., 3 … x … 4 … = … 12). All 60 critical multiplication problem stems had single digit 
operands. The only single digit operations that were not included were ones for which creation of 
all the necessary answer types was not feasible due to how small the operand numbers were: 2 x 
3 (and its counterpart 3 x 2), and 2 x 4 (and its counterpart 4 x 2). Square operations (e.g., 6 x 6) 
were included.   
 Answer types were either Correct, Incorrect Unrelated, or Incorrect Related. Since 
Correct answers are naturally distributed to be even numbers about 75% of the time (odd 
answers are only the result of an odd number times another odd number), both types of Incorrect 
answers were forced to match this naturally-existing distribution of even numbers. Thus, critical 
Correct answers were 73% even, Incorrect Unrelated answers were 72% even, and Incorrect 
Related answers were 75% even. The average answer size participants encountered was about 36 
(mean = 36.35), including all Correct/Incorrect answer types. 
Incorrect Unrelated answers were generated by taking the Correct answer and either 
adding and subtracting a number between 1 and 5 to it (with rare cases of 6 when 5 or less 
generated related answers), thus allowing the creation of Incorrect Unrelated answers that were 
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even in the desired distribution and also that deviated from the Correct answer in an 
unpredictable manner. Incorrect Unrelated answers were also deliberately selected so as not to 
accidentally be a correct answer to the sum of the operands (e.g., 5 x 2 = 7 was not permitted as 
an Incorrect Unrelated answer). 
Incorrect Related answers were always a multiple of the first operand, generated by 
multiplying them with +/- 1 of the second operand. For stems with 9 as the second operand, 8 
was used to generate the Incorrect Related answers (since multiples of 10 might be perceived as 
implausible), and similarly, when 2 was the second operand, Incorrect Related answers were 
generated by multiplying by 3, not 1. 
Half of each type of Incorrect answer were numerically larger than the problem’s 
corresponding Correct answer and the other half were numerically smaller than the Correct 
answer. On average, Incorrect Related answers were numerically more distant from the Correct 
answer than were Incorrect Unrelated answers. This is because any time the first operand was 
above 5, the Incorrect Related answers would necessarily deviate from the Correct answer by a 
multiple of 6-9, whereas Incorrect Unrelated answers were almost always limited to deviations of 
5 from the Correct answer. 
There were additionally 30 filler multiplication problems that used 1 as an operand and 
that used common double-digit operands in very simple problems (e.g., 20 x 3 = 60; 2 x 13 = 
26). The answer to these problems was always correct, such that, from the perspective of the 
participant, the distribution of Correct/Incorrect answers throughout the experiment was 50/501. 
Due to their relative simplicity, these problems also functioned as intermittent confidence-																																																								1	The	P300	is	sensitive	to	both	subjective	and	global	probability,	with	larger	P300s	for	less	probable	target	items.	A	50/50	probability	design	here	therefore	reduces	the	likelihood	of	observing	particularly	large	target	P300s,	but	even	in	50/50	manipulations,	targets	elicit	larger	P300s	than	non-targets	(see	Johnson,	1985,	for	factors	influencing	P300	amplitude).			
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boosters so that participants would not be discouraged after encountering larger multiples of 7, 8 
or 9 (for example).  
 For the 3 Visual Field presentation conditions (LVF/RH; RVF/LH; Central), there were 3 
separate sets of 30 critical items – one set for each of the 3 answer types. The 60 critical problem 
stems were divided such that there were no exact matches in any group of 30. There could be 
rare cases of operand order swaps (e.g., a set of 30 could have both 3 x 5 and 5 x 3).   
Because the responses were delayed to prevent artifacts during collection of critical data, 
and because we wanted to prevent early button-pressing, only a subset of trials were selected for 
participants to respond to. All 90 filler trials were probed, and a subset of the critical trials was 
probed (33% of the incorrect answers, evenly distributed between unrelated and related 
conditions across visual fields). From the participants’ perspective, just under half of trials were 
queried (42% total), and 60% were correct. 
 Six lists were generated so that each combination of answer type (Correct, Incorrect 
Unrelated, Incorrect Related) and level of VF of presentation (RVF/LH, LVF/RH, Center) was 
rotated. For example, on List 1, the 30 problem stems in set 3 might have assigned to have 
Incorrect Unrelated answers in LVF/RH, whereas on List 2, set 3 might have been assigned to 
have Correct answers in Central vision. Across each set, the distribution of even/odd answers and 
the distribution of Incorrect answers that were larger/smaller than the Correct answer were 
examined so as to be matched as closely as possible (although having full rotation of the sets 
minimized concerns at this level). 
 Across lists, the order of the 360 problem stems (270 critical: 3 x 3 x 30) was the same.  
 
Procedure 
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Equations were presented one element at a time on the screen (Operand 1 …  x … 
Operand 2 … = … Answer). All equation contexts were presented centrally, whereas the answers 
could appear either lateralized or in central vision. Each element was presented for 200ms, then 
was off for 300ms (SOA of 500ms). After the answers were presented, there was a 1000ms blank 
period for ERP collection, during which participants were instructed to refrain from blinking or 
moving their eyes. After the blank, a subset of trials was queried for correctness. Queries 
occurred after the answer was presented in any of the visual fields in an unpredictable manner. 
Since queries were postponed, speed was not emphasized to participants.  
After the response, if probed, a series of white “~~~~” were presented for 1200ms, 
during which subjects could blink and move their eyes around. (If there was no probe, this 
blinking period directly followed the blank period.) A series of red “~~~~” directly followed the 
blinking period, serving as a warning that the next critical stimulus was about to appear. This 
warning signal was presented for an unpredictable amount of time ranging from 400ms to 
600ms. A small square was continuously presented in the center of the screen just below the 
stimuli to remind participants where the center was; many participants reported focusing on the 
dot to keep their eyes steady when the lateralized items appeared. There were periodic self-paced 
breaks in which yellow “~~~~” were presented after a response – this indicated that the subjects 
could take a break until they were ready to do more trials. We find that some participants want to 
use breaks, whereas others find them unnecessary; having them self-paced resolves this problem. 
 
ERP Recording 
EEG was recorded using 26 silver/silver-chloride electrodes mounted in an elastic cap. 
All electrode impedances were kept below 5kΩ, and electrodes were evenly distributed over the 
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scalp (see Figure 2.1 for the arrangement). The data were referenced on-line to the left mastoid 
and re-referenced offline to an average of the right and left mastoids. A separate frontal electrode 
acted as ground. The vertical electrooculogram (EOG) signal was monitored with an electrode 
just below the eye (on the infraorbital ridge) and horizontal EOG was monitored with electrodes 
placed on the outer canthus of each eye. The EEG signal was sampled at 250 Hz and was 
subjected to an analog bandpass of 0.02 to 100 Hz during online amplification by Sensorium 
amplifiers.  
Raw waveforms were assessed for inclusion on a trial-by-trial basis with artifact 
thresholds separately calibrated by visual inspection for each subject. Trials were excluded from 
averaging if they included blinks, movement artifacts, signal drift, blocking, or a horizontal eye 
gaze movement. Because participants were only queried following some (but not all) trials, all 
trials were included in the analysis regardless of subsequent accuracy.2 For five subjects who had 
at least 20 blink-contaminated trials, the trials that were excluded from inclusion only due to 
blink artifacts were corrected and reintroduced to the average (in a procedure described by Dale, 
1994). After artifact rejection, critical bins included 26 trials on average, and no individual 
subject had fewer than 16 critical trials in any bin. 
Epochs of EEG data for each trial were taken from 100ms prior to item onset until 920ms 
after item onset, and the baseline acquired over the 100ms preceding the onset of each trial was 
subtracted prior to averaging. ERP mean amplitudes were measured after application of a digital 
bandpass filter of 0.1 to 20 Hz.  In all of the results below, interactions and effects of electrode-
related factors are only reported for those of theoretical relevance. For all F tests reported with 
																																																								
2 Trials are not removed on the basis of accuracy in language comprehension / sentence reading 
tasks either. It is typical in paradigms analyzing expression completions for participants’ 
confidence and interpretation to vary across individual trials. 
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more than 1 degree of freedom in the numerator, reported p-values are Huynh-Feldt corrected for 
violations of sphericity.  
 
Arithmetic fluency measure 
Following the ERP experiment, participants took a 60-second paper and pencil 
multiplication test in which they provided answers to as many of the critical single-digit 
problems in the study as they could. The 60 problems were in the same scrambled order for all 
participants. In order to minimize test anxiety, this was always described as an “exercise” and 
never as a test, quiz, or examination.  
 
Results 
Behavioral data 
 On the multiplication fluency test, participants on average produced 38 correct answers 
for the 60 problems, which is a speed of about 1.5 seconds per written answer (range: 18-60 
correct answers). Most participants did not finish in the allotted time, leaving many problems at 
the end blank (problems were randomly ordered, with easier and harder single-digit problems 
mixed). The accuracy of reported answers was 98% (most participants, 20/30, did not write any 
wrong answers). Thus, results of the test found that participants’ multiplication fluency was high 
enough not to be a concern for the validity of interpreting the ERP manipulations, and that, as 
one would expect, there was some (minor) natural variability in multiplication fact retrieval 
ability across individuals. 
 
Event-related potentials 
	 44	
General waveform morphology 
In Figure 2.2, one can observe the success of the manipulation of visual field. By plotting 
the lateral occipital channels, effect of visual stimulation in the contralateral visual field is 
apparent on the N100 component. In the right lateral occipital channel, the visually-evoked N100 
is larger for left visual field presentation, reflecting RH stimulation from the contralateral left 
visual field, and the same is true of N100 in the left lateral occipital channel.  
In Figure 2.3, one can observe over posterior channels that a visually evoked P200 
component is generated in response to onset of the critical item, with an average latency of 
235ms. This effect is almost immediately followed by another positivity, the P300, which is 
fairly punctate and is over by 400ms post-stimulus. Following the P300, there is a late effect that 
appears smoother and peaks around 500ms post-stimulus onset.  
 
P300 for Correct Answers 
Latency analysis of the P300 effect over all channels found that its peak was 311ms (u = 
310.87ms, SE 0.62) after presentation of the critical answer stimulus, with no effect of Visual 
Field of presentation (F(2,58) = 0.73, p > 0.1) due to remarkably similar timecourses (RH/LVF 
peak at 308.56ms, SE = 1.14; LH/RVF peak at 310.15ms, SE = 1.10, Central presentation peak 
at 313.90ms, SE = 0.96).  
In order to characterize its distribution, we ran an omnibus ANOVA on mean values 
centered around the effect, from 250 to 400ms, with 3 levels of Visual Field (Right VF/Left 
Hemisphere, Left VF/Right Hemisphere, and Central Presentation), 3 levels of Condition 
(Correct, Incorrect Related, Incorrect Unrelated), 3 levels of Laterality (right lateral, central 
midline, left lateral), and 4 levels of Anteriority (from frontal to posterior channels).  
	 45	
This identified a main effect of Condition (F(2,58) = 9.11, p < 0.001), and interactions 
between Condition and Laterality (F(4,116) = 3.38, p < 0.05), Condition and Anteriority 
(F(6,174) = 3.90, p < 0.05), and Condition, Anteriority, and Laterality (F(12,348) = 5.20, p < 
0.05). The main effect of Condition was due to larger P300s in all hemispheres to Correct 
answers (4.49µV, SE = 0.10) relative to Incorrect Unrelated answers (3.77µV, SE = 0.10) and 
relative to Incorrect Related (3.64µV, SE = 0.10) answers. The interactions between Condition 
and distributional factors reflected that the P300 effect, while widespread, was largest in 
centromedial channels, and was quite small in frontal channels (see Figures 2.5 and 2.6 for 
topographical maps of the distribution). For example, there was no difference between Correct 
(3.77µV, SE = 0.17) and Incorrect Unrelated, (3.66µV, SE = 0.17) answers in frontal channels, 
but the mean amplitude of Correct (4.74µV, SE = 0.19) and Incorrect Unrelated (3.75µV, SE = 
0.20) differed over middle and posterior channels. 
Follow-up comparisons were performed to examine Correctness (Correct compared to 
Incorrect Unrelated answers) and Relatedness (Incorrect Related compared with Incorrect 
Unrelated answers) separately, in two ANOVAs including 3 levels of VF, over 21 channels that 
captured the effect (i.e., five frontal channels were dropped). These tests confirmed that there 
was a significant effect of Correctness (F(1,29)= 14.39, p < 0.001) and no effect of Relatedness 
(F(1,29) = 0.04, p > 0.5), nor of Visual Field in either test (F(2,58)s < 0.32, p > 0.5).  
 
Overall effect of Late Positivity 
In order to characterize the distribution of the late positive effect, we began by running an 
omnibus ANOVA with 3 levels of Visual Field (Right VF, Left VF, and Central Presentation), 3 
levels of Condition (Correct, Incorrect Related, Incorrect Unrelated), 3 levels of Laterality (right 
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lateral, central midline, left lateral), and 4 levels of Anteriority (from frontal to posterior 
channels) over the time period 400-600ms following presentation of the critical answer stimulus. 
For all F tests reported with more than 1 degree of freedom in the numerator, reported p-values 
are Huynh-Feldt corrected for potential violations of sphericity. 
This revealed main effects of Visual Field (F(2,58) = 4.44, p < 0.05), Condition (F(2,58) 
= 9.32, p < 0.001), Laterality (F(2,58) = 49.89, p < 0.001), and Anteriority (F(3,87) = 34.75, p < 
0.001).  
Additionally, there was a significant four-way interaction between all factors (Visual 
Field, Condition, Anteriority, and Laterality), (F(24,696) = 1.8, p < 0.05), reflecting that effects 
of Condition between visual fields were distributed unevenly across the scalp. Specifically, when 
Condition-related effects were present in a VF, they were largest over central and posterior sites, 
and reduced or absent in other locations (e.g., in LVF/RH presentation, there was a 0.79µV 
difference between Correct (0.37µV, SE = 0.50) and Incorrect Unrelated (1.15µV, SE = 0.42) in 
a representative frontal channel, whereas in a representative posterior channel there was a 
1.93µV difference between Correct (3.03µV, SE = 0.43) and Incorrect Unrelated (4.96µV, SE = 
0.47)).  
In order to test prior planned comparisons for the effect of Correctness (Correct versus 
Incorrect Unrelated) and Relatedness (Incorrect Related versus Incorrect Unrelated) in each 
hemisphere/VF on the LPC, a cluster of 13 electrodes from the peak of the effect (as indicated by 
the distributional analysis, see Figure 2.6) is therefore used in the following analyses.  
 
Central Presentation 
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There was a significant effect of Correctness: ((F(1,29) = 4.67, p < 0.05) due to more 
positivity in response to Incorrect Unrelated answers (4.25µV, SE = 0.16) than to Correct 
answers (3.21µV, SE = 0.12). In testing the effect of Relatedness, although numerically Incorrect 
Unrelated answers elicited a more positive response (4.25µV, SE = 0.16) than did Incorrect 
Related answers (3.94µV, SE = 0.15), this was not significant (F(1,29) = 0.57, p > 0.1).  
 
Right Hemisphere 
There was both an effect of Correctness (F(1,29) = 9.68, p < 0.01) and Relatedness 
(F(1,29) = 7.94, p < 0.01) . This was driven by significantly more positive responses to Incorrect 
Unrelated answers (4.71µV, SE = 0.14) compared to both Correct answers (3.24µV, SE = 0.14) 
and Incorrect Related answers (3.65µV, SE = 0.13). Numerically and visually (see Figure 2.4), 
the effect of Correctness was larger than Relatedness, although a post-hoc follow-up comparison 
of Incorrect Related and Correct answers found no difference between these conditions in this 
timewindow (F(1,29) = 1.64, p > 0.21).  
 
Left Hemisphere 
There were no effects of Correctness (F(1,29) = 2.46, p > 0.1) or Relatedness (F(1,29) = 
0.54, p > 0.1) in this timewindow following RVF/LH presentation. The absence of effects as 
compared to LVF/RH can be seen in Figures 2.4 and 2.6. 
 
Discussion  
 Our data from central presentation generally replicates what has been previously shown 
in prior papers using these manipulations with arithmetic expressions, despite moderate changes 
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to the precise stimulus design (e.g., our incorrect answers of both types were generated by 
different means than has been used before). Specifically, we replicate the presence of an early 
distinction between correct and incorrect answers in the form of a larger P300 to correct answers 
(although this same effect has a history of being labeled an N400 by others). Importantly, the 
actual waveform morphology of a positivity to correct answers is the same across these studies 
(see Jasinski & Coch, 2012). In the broader literature, the P300 is enhanced to target items, even 
when probability is held constant, and its latency is generally taken as a measure of stimulus 
evaluation time. The larger P300 to correct items, peaking around 300ms in this experiment, 
implies that these items were identified and categorized as the target item quite quickly, likely 
because of there was a full second between onset of the second operand and onset of the final 
answer. In cases with reduced time to predict and expect the final target answer, the P300 has 
been delayed in time – hence occurring more in the traditional N400 timewindow --  and/or 
reduced in amplitude (indeed, if at all present, e.g., Domahs et al, 2007, SOA 150ms; Niedeggen, 
Rösler, & Jost, 1999, SOA 200ms). Our result in central presentation largely implies that the 
system had sufficient time to process the problem prior to presentation of the answer. 
 That we did not find support for a relatedness effect in central vision suggests that the 
generation of this effect is relatively more sensitive to nuances of stimulus design. The timing of 
presentation is one potential reason for a lack of a significant late positivity – effects of 
relatedness might be smaller when the system has more time to fully process the problem and 
retrieve the correct answer. Alternatively, in preparation of our incorrect unrelated answers, we 
carefully matched the distribution of even and odd numbers in our related and unrelated incorrect 
answers to the distribution of correct answers (because they are more likely to be even). This is 
not a process that we have seen others regularly do, leaving open the possibility that sensitivity 
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to relatedness might be partially a sensitivity to those answers being more like correct answers 
on the dimension of evenness, compared to incorrect unrelated answers (which are more likely to 
be odd unless intervention occurs). Given that the P300 is sensitive to subjective probability, it is 
possible that the relative evenness and oddness of answers across conditions could be influencing 
its amplitude in these studies, although the result of direct manipulation of these variables has not 
yet been examined. 
Our primary aim was to characterize how the effects of correctness and relatedness might 
differ as a function of hemisphere, given the prevalence of differences across patient groups with 
unilateral lesions, (Rosselli & Ardila, 1989; Cohen et al, 1999; for review, see Cappelletti & 
Cipolotti, 2010) and given the effects of lateralized presentation in patients who have undergone 
commissurotomies (Gazzaniga & Smylie, 1984; Colvin, Funnell, & Gazzaniga, 2005; Funnell et 
al, 2007). Through examining these effects, we are able to address two fundamental questions: 1) 
How well is each hemisphere able to recognize and accurately categorize correct answers from 
incorrect answers? and 2) How sensitive is each hemisphere to the putative table-based 
organization of knowledge about mathematical facts, as primed here by different problem 
contexts? Interpretation and discussion of our results follows for each issue in turn, with 
consideration given to the corresponding findings in sentence processing. 
We found that both hemispheres were able to recognize and categorize the correct answer 
as correct (indicated by a larger P300 to this condition than to incorrect answers), and were able 
to do so at the same speed (indicated by no latency difference in the P300 across visual field 
presentations). In order to reconcile this with prior reports that the right hemisphere is less 
critical for production of answers than is the left (i.e., patients with left hemisphere lesions are, 
consistently across studies, more likely to have difficulties with arithmetic), it is important to 
	 50	
remember that our recordings do not reflect the hemisphere’s abilities to output their knowledge 
in the form of a response (verbal or otherwise) – instead, our ERPs reflect each hemisphere’s 
appreciation for the answer types in the absence of any form of overt response (which was only 
requested after a substantial delay). It is well documented that the P300 specifically indexes 
stimulus evaluation time, and not response selection and planning/execution, which are 
otherwise difficulty to disentangle in reaction time measures (Kutas, McCarthy & Donchin, 
1977). Our findings are consistent with the interpretation that the hemispheres are able to 
recognize correct from incorrect answers at the same timescale, but subsequently undergo 
different processes when selecting and executing outward expressions of this internal 
categorization process.   
 This pattern aligns with typical results in studies of language comprehension, in which 
participants passively read sentences and that end in expected or unexpected ways. Both 
hemispheres have been shown to able to distinguish “correct” final words from “incorrect” final 
words (and consistent / inconsistent line drawing images as well), albeit on a different ERP 
component (the N400, Coulson, Federmeier, Van Petten, & Kutas, 2005; Federmeier, Mai, & 
Kutas, 2005; Wlotko & Federmeier, 2007). The similarity in response patterns across 
hemispheres in those studies has been taken as evidence that both hemispheres are able to make 
sense of the provided sentential context and integrate new words into the message. Our findings 
here are similarly consistent with the idea that both hemispheres are able to take the context 
provided by mathematical expressions (multiplication problems) and recognize whether provided 
answers are good fits or poor fits, although ultimately they might not be equally able to overtly 
communicate that knowledge.  
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That this main effect of congruency occurs on different components across language and 
arithmetic studies is intriguing. It is perhaps understandable why in sentence processing studies 
there are typically no reported P300 effects. The goal in these experiments tends to be to “read 
for understanding”, not to read and make an explicit judgment specifically about the correctness 
of the critical (typically sentence-final) word. When people do make explicit, categorical 
judgments about words in a sentence (or at least about the sentence as a whole) then the critical 
words that typically contain information relevant for making the categorical judgment often elicit 
positivities as well (see, e.g., Geyer, Holcomb, Kuperberg, & Perlmutter, 2006, and Kim & 
Osterhout, 2005, for positivities elicited in the context of plausibility judgments).  
What is harder to reconcile is why there is not also an N400 effect of congruency in the 
context of math equation processing. Symbolic digits presumably convey meaning (in the form 
of numerosity and other long term memory representations), but perhaps this information is not 
fully appreciated by the N400 timewindow. We have previously observed that some features of 
wordforms that have been thought to be part of the meaning of the word only are appreciated 
later in the form of a late positive complex (LPC), and the same might be true of the nuanced 
meaning of symbolic numbers (Fischer-Baum, Dickson, & Federmeier, 2014).  
On the other hand, it is possible that the P300 effect is overlapping with a co-occurring 
(smaller) N400 effect, and that the effect of semantic facilitation is present, but hard to detect. 
Given that all potentially meaningful stimuli elicit N400 components, and that digits fall within 
that category, we believe this to be possible (Federmeier & Kutas, 2011). However, the effects in 
the present study are clearly unlike typical N400 effects of semantic facilitation in both 
morphology (with a distinct positivity for the “facilitated” correct condition) and in timing 
(occurring almost 100ms prior to the traditional N400 timewindow.) To more clearly examine 
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semantic processing of digits, the experimental design would need to contain tasks that do not 
also elicit substantial P300 effects.  
Regarding sensitivity to subtypes of incorrect answers, we only find evidence for an 
effect of relatedness in the LVF/RH (in the form of a larger late positivity for incorrect unrelated 
answers compared to incorrect related answers), and no significant difference between these 
answer types in either the left hemisphere or in central presentation (although there was a 
numerical trend for the effect during central viewing). This result provides the first evidence, to 
our knowledge, that, whereas the right hemisphere appreciates a given incorrect answer’s 
similarity to the correct answer, the left hemisphere does not. 
This pattern is a remarkable reversal of what was previously reported for a similar 
manipulation in sentence processing, in which unexpected sentence-final words that were 
semantically related to the expected completion were only distinguished from unexpected 
unrelated words following presentation to the RVF/LH (i.e., the left hemisphere had a 
relatedness effect) (Federmeier & Kutas, 1999b). In that work, it was instead the right 
hemisphere that had a more categorical approach in comprehension of completions. However, at 
a mechanistic level, direct comparisons of these results to those reported here is difficult because, 
whereas the effect of relatedness in sentence processing was observed on the N400, the effect of 
relatedness we report is on a late positivity. 
Effects in language processing on late positivities are common across studies, although 
the particular eliciting conditions and nomenclature for the subsequently reported effects varies 
(see Van Petten & Luka, 2012, for a review of the ongoing differences of opinion and 
complicated discussions unfolding in this domain). A few studies have looked at late positivities 
in each of the hemispheres. In one, there was greater late positive complex (LPC) priming for 
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backward ordered word pairs in the left hemisphere (e.g., “meat” followed by “butcher”, where 
“meat” does not strongly prime “butcher”, but the words are clearly related) than in the right, 
which suggests that there is a left hemisphere advantage for strategically reshaping meaning 
activation for weakly related and/or non-canonically ordered word pairs (Kandhadai & 
Federmeier, 2010a). In a subsequent publication, it was observed that the right hemisphere could 
be forced to appreciate the relatedness in these types of word pairs, but, on the whole, there is 
largely evidence of hemispheric biases in language contexts favoring the left hemisphere for 
sensitivity to relatedness on late positive effects (Kandhadai & Federmeier, 2010b). Our result of 
a right hemisphere relatedness effect thus serves as strong evidence that the memory system 
engaged by multiplication arithmetic problems and the memory system engaged in sentence and 
word reading can be dissociable, and their interrelationship is more complicated than it might 
appear on the surface.  
Because there are currently no published reports of late positivities selective to the right 
hemisphere, and because there are also no studies looking specifically at behavioral responses to 
these particular conditions with visual half-field presentation, there are many alternative 
interpretations for why, in the present work, there is a late positivity selective to the right 
hemisphere that is sensitive to the relatedness of answer types. That is, at a mechanistic level, the 
source of the right hemisphere appreciation of related answers could be the result of a number of 
differences in how learned information is structured and/or in how incoming information is 
processed by each hemisphere. We will therefore review three possible sources of the effect 
below. 
Under a first interpretation, this right hemisphere relatedness sensitivity finding could be 
because arithmetic fact knowledge is genuinely organized in a table-like fashion in the right 
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hemisphere and not organized in this way in the left hemisphere. Then, when related answers are 
provided, only the right hemisphere is prepared to recognize this property. Although this is 
possible, we don’t have any evidence to justify why this would be the case. In fact, our finding 
for similar effects of correctness across the hemispheres is also possibly inconsistent with this 
view because it might be expected that there should be divergences in responsivity on the P300 
during this timewindow if its memory were indeed structured so differently in the hemispheres. 
A second possibility is that the left hemisphere also contains the table-relatedness 
information but does not engage in accessing it. In fact, this might be advantageous: it could be 
harmful for the successful execution of the task at hand to be entertaining multiple answers after 
seeing the full arithmetic expression. Under this view, the left hemisphere could be strategically 
focusing on the search for only the correct answer. Interestingly, this idea is consistent with the 
proposal that the right hemisphere generates a broader range of concepts than does the left (Jung-
Beeman, 2005), which in this case would imply that the right hemisphere activated a broader 
range of potential answers. If the right hemisphere does this, it might explain some of its 
apparent difficulty in response selection. This interpretation would effectively render the right 
hemisphere relatedness effect as reflecting a kind of “confusion”, which could serve as a 
potential explanation for why the isolated right hemispheres in commissurotomized patients 
performs poorly in verification tasks (e.g., Funnel et al, 2007). Although this interpretation is 
certainly possible, it is difficult to heavily favor it because multiple direct tests of the coarse 
coding / spreading activation hypothesis has not found support for it (Kandhadai & Federmeier, 
2007, 2008). Also problematic for this view is that one might have expected to see earlier effects 
of relatedness on the P300 in the right hemisphere, reflecting a lack of focus on the correct 
answer as a target item, which is not what was observed.  
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A final mechanistic explanation places the locus of this effect more in the domain of 
explicit evaluation of the provided answer. This is in contrast to the prior two explanations, 
which place the source of the difference between the hemispheres response to related answers 
either at the level of differences in long-term memory structures or in differences in spreading 
activation following presentation of the problem itself. Under this third view, once the left 
hemisphere sees an answer, it categorizes it as correct or not (i.e., generating a P300), and then 
does no more follow-up evaluation the answers. In the right hemisphere, once an answer has 
been presented for consideration, it could be engaging in a deliberative appreciation for subtleties 
in properties of provided answers. Although this might be functionally important for fully 
analyzing arithmetic problems beyond an instinctual recall of correct answers, and having more 
information about the qualities of the provided answers could in theory be helpful for 
deliberative mathematical reasoning tasks, it is nonetheless the case that the left hemisphere’s 
theoretically more categorical approach would be less likely to be vulnerable to error production. 
In general, this potential interpretation of the relatedness effect in the right hemisphere is 
also consistent with the idea that the calculating right hemisphere is involved in more nuanced 
evaluations of approximate values (perhaps drawing on enhanced spatial abilities), whereas the 
left hemisphere’s approach to answer evaluation has been attributed to relatively more simple 
memorized retrieval of mathematical facts (i.e., recognizing the correct answer as correct) 
(Dehaene & Cohen, 1995; Rosselli & Ardila, 1989). However, it is important to note that we 
have evidence that the right hemisphere initially does engage in the categorization process that 
characterizes the left hemisphere; it is only later in time that the right and left hemispheres’ 
processing strategies diverge and the right could begin this process of appreciating more detailed 
properties of the proposed answers.  
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On the whole, we therefore find this final interpretation to be most consistent with the 
existing literature on both arithmetic and language, and it is the only interpretation of the three 
we introduced that does not also make a prediction that the P300 in the right hemisphere should 
have a relatedness effect.  
One important factor that has not been discussed thus far is that of the amount of time our 
participants had to process the full multiplication expression prior to the answer appearing on the 
screen. This one-second interval between seeing the second operand (i.e., the complete problem) 
and seeing the answer is not very pressured, especially compared with some paradigms wherein 
this interval was reduced to 150ms (in particular, in Domahs et al, 2007, this presentation latency 
visually appears to have substantially delayed and reduced the amplitude of the P300 compared 
to the when the P300 was elicited with a 550ms stimulus onset asynchrony). Moving forward, 
then, it could be of interest to see how the hemispheres respond when they are under more 
pressure (i.e., in speeded response conditions, and/or with less time between viewing the 
operands and viewing the answers). It is possible that the left hemisphere, which has been 
associated with rapid top-down processing of input, might be differently affected by such a 
manipulation than would the right hemisphere, which has been associated with slower, more 
bottom-up processing (Federmeier, 2007).  
 This work is the first to characterize the temporal dynamics of answer evaluation 
processing in the two hemispheres, and, as such, our findings make a novel and important 
contribution to the growing field of interest in the neurobiology of arithmetic processing. We 
found that, similar to language, both hemispheres are sensitive to whether or not an expression 
has been completed in an expected / correct or unexpected / incorrect manner, although the 
mechanisms supporting this sensitivity seem to be functionally different. Most intriguingly, we 
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uncovered a unique sensitivity to properties answer, beyond their status as correct or incorrect, 
that occurs later in time only in the right hemisphere, which appears to reflect its more 
deliberative processing strategy. Given that a similar effect has not yet been observed in 
language processing, these results are consistent with a view that there are important differences 
in how we read and assess sentences in language and expressions in arithmetic problems. 
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Figures 
Figure 2.1 
 
Figure 2.1 A graphical representation of the configuration of the 26 channels used in critical 
EEG recordings. 
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Figure 2.2 
 
Figure 2.2 This displays the recordings from left and right lateral occipital channels (LLOC at 
left and RLOC at right) following presentation to the right visual field (biased to the left 
hemisphere, plotted with solid black), and presentation to the left visual field (biased to the right 
hemisphere, plotted with dashed black). The N1 visually evoked potential is larger for the scalp 
channels corresponding to the stimulated hemisphere. There is also a later, slow-wave effect 
(starting here around 400 ms post-stimulus) that is characteristic of visual field manipulations. 
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Figure 2.3 
 
Figure 2.3 Responses to centrally presented critical answer types from selected channels over the head (starred on the channel 
configuration plot at left) are plotted. The P300 elicited by correct (red) answers, as compared to incorrect related (solid black) and 
incorrect unrelated (dashed black), can be seen in the centromedial and posterior channels (and not the frontal channels at top).  
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Figure 2.4 
 
Figure 2.4 Responses to critical answer types after presentation to RVF/LH (left plots) or LVF/RH (right plots) from selected 
channels over the head (same as in Fig. 1.3) are plotted. The P300 elicited by correct (red) answers, as compared to incorrect related 
(solid black) and incorrect unrelated (dashed black) can be seen in the centromedial and posterior channels in both LVF/RH and 
RVF/LH, and the later effect of relatedness can only be seen in the LVF/RH plots (difference between two black lines in central/right 
channels). 
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Figure 2.5
  
Figure 2.5 Topographical maps of the distribution of the effect of correctness (left) and 
relatedness (right), as measured by the subtraction of the response to incorrect unrelated answers 
from correct answers during the P300 timewindow (measured from 250 – 400 ms post stimulus 
onset), and subtraction of the response to incorrect related answers from incorrect unrelated 
answers during the later timewindow (measured 400 – 600 ms post stimulus onset), as viewed 
over the back of the head. Darker areas correspond to more substantial effects. It can be seen that 
there is an effect of correctness in the P300 timewindow and no effect of relatedness in the later 
timewindow. 
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Figure 2.6 
 
Figure 2.6 Topographical maps of the distribution of the effect of correctness (plots on left) and 
relatedness (plots on right), as measured by the subtraction of the response to incorrect unrelated 
answers from correct answers during the P300 timewindow (measured from 250 – 400 ms post 
stimulus onset), and the response to incorrect related answers from incorrect unrelated answers 
during the later timewindow (measured 400 – 600 ms post stimulus onset), viewed over the back 
of the head. Darker areas correspond to more substantial effects. It can be seen that there is an 
effect of correctness in the P300 timewindow for both RVF/LH (bottom left plot) and LVF/RH 
(top left plot), but an effect of relatedness only for responses following LVF/RH presentation 
(top right plot). 
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CHAPTER 3 
Experiment 2: Behavioral effects of answer evaluation across the hemispheres 
  
Introduction 
The results from Experiment 1 suggest that there are both similarities and differences in 
how the hemispheres process multiplication problems. Effect patterns on the P300 revealed 
similarities in how each hemisphere evaluates solutions to such problems: both hemispheres 
were sensitive to the overall correctness of answers and made this distinction similarly quickly 
(as indicated by P300 latency). However, the hemispheres’ differential sensitivity to incorrect 
answer types on a later positivity suggests important differences in how the RH and LH represent 
numerical relationships and/or process math equations. Thus, ERPs revealed substantial 
mechanistic processing differences between categorizing an answer as correct versus incorrect, 
and performing more deliberative and/or prolonged analyses of provided answers.  
Little is known about how these differences manifest behaviorally – in fact, there is only 
one behavioral experiment looking at arithmetic processing across the hemispheres in 
participants without brain damage (Castro, Sumich, Premkumar, & Jones, 2014). That study, 
which grouped all arithmetic operation types together, reported a disadvantage for accuracy in 
responding to mathematical expressions with LVF/RH presentation (compared to both RVF/LH 
and bilateral presentation), but only in the context of a complicated interaction with answer type 
and notational consistency. Thus, no study has specifically examined response time and accuracy 
differences across the hemispheres in the context of multiplication problems. However, the ERP 
results from Experiment 1 permit some predictions about likely outcomes. The present study is 
therefore designed to look at the behavioral consequences of the processing differences 
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uncovered in the prior experiment, with the aim of better understanding the nature and impact of 
hemispheric differences in numerical processing. 
In the language domain, it is typical for behavioral indices to favor RVF/LH presentation 
(faster RTs, higher accuracies) in most basic comprehension tasks, an outcome that has been 
attributed to the LH’s superior word recognition abilities (Jordan, Patching, & Thomas, 2003; 
Jordan, Patching, & Milner, 2000; see Hellige, 1993 for an overview). However, the P300 effect 
pattern obtained in Experiment 1 suggests that similar LH advantages may not obtain in math, 
and, instead, that there might not be any substantial differences across the hemispheres in their 
response times, at least to correct answers. This prediction can be formed because P300 latency 
(which was the same across the hemispheres) is highly correlated with reaction time, as reviewed 
below.  
Prior work examining the relationship between P300 latency and RT has indicated that 
there are strong correlations between the two under many circumstances (e.g., Ritter, Simson, & 
Vaughan, 1972). Stronger alignment between P300 latencies and RTs are obtained when timing 
differences arise at the level of stimulus evaluation, and when people are not required to 
emphasize speed in their responding (which is associated with responding in the context of 
incomplete stimulus evaluation; e.g., Kutas, McCarthy & Donchin, 1977). Dissociations between 
these measures have been found to occur when a delay in processing arises at later stages, such 
as response selection (Ragot & Renault, 1981). For example, whereas RTs are sensitive to 
manipulations of response compatibility (e.g., needing to respond with a left hand button press to 
the word “RIGHT”; McCarthy & Donchin, 1981), P300 latencies are not, making them a more 
selective measure of timing shifts related to stimulus evaluation. In sum, given the findings in 
Experiment 1, and the relationship between RTs and P300 latency, VF-based differences in RT 
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would suggest hemispheric differences that arise after the stimulus evaluation processes that 
were reflected in the P300.  
Interestingly, the (initial) P300 in response to incorrect answers occurred at the same time 
as the target P300 for correct answers (albeit being smaller in amplitude), suggesting that there 
also might not be an RT delay for responding to incorrect answers. However, the behavioral 
arithmetic literature strongly suggests that we should observe slower RTs to incorrect compared 
to correct answers (e.g., Lemaire, Abdi, & Fayol, 1996). It has been shown in the broader 
response time literature that, although verification is typically faster than falsification, speed of 
yes/no matching judgments can be changed as a function of how cautious participants are told to 
be (i.e., if told to be more cautious about responding “yes”, participants can even become slower 
to verify than to respond “no”), and that, more generally, differences in criterion-setting can 
explain RT delays for “no” responses, without needing to invoke additional processes to explain 
these delays (Ratcliff & Hacker, 1981; Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). Given that our instructions are 
the same as is generally used in the arithmetic verification domain (and thus that we are not 
introducing new or different response biases), we expect to obtain an RT delay for incorrect trials 
despite the similarity in the P300 latencies for these conditions.  
In addition to delays for incorrect trials as a whole, incorrect answers that are related to 
the correct answers are associated with even slower RTs. Through dual-task manipulations and 
studies of special populations, it has been revealed that there are likely additional cognitive 
processes (e.g., inhibition and working memory resources) that are specifically engaged when 
rejecting these provided solutions (e.g., Barrouillet, Fayol, & Lathulière, 1997; Rammelaere, 
Stuyven, & Vandierendonck, 1999; Lemaire, Adbi, & Fayol, 1996). In the ERP data as well, 
differences between unrelated and related incorrect answers emerged in the post-P300 time 
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window, in the form of differential amplitude of a component in the Late Positive Complex 
(LPC) family. Therefore, although we, again, did not obtain latency differences on the initial 
P300 response to these items compared to other answer types, we expected to replicate the 
finding that RTs to these items are slowed, possibly because of differential processing that takes 
place after initial stimulus evaluation.  
In general, then, there are two main effects that are expected to lead to RT delays – one being 
answer correctness (with slower RTs for incorrect answers), and the second being incorrect 
answer relatedness (with the slowest RTs for incorrect related answers); the second of these in 
particular may be associated with unique processing demands (as evidenced by both our prior 
ERP results and prior patterns in the behavioral literature). Our goal, then, is to further examine 
these anticipated RT patterns in the context of visual field manipulations that offer the 
opportunity to link hemispheric processing differences to behavioral outcomes.  
One potential approach to examining the impact of these processing differences at a 
behavioral level would be to measure mean reaction times across our visual field and answer 
type conditions. Indeed, measurements of the mean are the traditional source of reported RT 
effects in this domain (e.g., Ashcraft, 1992; Lemaire & Reder, 1999; Campbell & Tarling, 1996; 
Zbradoff & Logan, 1990). However, there is another method of examining RTs that seems more 
readily capable of capturing the potential distinction between the processes associated with 
effects of correctness and effects of relatedness (which were associated with different brain 
responses). In literatures outside the arithmetic domain (e.g., language, aging), there have been 
many reports that experimental manipulations not only affect mean RTs, but also alter the 
underlying shape of the distribution at a trial-by-trial level (see Balota, et al., 2008, for review).  
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One of the key features of the relatedness effect in particular is its characteristic 
association with very slow RTs, resulting from the additional processing mechanisms required to 
reject these easily confusable answers. This is likely to manifest in the form of relatively more 
RTs in the tail of the distribution as compared to just a uniform shift in the peak of the mean to 
the right (e.g., Staub & Benatar, 2014, for an example of this). In order to specifically address 
this possibility, we opted to fit our data to the ex-Gaussian distribution, which has parameters 
that can separately capture overall shifts of the distribution as a whole from alterations to the 
shape of the distribution in the form of rightward skewing (i.e., disproportionately very slow 
RTs).  
This distribution is a convolution of the Gaussian and exponential probability 
distributions (yielding its name), and its shape is defined by three parameters: µ, σ, and τ 
(reviewed in Balota & Yap, 2011). Two parameters (µ and σ) are derived from the Gaussian 
component of the distribution: the modal central tendency is reflected in µ, and variability in this 
modal portion of the distribution is captured by σ, the standard deviation. Critically, these 
parameters are not as influenced by rightward skews as measurements of the mean are. Instead, 
the rate parameter, τ, from the exponential component of the distribution, captures the amount of 
rightward pull in the tail of the distribution due to slower RTs. An additional feature of using this 
distribution is that its parameters are readily linked back to tradition RT measures: the sum of µ 
and τ correspond to an approximation of the mean, such that, if there is no disproportionate 
rightward distribution of RTs, then τ would be 0, and µ would simply correspond to the “normal” 
mean (see Fig. 1 of Balota & Yap). 
With respect to the current study, we anticipate that effects of correctness and effects of 
relatedness might manifest differently on µ and τ – and, specifically, that there might be a 
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difference on τ that is unique to rejecting incorrect but related answers. This would be 
particularly interesting given that increases in τ manifest on more challenging decision-making 
processes and have been linked to increased response competition (Balota & Spieler, 1999; 
McVay & Kane, 2012; Schmiedek, Oberauer, Wilhelm, Süß, & Wittmann, 2007). There is also a 
growing field measuring individual differences in properties of RT distributions, which have 
correlated higher τ with lower working memory span. This effect has been interpreted under the 
view that people with lower working memory abilities also have a disproportionate number of 
trials in the slow tail of their RT distribution as compared with higher-span individuals whose 
responses cluster more closely around the mode (e.g., Tse, et al., 2010; Payne & Stine-Morrow, 
2014). Alternatively, there is an account of τ that associates its increases with a disruption in 
normal, ongoing processing (Staub & Benatar, 2014), which might be expected to occur when 
participants encounter either type of incorrect answers relative to correct. In sum, we may be 
able use this property of the RT distribution (τ) to make inferential links between arithmetic 
processing and the broader decision-making field. 
 Of particular interest, of course, will be whether any of these effects manifest differently 
across the VFs. A straightforward mapping of effect sensitivity in each hemisphere would predict 
that, since only the RH showed an effect of relatedness at the level of brain activity, the expected 
RT delay should emerge for LVF/RH but not RVF/LH processing. However, there are theories 
of interhemispheric communication that suggest that the RH is particularly fast at sharing its 
knowledge with the LH, which would instead predict that relatedness effects from the RH might 
also be able to manifest behaviorally under RVF/LH processing conditions (e.g., Marzi, 
Bisiacchi, & Nicoletti, 1991; Barnett & Corballis, 2005). Moreover, the particular demands of 
making manual responses with both hands may entail a level of cooperation that would mean 
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that the effect of relatedness emerges in the RVF/LH case as well. That is, because motor 
planning in both hemispheres is required to execute the necessary manual responses (and yes/no 
response mapping is counterbalanced with response hand across participants), decision-making 
information that originates from the LVF/RH might necessarily spread to the LH and manifest 
behaviorally. It might not be surprising, then, if the relatedness effects that emerged only under 
LVF/RH presentation conditions in brain activity would be more widespread in behavioral 
testing. 
In sum, in Experiment 2 we compared how effects of correctness and relatedness 
manifest across parameters that emphasize different features of the underlying RT distribution 
(i.e., the location of the modal response versus the amount of their rightward skew), which may 
provide further evidence that the different processes that were revealed in ERPs also are 
associated with mechanistically different behavioral responses.  
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
Data were analyzed from 30 young adults who were recruited from the University of 
Illinois community and compensated with either course credit or cash. None had participated in 
Experiment 1. Participants provided written informed consent in accordance with the 
Institutional Review Board at the University of Illinois. All were right-handed native 
monolingual English speakers (15 female) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no early 
exposure to a second language, history of brain trauma, or current use of psychoactive 
medications.  Mean age was 19.8 years old (Range: 18 - 22).  Mean laterality quotient on the 
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Edinburgh handedness inventory (Oldfield, 1971) was 0.83 (Range: 0.40-1.00, with 1.0 
indicating strongly right-handed and -1.0 strongly left-handed). Fifteen participants reported 
having a left-handed biological family member. 
In order to reach our target of 30 participants, we collected data from a total of 32 
participants because two had to be dropped prior to analysis: 1 due to early second language 
exposure and 1 due to a recording error.  
 
Stimuli 
The same stimuli from Experiment 1 were used.  
 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1 except that participants were responding with 
a button press to categorize answers as correct or incorrect as quickly and accurately as possible. 
The timing of item presentation was the same, with critical answers being presented only for 
200ms. The screen was therefore blank when participants were responding, and the next trial was 
triggered after a response was registered. Due to the speeded nature of the task, the white “~~~~” 
break indicators were presented for 2200ms (instead of 1200ms in Experiment 1) because the 
pacing of the experiment was faster without the forced 1000ms of blank following the answer. 
As before, the red warning “~~~~” signal appeared for a time within the range of 400 to 600ms. 
Electrodes were placed next to each eye and behind each ear in order to record eye 
movements. This allowed us to remove trials where participants moved their eyes to the 
lateralized items. 
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EOG Recording 
In order to track eye movements that would invalidate the critical visual field 
manipulation, electrodes were placed on the face to monitor the electrooculogram. The 
electrooculogram signal was recorded using 4 silver/silver-chloride electrodes, 2 placed on the 
outer canthus of each eye, with an electrode on the left mastoid process used as reference and an 
electrode on the right mastoid process used as ground. All electrode impedances were kept below 
5kΩ. The EOG signal was sampled at a 250 Hz and was subjected to an analog bandpass of 0.02 
to 100 Hz during online amplification by Sensorium amplifiers.  
Raw waveforms were assessed for inclusion on a trial-by-trial basis with artifact 
thresholds separately calibrated by visual inspection for each subject. Trials were excluded from 
averaging if they included a horizontal eye gaze movement in the first 200ms of stimulus 
presentation. Blinks during this time period also were captured because the threshold for trial 
rejection was set low.  
After artifact rejection and including only correct responses, all critical conditions 
included 27 trials on average, and no individual subject had fewer than 19 critical trials in any 
given condition. 
 
Behavioral Analysis Methods 
 Mean levels of accuracy (as raw percentages) will be measured primarily to validate that 
participants were on task, but they will also be analyzed to check if there are substantial 
differences across visual fields. 
Critical reaction times were trimmed for outliers using a conservative threshold at the 
99.75th percentile. Using the function timefit from the package retimes in R, an ex-Gaussian 
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distribution was then fit to the RT data separately for each subject and condition. The critical 
distribution parameters (µ, σ, and τ) for each subject and condition were estimated via maximum 
likelihood estimation through bootstrapped resampling (N = 500) (for review of response time 
distribution model-fitting, see Van Zandt, 2000). The ex-Gaussian models converged normally 
for the conditions of interest in the data of each participant.  
 Separate analyses of µ, σ, and τ for effects of correctness and relatedness across levels of 
visual presentation mode will be reported. 
 
Results 
 
Accuracy 
 Table 3.1 reports accuracies for the critical conditions. Across all conditions, accuracy 
levels were consistently above ninety percent, suggesting that participants were familiar with the 
arithmetic problems and were appropriately sensitive to accuracy in their responding. The 
average number of errors committed by a participant across the nine critical conditions was 15, 
which is about 1.5 errors per condition per participant. For a given condition, only a subset of 
participants committed errors, and in general the most low-performing participants 
disproportionately contributed to the results.   
Separate analyses were performed to assess if there were any effects of Correctness for 
two levels of Answer Type (Correct versus Incorrect-Unrelated) or Relatedness for two levels of 
Answer Type (Incorrect-Related versus Incorrect-Unrelated) with three levels of Visual Field 
(Left Visual Field/Right Hemisphere, RVF/LH, and Central). There were significant effects of 
Answer Type for both Correctness (F(1,29) = 6.12; p < 0.05) and Relatedness (F(1,29) = 19.61; 
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p < 0.01), and no effects of Visual Field or interactions between Visual Field and Answer Types, 
suggesting that accuracies were similar across modes of visual presentation. The effects of 
accuracy on Correctness and Relatedness were due to higher accuracies overall for Incorrect 
Unrelated answers (96%, SE = 0.5) compared to both Correct answers (94%, SE = 0.6) and 
Incorrect Related answers (92%, SE = 0.9).  
 
Reaction Times 
 Table 3.2 reports the parameter estimates of reaction times for the conditions of interest. 
Separate analyses of Correctness and Relatedness were performed for each estimated parameter 
with three levels of Visual Field (Left VF/RH, RVF/LH, and Central). No analyses found any  
significant effect involving the σ parameter or Visual Field3.  
However, for Correctness, there was a main effect of µ, reflecting that the identification 
of Incorrect Unrelated answers as incorrect involved longer reaction times (553ms, SE = 17.32) 
than verifying Correct answers (497ms, SE = 18.50) as correct (F(1,29) = 4.84; p < 0.05). There 
was no effect of Correctness on τ (F(1,29) = 0.26; p > 0.05).  
For Relatedness, the reverse was true: there was a main effect on τ, reflecting 
disproportionate slowing for Incorrect Related answers (462ms, SE = 28.67) relative to Incorrect 
Unrelated answers (364ms, SE = 22.50) (F(1,29) = 7.01; p < 0.01), but no main effect on µ 
(F(1,29) = 0.05; p > 0.05). These effects are plotted in Figure 3.1, which displays µ and τ for the 
three answer types collapsed across levels of Visual Field. 
 
																																																								
3 Separate analyses of each parameter with only Right Visual Field and Left Visual Field (and 
not the Central condition) also did not identify any main effects or interactions with viewing 
condition / hemisphere. 
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Discussion 
In the interest of forming more refined interpretations of Experiment 1, a behavioral 
experiment was performed wherein new participants responded as quickly as they could without 
sacrificing accuracy to the critical answer types in each of three visual field presentation modes 
(left, right, and central). We separately evaluated effects of correctness (comparing responses to 
correct answers from incorrect unrelated answers) and effects of relatedness (comparing 
responses to incorrect unrelated answers from incorrect related answers) in these visual fields. 
Overall, we found high levels of performance (accuracies above ninety percent), and no effects 
of visual field of presentation on accuracy. There were also no effects of visual field on any 
measure of reaction time. Importantly, there were several main effects of answer type, suggesting 
that these VF results were not simply due to the manipulations being ineffective. We will next 
explain how these findings impact our interpretations of the prior ERP results, first for evaluation 
of answer correctness and then for answer relatedness. 
In the ERP results, there was a P300 that distinguished between correct and incorrect 
answers at the same latency regardless of visual field. We did not know whether there might be 
additional processes beyond answer evaluation that differed across the hemispheres and could 
have resulted in different patterns of RTs across the hemispheres in behavior. Interestingly, there 
does appear to be evidence for additional response-related processing that is not captured by the 
P300: the parameter µ (which corresponds to the central tendency of the distribution of reaction 
times) differed between correct and incorrect unrelated answers, such that incorrect unrelated 
answers were associated with overall slower reaction times (see Figure 3.1). The magnitude of 
this effect (around 50ms) would have been readily detectable on P300 latency, so having not 
obtained a temporally shifted P300 under these circumstances makes the case that something 
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beyond answer evaluation is responsible for the delay. At the same time, the τ parameter (which 
captures the skew of the distribution towards very slow answers) was not significantly different 
across these conditions. Under some accounts (e.g., Staub & Benatar, 2014; Reingold, Sheridan, 
& Reichle, 2015; Jackson, Balota, Ducheck, & Head, 2012), shifts in τ reflect additional 
processing and/or disruptions in processing. Thus, our result pattern shows a modal shift in RT to 
incorrect, relative to correct, answers, which seems to arise after stimulus evaluation, and might 
reflect influences from criterion-setting that apply uniformly, as opposed to a distributional shift 
due to additional processes coming online for a subset of trials. 
The µ effect obtained for correctness did not interact with presentation condition (i.e., it 
was the same across the hemispheres). Thus, not only do readers use the same amount of time to 
evaluate each provided answer regardless of which hemisphere was preferentially processing it, 
we also found no evidence that there are additional differences in response selection and 
execution to verify answer correctness as a function of visual field in this paradigm. These 
results are in contrast to reports from brain damaged participants and some split-brain patients 
(Gazzaniga & Smylie, 1984; Funnell, Colvin, & Gazzaniga, 2007; Delazer, et al., 1999), which 
have found that the arithmetic abilities of the isolated LVF/RH are poor, but are consistent with 
studies using larger groups of non-brain damaged participants (Andres et al., 2011), which have 
suggested that the RH does contribute to normal processing of arithmetic problems. 
The other effect of interest in the present study was the sensitivity of the distributional 
parameters to the manipulation of answer relatedness. Relatedness effects are typically reported 
as slower mean RTs to incorrect answers that are related to the correct answer compared to 
unrelated incorrect answers (see Ashcraft, 1992, for review). We found that this effect 
manifested on the parameter τ in the form of a longer τ in the incorrect related condition as 
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compared to the incorrect unrelated condition (see Figure 3.1). This finding is entirely consistent 
with what would be expected given the current literature on RT distributions: in more cognitively 
demanding or working memory-intensive situations, effects of τ are frequently obtained rather 
than effects of µ (e.g., Balota & Spieler, 1999; McVay & Kane, 2012; Payne & Stine-Morrow, 
2014). Thus, by examining the underlying RT distribution rather than simply reporting the mean, 
we found additional evidence in support of claims that rejecting incorrect related answers 
involves the recruitment and utilization of additional processing mechanisms (e.g., inhibitory 
control and working memory) beyond what are needed to reject incorrect unrelated answers 
(Barrouillet et al., 1997; Rammelaere et al., 1999; Lemaire et al., 1996). 
 Interestingly, there was no difference in µ between incorrect related and incorrect 
unrelated answers, creating an apparent one-to-one mapping between effects of correctness and 
relatedness, and the distributional properties of µ and τ, respectively. That is, we identified 
evidence differentiating between effects of answer correctness (µ) and effects of answer 
relatedness (τ), suggesting that the processes involved in their generation might not be entirely 
overlapping -- i.e., we show a new, qualitative difference in the nature of the effects that was not 
evident from prior work showing just that RTs to these conditions were longer on average. This 
is also consistent with what ERPs had revealed about arithmetic processing; there, the effect of 
correctness was present on the P300, whereas the effect of relatedness only emerged on a late 
positivity. 
We were also interested in how relatedness effects might manifest differently in behavior 
across the hemispheres, given that the late positivity difference for relatedness in the ERPs was 
only significant in the LVF/RH. That ERP result suggested that the RH performed some 
additional cognitive processing of the answers, which, given its nature and timing, we interpreted 
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as deliberative in nature (rather than a more automatic response). However, in the behavioral 
results, the effect of relatedness (on τ) did not differ as a function of presentation condition or VF 
in particular (just as µ, which was sensitive to answer correctness, was similar across visual 
fields).  
Given that the only evidence of sensitivity to relatedness that we had in our brain 
measure was following LVF/RH presentation, the main effect of relatedness in behavior suggests 
that the ERP relatedness effect was non-trivial (i.e., is functionally operative). That is, although 
only the RH showed evidence of relatedness effects in ERPs, in behavior, both the left 
hemisphere and the joint processing of both hemispheres (central presentation) also showed 
appreciation of this more detailed aspect of the provided answer. Mechanistically, whatever 
cognitive process led to the generation of the late positivity might have interactively spread from 
the right hemisphere, ultimately impacting decision making under all viewing conditions. This is 
consistent with many theories of interhemispheric communication that claim that the RH rapidly 
shares information with the LH (e.g., Marzi, Bisiacchi, & Nicoletti, 1991; Barnett & Corballis, 
2005). However, it is also possible that interhemispheric transfer was required in order to 
perform the response task, as manual responses necessarily require access to relevant 
information to execute the response, and, across trials, both hands were used (mapping of the 
yes/no response type for R/ L hand was counterbalanced across participants).  
Regardless of the source of the interhemispheric transfer, our results suggest that the 
decision-making information that originated from the LVF/RH (as suggested by the ERP results) 
spread to the LH and affected overall behavior. That the process indexed by the late positivity 
could conceivably cause the behavioral effect is at least consistent with a comparison of the 
latency of the late positivity, which peaked between 400 and 600ms post-stimulus onset, and the 
	 79	
average raw RTs observed for the relatedness condition, which occurred at 1045ms. In future 
work, it would be useful to assess this possibility at a trial level with concurrently recorded 
behavioral and ERP results.  
 Beyond the opportunity to expand our understanding of the mechanisms involved in 
answer evaluation by uncovering novel distributional features of the response times obtained in 
this task, perhaps the biggest takeaway from the present work is that there were no LH 
advantages in answer evaluation and response execution at all. This is very different from what is 
typically reported in behavioral language studies, wherein the LH is generally faster/more 
accurate (e.g., Jordan et al., 2000). Thus, in healthy young adults, we find that basic answer 
evaluation and decision making is not the sole domain of LH processing (as has been suggested 
by, e.g., Dehaene et al., 1999; Dehaene & Cohen, 1995), but, instead, that the RH is actively 
involved in evaluating and executing responses for these answers as well. Interestingly, the RH 
has previously been associated with the ability approximate answers and perform basic number 
comparison (e.g., judging relative quantities for size) – both kinds of skills which may be 
possible to perform through more deliberative evaluation. Consistent with this view, in patients 
with LH brain damage (who thus must rely on RH processing), it is often reported that they 
employ slow, elaborative or procedural techniques to reach the correct answer (Crutch & 
Warrington, 2002; Diesfeldt, 1993; Cappelletti, Butterworth, & Kopelman, 2001, 2012). Taken 
together, it is possible the behavioral relatedness effect we are observing here is a manifestation 
of that same particular feature of RH processing that is observed in patients. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Table 3.1: Accuracy 
 
 Accuracy 
 Left VF 
Right Hemisphere 
Right VF 
Left Hemisphere 
Central 
Viewing 
 
Accuracy SE Accuracy SE Accuracy SE 
Correct 92.99 1.32 94.81 0.85 95.69 0.92 
Incorrect – Unrelated 95.80 0.98 96.67 1.05 96.92 0.58 
Incorrect – Related 
93.23 1.19 92.40 1.48 90.47 1.74 
 
 
Table 3.1: Participant accuracy at categorizing an answer as correct or incorrect across viewing 
conditions. 
 
 
Table 3.2: Reaction Time Parameter Estimates 
 
  Reaction Time Parameter Estimates 
  mu (ms) SE tau (ms) SE sigma (ms) SE 
Right 
VF 
(LH) 
Correct 502 31 399 43 76 15 
Incorrect-
Unrelated 539 28 376 41 67 13 
Incorrect-
Related 536 37 486 54 95 40 
Left VF 
(RH) 
Correct 526 36 387 43 90 22 
Incorrect-
Unrelated 553 33 369 40 61 9 
Incorrect-
Related 550 27 470 52 131 50 
Central 
Vision 
Correct 463 29 358 47 68 11 
Incorrect-
Unrelated 566 29 348 36 56 11 
Incorrect-
Related 555 35 430 44 82 22 
 
 
Table 3.2: Estimates of mu, tau, and sigma across viewing conditions and stimulus category 
types. 
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Figure 3.1 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Estimates of mu and tau across answer types. The effect of correctness can be seen in 
mu, whereas the effect of relatedness can be seen in tau. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Experiment 3: On the potential (in)flexibility of semantic memory access for numerals: the effect 
of incidental repetition across tasks  
 
Introduction 
In Experiment 1, we observed that effects of answer expectancy occurred relatively early 
following stimulus presentation – just after 300ms. Both the timing and the morphology of the 
expectancy effect in arithmetic expressions was inconsistent with what is typically observed in 
sentence processing paradigms, wherein there is a larger negativity for unexpected words relative 
to expected words that peaks just prior to 400ms post-stimulus – i.e., an amplitude modulation of 
the N400, a component linked to amodal semantic access. This difference in processing 
mechanisms across domains is not intuitive because both sentences and arithmetic expressions 
seemingly construct a meaningful message about what is likely to appear next – yet this meaning 
seems to not be appreciated the same way in arithmetic expressions as it is in not only language 
but also other, semantically richer domains (as N400 congruity effects obtain not just for words 
following sentential contexts, but also, e.g., in paradigms with unexpected pictures and movie 
clips: Nigam, Hoffman & Simons, 1992; Sitnikova, Kuperberg, & Holcomb, 2003).  
One possible explanation for the apparent absence of N400 effects in arithmetic contexts 
is that component overlap – in particular, the co-occurrence of the P300 – creates a barrier to 
directly measuring the N400. The P300 is particularly difficult to disentangle from any potential 
effect on the N400 because the direction of the effect is the same: more positive (less negative) 
for target (expected) items than non-target (unexpected) items. Indeed, although there are many 
reports of N400 effects in arithmetic contexts, these almost universally occur in situations where 
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there are positivities in response to the correct answer. Even in Experiment 1, in which the P300 
effect preceded the typical timewindow for the N400, it is difficult to assess what might be 
happening in the N400 timewindow in the absence of the prior effect (i.e., the P300 peaks around 
the time that a divergence on the N400 would be expected to start).  
Due to the overlap with the P300, it is not clear at present how thoroughly numerals 
(specifically, the Arabic system of representing number values) are processed for their 
conceptual meaning. The N400 is thought to reflect a first pass into long-term semantic memory, 
and larger amplitude N400s are associated with more new processing of a semantic concept 
(Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). What is typically examined is the amount of facilitation (reduction 
in N400 negativity) an item receives as a function of prior semantic processing, similar to 
conceptual priming. When it was first proposed that arithmetic answers were processed for their 
semantic content similarly to words in sentences, the implication was that our memory for 
Arabic numerals is structured and accessed similarly to how the conceptual relationships 
between words are processed, at least when probed in the context of arithmetic expressions 
(Niedeggen & Rösler, 1999; Niedeggen, Rösler, & Jost, 1999). However, given the difficulty in 
isolating the N400 component in these studies, it is unclear at present whether that claim is fully 
justified.     
 A critical question to resolve, then, is if Arabic numerals convey the type and degree of 
conceptual information needed to influence N400 amplitude. One possibility is that these 
symbolic representations of numerical information are not processed for meaning the way that 
words and pictures seem to be, and that effects of contextual support from numerals thus do not 
result in modulations of the N400 on subsequent numerals. It is already known that not all forms 
of expectancy in familiar, and potentially meaningful, sequences are associated with N400 
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effects. For example, there is a long history of searching for N400 effects in response to deviant 
notes in familiar musical melodies – and failing to find them (Besson & Macar, 1987; Paller, 
McCarthy, & Wood, 1992). It is possible that the conceptual information conveyed by arithmetic 
expressions might be more similar to the case of learned musical patterns/sequences than to the 
case of sentences. That is, arithmetic expressions might convey too impoverished a semantic 
message to elicit the kind of N400 effects that are seen for sentences, picture sequences, and 
movie clips. If true, it would be consistent with the interpretation that, indeed, effects of 
expectancy in purely arithmetic contexts (using Arabic numerals rather than number words) are 
not modulations of the N400, but are instead limited to differences in P300 amplitude. 
In order to assess whether double-digit Arabic numerals of the sort usually found in 
common arithmetic problems can elicit N400 effects (and thus access semantics similarly to 
other stimulus types), we will utilize a paradigm in which N400 effects can be generated in the 
absence of an overlapping P300. Specifically, a simple design that allows for the examination of 
N400 effects in the absence of componentry related to evaluation and decision-making (i.e., 
P300) is a repetition paradigm in which participants are unable to render decisions when 
presented with the critical (repeating) numerals and, instead, decision-related information is 
presented in a delayed probe item. Through this method, rather than measuring the amount of 
facilitation an item receives as a function of a prior arithmetic expression, we will instead be 
simply measuring the amount of facilitation an item receives as a function of its own prior 
presentation earlier in a list (i.e., a self-priming effect). In sum, this approach could reveal 
evidence of N400 effects to common Arabic numerals, suggesting that indeed there is some 
obligatory meaning being accessed when we view these numerals. 
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Importantly, we will not be measuring facilitation to immediate and direct repetitions 
(which could reflect perceptual priming in addition to any semantic priming that might also 
occur), but on incidental, later repetitions, such that the conceptual meaning of the numeral must 
be retained in memory through several intervening trials. This is a widely used method for 
examining the quality of semantic processing a potentially meaningful item undergoes, and 
reductions in N400 amplitude in these contexts are more broadly thought to reflect conceptual 
priming of items (e.g., Voss & Paller, 2006; Voss, Schendan & Paller, 2010; Voss & Federmeier, 
2011). That such delayed repetition effects reflect conceptual priming is supported by evidence 
that deliberate manipulations of the amount of conceptual processing influences the size of the 
effect. For example, although N400 priming effects are often small or absent for strings of 
meaningless letters (e.g., “TXQ”), if participants are encouraged to entertain the possibility that 
these items are meaningful by asking them to judge whether or not they are a familiar acronym, 
then illegal strings manifest repetition effects similar to other, meaningful strings of letters (e.g., 
words and acronyms; Laszo, Stites, & Federmeier, 2011). Similarly, although N400 effects are 
difficult to find when people are processing melodies, it is possible to obtain them through cross-
modal priming studies with language stimuli and other sophisticated manipulations that tap into 
richer aspects of the meaning of musical elements (Daltrozzo & Schön, 2009; Koelsch et al., 
2004). As such, even if it is the case that arithmetic expressions do not convey sufficiently robust 
semantic messages to elicit N400 congruency effects, then some other task that encourages 
access to different, broader associations with numerical information might be able to draw out 
their conceptual meaningfulness.  
Motivated by this possibility, our examination of the processing of symbolic 
representations of number (i.e., Arabic numerals) for conceptual information will include three 
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tasks, each of which recruit different types and amounts of engagement with these numerals’ 
potential semantic content. The effects of repetition will be examined in order assess how much 
meaning is extracted from numerals across these different task contexts. Critically, what is 
measured across these tasks is always the response to first and second presentation of numerals 
(not responses to the subsequent probe items, which vary across task). This enables us to directly 
measure, within subjects, how the size and morphology of the repetition effect to the exact same 
physical stimuli is influenced by the kind of processing demanded by each task. The three tasks 
and their respective potential for eliciting repetition effects for Arabic numerals are described 
below. 
In the “matching task”, relatively little assessment of the conceptual content of the 
numeral is required. Participants view a double-digit number and later verify the presence or 
absence of a provided probe digit – essentially, performing a delayed detection (or match-to-
sample) task. This encourages participants to see numerals as objects with subparts, but does not 
require them to access their memories of those objects for additional conceptual information 
about them. The critical question this task asks is whether or not numerals are obligatorily 
processed for their conceptual meaning. In similar paradigms using words, N400 repetition 
effects have been observed, showing that meaning extraction is relatively automatic (although 
this N400 repetition effect is smaller than when reading for semantic category membership; 
Rugg, Furda, & Lorist, 1988). However, it has also been observed that for other items that are 
less inherently meaningful than words (e.g., ambiguous and novel line drawings), simply 
detecting visual features does not result in N400 effects, and, instead, such effects are only 
obtained when participants are encouraged to think about these stimuli as potentially meaningful 
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have not previously experienced before, but whether the type of meaning elicited by numerals is 
more similar to wordforms (and meaningful pictures), which typically elicit robust N400 effects 
in repetition paradigms, versus novel shapes or scrambled images, which typically do not elicit 
robust N400 effects, is unknown. In sum, if access to semantic knowledge of numerals is as 
obligatory as it seems to be for words, then this task should result in N400 repetition effects 
(albeit perhaps smaller than a more conceptually driven task).  
In the “divisor task”, participants view a numeral and then must later verify whether a 
probe number is one of its factors (e.g., seeing “14”, participants would confirm probe items of 
“1”, “14” “2”, and “7”). This task potentially requires participants to access more of their 
knowledge of numbers than the first task. If retrieving associated arithmetic facts activates a 
semantic network for the numeral itself, or otherwise conceptually primes the presented numeral, 
then one would expect facilitation on the N400. This task thus most directly addresses the 
question of whether or not the expectancy/congruency effects observed in arithmetic contexts 
reflect modulations of N400 amplitude – but critically, since the actual arithmetic probe comes 
later in this paradigm, we can look at the response to the numeral without concurrent P300 
activity.  
Finally, in the “quantifier task”, we attempt to emulate typical “read for comprehension” 
tasks often used in paradigms studying the semantic processing of words. It is unclear with 
numerals what the true equivalent of this might be, since the significance of Arabic numerals as a 
representation can vary as a function of use (e.g., as part of an arithmetic problem, as a label for 
the identity of a sports figure, as a representation of associated magnitude). However, under the 
assumption that most people’s natural experience with numbers outside the realm of the 
classroom is in the context of measuring and counting, we had people read numerical 
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expressions (e.g., “85” followed by the quantifier “yards”) and judge them for plausibility. This 
task is aimed at tapping into their conceptual knowledge of the size/magnitude conveyed by the 
numeral, and presumably also engages other long-term memories of experiences with it. We 
expected that, if any task would be able to demonstrate conceptual priming for Arabic numerals 
in the form of N400 facilitation, this would be the one most likely to succeed.  
Stepping back from the particular nuances of each task and their respective possibility for 
eliciting effects of repetition, the main question being addressed by this approach is whether 
Arabic numerals are able to convey a rich enough semantic concept to modulate the N400, a 
component functionally linked to processing the meaningfulness of a stimulus. In general, the 
approach of using single-item presentations with repetitions of identical or related primes has 
been critical for honing our understanding of the temporal dynamics of extracting various 
properties (such as semantics) from a diverse group of stimuli across modalities, such as visual 
and auditory words (e.g., Rugg, Doyle, & Melan, 1993; Joyce, Paller, Schwartz, & Kutas, 1999; 
Holcomb & Grainer, 2006; 2007), faces (e.g., Schweinberger, Pickering, Jentzsch, Burton, & 
Kaufmann, 2002; Schweinberger, Huddy, & Burton, 2004), dynamic gestures (Corina, Grosvald, 
& Lachaud, 2011; Wu & Coulson, 2005), environmental sounds (Shirmer et al., 2011), and 
pictures of objects (McPherson & Holcomb, 1999; Schendan & Kutas, 2003; 2007; Eddy, 
Schmid, & Holcomb, 2006), so this study will support and extend the existing broader literature 
of how different classes of stimuli are assessed and processed for meaning. 
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
	 89	
 Twenty-four participants were included for analysis in the study (due to the relatively 
large numbers of trials per critical condition, stable effects should not require more than this). All 
were right-handed native monolingual English speakers (12 female) with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, no early exposure to a second language, history of brain trauma, or current use of 
psychoactive medications. Participants’ average age was 20 years (range: 18 – 25), their mean 
laterality quotient on the Edinburgh handedness inventory (Oldfield, 1971) was 0.79 (range: 0.39 
- 1.00, with 1.0 indicating strongly right-handed and -1.0 strongly left-handed), and 10 reported 
having a left-handed biological family member. In order to reach the number of 24 participants, 
data was additionally collected from 2 participants who were dropped prior to analysis due to 
failure or inability to comply with instructions (i.e., excessive sleep deprivation and/or blinking 
during critical trials). Informed consent was received from all participants in accordance with the 
Institutional Review Board at the University of Illinois.  
 
Stimuli 
Critical Stimuli for All Tasks 
All double-digit numbers were used as critical stimuli, with fillers being either single- or 
triple- digit initial numbers (1-9; 100-116). From the perspective of the participant, numbers that 
they were attending and responding to ranged from 1 to 116. Critical numbers repeated after 2 or 
3 intervening numbers. Filler items did not repeat; this was necessary to build the lag structure. 
There was no indication that numbers in the double-digits were of special interest other than that 
they repeated after some intervening items. To avoid unintentional repetitions of non-identical 
numbers, there were no consecutive numbers with matching initial digits (e.g., 90 would not be 
directly followed by 93), and sequential matches of the second digit were rare.  
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Three separate orders of numbers and structures of repetitions were generated, so 
numbers that had 2 intervening items in one list might have 3 intervening items in another list, 
and numbers which appeared chronologically earlier on one list might appear later on another. 
This was necessary to have all subjects be able to perform all three tasks, and it also provided 
experimental security so that particular nuances of a given list structure could not be responsible 
for any effects.  
 
Probe Stimuli for Matching and Divisor Tasks   
In the Matching and Divisor tasks, critical numbers were followed by a single-digit 
probe. To prioritize having the correct response be evenly distributed between YES/NO, 
distribution of these probes differed across these experiments (i.e., there were a disproportionate 
number of probes of the digit 2 in the Divisor task). In the Matching task, the probe query 
required attention to have been paid to any one of the digits in the critical item in an 
unpredictable manner. Probes for correct answers were distributed as evenly as reasonably 
possible between the first digit and second digit. 
 
Probe Stimuli for the Quantifier Task 
In the Quantifier task, the critical numbers were followed by a probe quantifier word. 
These words included basic units of measurement (e.g., inches, gigabytes), as well as some 
collective nouns (used in an incomplete expression fragment, e.g., “pieces of…”), arrangement 
classifiers (“rows of…”, “pieces of…”) and varietal classifiers (“stages of…”, “types of…”). The 
use of expression fragments was necessary to encourage the measurement/counting interpretation 
of the word rather than its basic noun meaning.  
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In order to select quantifier words that were best associated with measurements and 
numbers, 105 English-speaking participants from the United States were recruited to participate 
in a norming study through Mechanical Turk. These participants consented and were 
compensated with $1.50 in accordance with University of Illinois IRB policies. In the norming 
study, participants were given a sliding ruler that spanned 0 to 100, and their assignment was to 
select a number that felt “most natural” completing the expression or word they were provided 
with. For example, they saw, “______ calories” and selected the number that they most naturally 
fit with the given measurement term. Critically, there was also a “No number feels natural” 
option, which was used to determine whether or not a given term would be sensible to our 
participants in the ERP experiment.  
Data from 101 of 105 subjects was usable; a few participants either skipped too many 
responses or picked “No number feels natural” for more than half the items. There were 100 
potential words for measurement tested for viability. The threshold for exclusion was if five or 
more participants reported “No number feels natural” for a given word. This process removed 53 
words from the set, leaving 47 to be used in the study.  
Of the 47 quantifiers included, there was variability in the numbers that were selected to 
be natural-sounding with them. The smallest average response was for “teaspoons” (mean: 6.30, 
mode: 2.0) and the largest average response was “calories” (mean: 87.95, mode: 100.0). The 
average of all responses was around 30 (29.19), and the majority of responses were below 50. 
Respondents only picked numbers above 50 for the following terms: gigabytes, pounds, 
megabytes, degrees Fahrenheit, and calories. The default position of the sliding ruler was placed 
at 50 (and to be registered as a response, they would have to move it deliberately off of this 
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position), so this bias towards being comfortable counting smaller numbers was not because the 
slider would need to be dragged farther to reach a higher number.  
On all lists, probe words repeated 4-5 times (average: 4.4), and there was a buffer of at 
least 15 intervening items before a given probe word would be used again. This was necessary 
because there were 206 items to be responded to and only 47 probe words that met criteria. As 
will become important later, this feature also allows ERP repetition effects for normal words to 
be measured in a within-subject design. 
 
Procedure 
General 
In all tasks, the timing of items followed the same format. Prior to the critical stimulus, a 
series of red “~~~~” were presented to alert the participant that a number was coming up. To 
discourage complete predictability of stimulus presentation, this remained on the screen for a 
random period of time within the range of 400 and 600ms. The critical stimulus was on the 
screen 500ms, followed by 800ms of blank to allow for ERP data collection. The probe query 
stimulus was then displayed for 500ms, after which the screen went blank. Subjects could 
respond as soon as they were able; speed was not emphasized. After a response was registered, a 
series of white “~~~~” were presented for 1500ms during which subjects could blink and move 
their eyes around. The red “~~~~” directly followed this blinking period. A small square was 
continuously presented in the center of the screen just below the stimuli to remind participants 
where to keep their eyes during otherwise blank periods. 
There were periodic self-paced breaks in which yellow “~~~~” were presented after a 
response – as in the prior Experiments, this indicated that the subjects could take a break until 
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they were ready to do more trials. During each of the three tasks across the experiment, there 
were also two experimenter-controlled breaks: one after an initial small batch of trials to check in 
on the subjects’ understanding of that task, and one roughly halfway through. Each repetition 
structure list had slightly different structure of breaks because interruptions are not possible 
when repetitions are in progress.  
Procedures that were unique to each task follow. 
 
Matching Task  
After reading the critical initial number, participants were probed with a second (single-
digit) number. They responded YES/NO to this number depending on whether that probe number 
was one of the digits in the first number. On trials in which the initial (filler) number is a single 
digit, participants were just answering whether the number repeated. More often, the first number 
was a double- or triple-digit number whose parts or identity needed to be held in memory.  
 
Divisor Task  
After reading the critical initial number, participants were probed with a second (single-
digit) number. They responded YES/NO to this number depending on whether the first number 
was divisible by the second number (i.e., if the probe was a factor). Participants were specifically 
instructed to assess if they could “take the first number, divide it by the second number, and get a 
whole number”.  They were further instructed that they did not need to know what the answer 
was, only whether or not it was a whole number. 
 
Quantifier Task 
	 94	
After reading the critical initial number, participants were probed with a quantifier word 
or expression that is typically used for measuring or counting items (as indicated by the prior 
norming study). Their instructions were to judge whether or not the previous number “seems 
typical for a given type of measurement” and to “decide if you think this is a common or typical 
pairing.” They were given examples of both rarer and more normal pairings, and it was further 
explained that there were no right answers because their judgments would depend on their own 
experience and familiarity with how numbers are used to express distances, sizes, amounts, and 
other measurements. All subjects read the same instruction sheet, and very little additional 
instruction was necessary despite the novelty of the task. After presentation of the word, subjects 
responded either “reasonably common” or “reasonably uncommon”. 
 
EEG Recording 
Brainwaves were recorded using 26 silver/silver-chloride electrodes mounted in an elastic 
cap. All electrode impedances were kept below 5kΩ, and electrodes were evenly distributed over 
the scalp (see Figure 2.1 from Experiment 1 for the configuration). The data were referenced on-
line to the left mastoid and re-referenced offline to an average of the right and left mastoids. A 
separate frontal electrode acted as ground. The vertical electrooculogram (EOG) signal was 
monitored with an electrode just below the eye (on the infraorbital ridge) and horizontal EOG 
was monitored with electrodes placed on the outer canthus of each eye. The EEG signal was 
sampled at a 250 Hz and was subjected to an analog bandpass of 0.02 to 100 Hz during online 
amplification by Sensorium amplifiers.  
Raw waveforms were assessed for inclusion on a trial-by-trial basis with artifact 
thresholds separately calibrated by visual inspection for each subject. Trials were excluded from 
averaging if they included blinks, movement artifacts, signal drift, blocking, or a horizontal eye 
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gaze movement. After artifact rejection, critical bins included 82 trials on average (range: 55 - 
90). 
Epochs of EEG data for each trial were taken from 100ms prior to item onset until 920ms 
after item onset, and the baseline acquired over the 100ms preceding the onset of each trial was 
subtracted prior to averaging. ERP mean amplitudes were measured after application of a digital 
bandpass filter of 0.1 to 20 Hz.  In all of the results below, interactions and effects of electrode-
related factors are only reported for those of theoretical relevance. 
 
 
Results 
 
 
General behavior 
 
Accuracy for responding to probes was high in both the Matching Task (98.8%) and 
Divisor Task (93.4%). In the Quantifier Task, the average percent of numerical expression 
endorsement was 54.7%, indicating a slight bias to respond “Yes” (lowest endorsement rate: 
22.3%; highest endorsement rate: 81%).  
 
Event-related potentials 
Initial presentation across tasks 
Prior to explicating the effects of primary interest to the current report (i.e., repetition 
effects on the N400), we first examined the general effect of task on the processing of the critical 
(non-probe) numbers. Visual examination of the waveforms (Figure 4.1) suggested a sustained 
effect differentiating the Quantifier Task from the other two tasks. To examine the pattern, we 
collapsed across the factor of repetition and compared the amplitude of the response to numerals 
in the Matching, Divisor, and Quantifier Tasks directly. We computed an average over a broad 
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window, from 300-700ms post-stimulus, and performed an ANOVA with 16 channels to cover 
the following distributional factors: 2 levels of Hemisphere (Left Hemisphere, Right 
Hemisphere), 2 levels of Laterality (Lateral, Midline), and 4 levels of Anteriority (from front to 
back). There was a main effect of Task (F(2,46) = 4.39, p > 0.05), which did not interact with 
any distributional factors, consistent with the widespread appearance of the effect.  
An analysis over all channels found that this effect of Task was due to more negativity in 
the Quantifier Task (1.19µV, SE = 0.07) than during either the Matching (1.66µV, SE = 0.07) or 
Divisor (1.82µV, SE = 0.08) Tasks. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons over all channels found 
significant differences between the Quantifier Task and both the Matching Task (F(1,23) = 5.70, 
p < 0.05) and the Divisor task (F(1,23) = 14.58, p < 0.01), but no significant difference between 
the Matching and Divisor Tasks themselves (F(1,23) = 0.61, p > 0.1).  
 
Repetition effects in the N400 timewindow  
An analysis of the latency of the N400 across tasks (in a timewindow from 250ms to 
500ms post-stimulus) found its peak on average to be at 395ms (SE = 1.2ms). An omnibus 
ANOVA was therefore performed on 16 channels around the center of the N400 effect, from 300 
to 500ms post-onset of critical number, with 3 levels of Task (Matching, Divisor, and 
Quantifier), 2 levels of Repetition (First Presentation, Second Presentation), and, to characterize 
the scalp distribution of any effects, 2 levels of Hemisphere (Left Hemisphere, Right 
Hemisphere), 2 levels of Laterality (Lateral, Midline), and 4 levels of Anteriority (from front to 
back). 
This analysis revealed significant main effects of Task (F(2,46) = 5.46, p < 0.01) and 
Repetition (F(1,23) = 5.40, p < 0.05), and an interaction between Repetition, Hemisphere, 
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Laterality, and Anteriority (F(3,69) = 3.83, p < 0.05). (Other interactions, between Task and 
Hemisphere (F(2,46) = 5.77, p < 0.01), Task and Laterality (F(2,46) = 3.24, p < 0.05), Task, 
Hemisphere and Laterality (F(2,46)=3.26), p < 0.05), and Task, Laterality, and Anteriority 
(F(6,138) = 2.58, p < 0.05), are reflective of the longer-lasting main effect previously 
characterized).  
 
Main effect of repetition  
 The main effect of repetition was due to facilitation (i.e., less negativity) for Second 
Presentation (repeated items) (1.72µV, SE = 0.07) relative to First Presentation (unrepeated 
items) (1.47µV, SE = 0.07). This effect’s interaction with distributional factors was due to 
relatively more facilitation for repeated items in centrofrontal channels (somewhat left-
lateralized) relative to very posterior and lateral posterior channels in general; see Figure 4.2 for 
a visual representation of this effect and its topographical distribution.  
 
Effects of repetition in each task 
Planned comparisons to examine the robustness of the effect of repetition in each task 
were performed over 21 channels (dropping the very posterior channels where there was no main 
effect). In the Matching and Divisor Tasks, there was no significant effect of repetition (F(1,23) 
= 2.43 and 2.05 respectively, p’s > 0.1). This was also true over a smaller, more focal selection 
of channels. However, as expected given that there was no interaction with task, there was a 
trend towards a repetition effect in both tasks. In the Matching Task, Second Presentation 
(1.49µV, SE = 0.10) was numerically more positive than First Presentation (1.20µV, SE = 0.09), 
and the same was true of Second Presentation (1.70µV, SE = 0.10) relative to First Presentation 
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(1.42µV, SE = 0.10) in the Divisor Task. Critically, in the Quantifier Task, there was a 
significant effect of repetition (F(1,23) = 5.13, p < 0.05), due to more facilitation for Second 
Presentation (1.12µV, SE = 0.08) compared to First Presentation (0.80µV, SE = 0.08). Figure 4.3 
displays the results of this analysis in the form of a series of bar graphs, which collectively show 
that there is a remarkable similarity in the (small) size of the repetition effect across all tasks. 
 
Effects of repetition for quantifier words 
To mitigate against potential concerns that the participants in this study were unusual in 
some way (that then resulted in a very small repetition effect with an unusual distribution), we 
took advantage of a feature of the Quantifier Task: the probe items were normal words, and all of 
the words repeated (i.e., were re-used later). Thus, we have access to a within subject 
measurement of word repetition effects in the present sample. There were at least 15 intervening 
trials prior to a word being repeated (substantially more than the number of intervening items 
between critical numerals). After artifact rejection, each presentation of the critical word had on 
average 34.5 trials per subject. 
We performed an omnibus ANOVA over 16 channels around the center of the N400, 
from 300 to 500ms post-onset of the critical probe word, with 2 levels of Repetition (First 
Presentation, Second Presentation), and, to characterize the scalp distribution of the expected 
effect, 2 levels of Hemisphere (Left Hemisphere, Right Hemisphere), 2 levels of Laterality 
(Lateral, Midline), and 4 levels of Anteriority (from front to back). This analysis found no main 
effect of Repetition (F(1,23) = 1.31, p > 0.05), but did identify an interaction between Repetition 
and Anteriority (F(3,69) = 13.75, p < 0.001).  
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Follow-up analysis was performed within two levels of Anteriority, frontal (with 11 
electrodes) and posterior (with the other 15 more central and posterior channels, where word 
repetition effects typically are obtained). There was no effect of Repetition over frontal 
electrodes (F(1,23) = 0.46, p > 0.05). However, over more posterior electrodes there was an 
effect of Repetition (F(1,23) = 9.45, p < 0.01), with words at Second Presentation (3.12 µV, SE 
= 0.22) being more facilitated (positive) than words at First Presentation (1.88 µV, SE = 0.21). A 
representative channel displaying this effect is plotted in Figure 4.4, along with a topographical 
display of its distribution. In Figure 4.5, the size of this repetition effect (i.e., the difference 
between first and second presentation) is plotted in direct comparison with the same effect for 
numerals.   
 
Discussion 
The purpose of the present set of experiments was to clarify whether or not Arabic 
numerals convey a stable enough semantic representation to influence semantic access upon 
repetition. In general, we found support for this possibility: reliable N400-like effects were 
elicited by the repetition of these numerals. In particular, we found that a negative deflection in 
the waveform, which peaked right before 400 ms, was reduced in amplitude (more positive) 
upon repetition. Under the assumption that this amplitude reduction we observed during the 
traditional N400 timewindow represents semantic access, we thus found evidence that there is 
less new semantic activity for a repeated numeral compared to the semantic activity present 
during its initial presentation.  
Our second question was whether these effects would be influenced by the level or type 
of semantic access that was being performed on the numerals: would a more superficial level of 
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processing elicit the same kind of effect as a more conceptually driven level of processing? 
Despite using a range of tasks that seemed to require different levels and types of information 
access, there was no interaction between the effect of repetition and task, because all tasks 
elicited numerically similar effects (see Figure 4.3). Although we cannot rule out subtle 
differences in the size or distribution of the effects elicited in the different tasks, the observed 
pattern suggests that the amount of meaning gleaned from processing a number seems 
remarkably stable. If this repetition effect does belong in the family of N400s, it would suggest a 
high level of stability in the amount/type of semantics that is accessed from symbolic numerals.  
There are at least two features of this effect of repetition that seem different from what is 
typically observed for repetition of other kinds of meaningful stimuli. One is that it is a very 
small effect – only about 0.30µV separates first and second presentations. In studies using words 
and letter strings, the difference that is reported tends to be substantially larger, around 1µV or 
1.5 µV (see, e.g., Laszlo & Federmeier, 2007). Further, the interitem lag (i.e., number of 
intervening items, which here was 2 or 3) is also on the smaller end than what has been used to 
observe repetition effects for words, which, if anything, should result in larger effects of 
repetition. In general, it is the case that, in contrast to words, the extent to which Arabic numerals 
receive a benefit from repetition seems smaller. Indeed, probe words that repeated in the 
quantifiers task had a more substantial repetition effect despite having notably longer repetition 
lags (see Figures 4.4 and 4.5).  
Given the parameters of the present study (high trial numbers, low numbers of 
intervening items), that the repetition effects were small indicates that numeral repetitions are 
associated with only a small amount of conceptual priming. Prior effects reported for 
expectancy-based “semantic” facilitation in arithmetic contexts have consistently been 
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substantially larger than 0.3 µV (e.g., in Exp. 1 were around 1 µV in central presentation, which 
is on the small side for that domain), and are also distributed more posteriorly than the present 
N400-like repetition effect. Thus, it would seem that the vast majority of those effects are, at 
least primarily, due to modulations in P300 amplitudes, although it is possible that there could be 
a very small contribution from N400 reductions as well. Certainly, the present results are 
inconsistent with prior researchers’ interpretation of the congruity effects in arithmetic contexts 
as entirely N400-based, given how relatively small numerals’ sensitivity to contextual support is 
– even from prior presentations of the same representation.  
The second major distinguishing feature of the repetition effect we obtained for numerals 
is its scalp distribution. In word repetition paradigms, the distribution of the effect tends to be 
centroparietal (typical for an N400 effect using an average mastoid reference) – indeed, the 
effect of repetition of words in these participants also had this canonical scalp distribution (see 
Figure 4.4). However, in the case of Arabic numerals, we found that the repetition effect 
distribution is more frontal and left-lateralized (see Figure 4.2). Although the effect was 
temporally and functionally similar to an N400, this atypical scalp distribution raises the question 
of whether the obtained repetition effect should be classified as an N400. 
It has been reported that N400 effects can shift distribution across stimulus categories, 
although precise characterization of these shifts has been difficult because of component overlap 
that often exists in paradigms eliciting N400 responses to other (non-word) stimulus types. For 
example, although N400 effects involving pictures and line drawings are typically more frontally 
distributed than those to words, pictures also tend to elicit a frontally distributed N300 effect 
(associated with the processing of visual structure), as well (Holcomb & McPherson, 1994; 
McPherson & Holcomb, 1999), which could affect the measured N400 distribution. Other 
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studies, however, have found evidence for a distributional shift in the N400 to pictures that does 
not seem to be attributable to N300 overlap (e.g., Ganis, Kutas, & Sereno, 1996; Ganis & Kutas, 
2003). Here, we similarly have a distributional shift that would not appear to be due to 
component overlap (especially since letter strings and digit strings have highly overlapping 
perceptual properties). As this kind of distributional shift is generally taken to indicate that at 
least partially non-overlapping sets of neural generators were involved in the responses, this 
pattern thus provides indirect evidence that the nature of the semantic representations being 
accessed is different for numerals and for words (to the extent that different sources imply 
different kinds of semantics). 	
We also observed an unexpected main effect of task in the form of a long-lasting 
negativity in response to numerals when they were about to be followed by a quantifier, 
compared to the tasks with digit probes (see Figure 4.1). This effect could be part of a larger 
class of negativities that have been characterized as being sensitive to uncertainty about 
upcoming stimuli. The quantifier task is associated with relatively more uncertainty about how to 
respond to the upcoming probe, as there are no clear yes/no answers, and as participants, rather 
than expecting one of 9 possible single digit probes, could not form much of an expectation for 
what specific probe words they might see. Thus, this main difference across tasks in response to 
numerals might not have to do with processing of the numerals themselves, but rather with the 
requirement to wait for an upcoming probe (see Brunia, van Boxtel, & Böcker, 2012, for review 
of anticipatory negativities).  
However, effects of this nature typically last the entire retention period, whereas in the 
present data the negativity resolves after a few hundred milliseconds. Alternatively, then, this 
effect might just be the result of comparing the processing of coherent phrases (“29” … 
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“inches”) with the processing of items that will not be conveying any kind of message-level, 
unified information (as the probe items in the other tasks are simply asking a question about the 
prior number). More importantly, although the exact source of this effect is unclear without 
further empirical work, we take this pattern as a clear indication that different sorts of cognitive 
mechanisms were engaged by our tasks (which otherwise patterned similarly).  
In sum, the very small, but reliable, effect of repetition and its unusual scalp distribution 
both are consistent with the idea that there might be a precisely tuned and specialized conceptual 
representation of semantics for Arabic numerals. Whereas the semantics accessed during word 
reading and picture viewing can be relatively more broad in scope, perhaps numerals elicit a 
more focal and specific kind of meaning, resulting in both a novel scalp distribution and a 
smaller effect of repetition priming. Arabic numerals operate in a unique space in our long term 
memories: we view them often enough to be familiar with them, but their meaning tends to be 
more specific than that elicited both by pictures (whose semantics can be ambiguous) and by 
words (e.g., reading “mop” engages the semantics not just of mops but also of similar-looking 
words “pop” and “top” and the semantics associated with them as well; Laszlo & Federmeier, 
2009). In contrast, it may be to our benefit to both associate Arabic numerals with very specific 
semantics (i.e., number words and their values) and to restrict the automatic spreading of 
semantic activations across numerals more than is done for written words.  
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Figures 
Figure 4.1 
 
Figure 4.1 Left: Schematic of electrode channel configuration, with stars indicating the plotted 
channels. Right: Response to the first presentation of Arabic numerals in each task (quantifier, 
divisor, and matching). There is a more negative response to these numerals in the quantifier task 
than in either the divisor or matching tasks. 
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Figure 4.2 
 
Figure 4.2  
Top: The effect of repetition of numerals across all tasks is plotted, where it can be seen that 
numerals are more positive on their second presentation compared to their first. Bottom: 
Graphical representation of the topographical distribution of the effect of repetition on the N400 
(measured 300 – 500 ms post-stimulus as the numerical subtraction of first presentation from 
second presentation). The darker areas correspond to a larger repetition effect.  
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Figure 4.3 
 
Figure 4.3 The N400 repetition effect measured in each task is presented, showing more positive 
responses for second presentation (striped red) compared with first (black). The average voltage 
from 21 electrode channels measured over 300 - 500 milliseconds post-stimulus onset in each 
task is reported. Positive is plotted down for consistency with ERP plotting customs. 
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Figure 4.4 
 
Figure 4.4  
Top: Response to the repetition of probe quantifier words. Bottom: Graphical representation of 
the topographical distribution of the effect of repetition on the N400 (measured 300 – 500 ms 
post-stimulus as the numerical subtraction of first presentation from second presentation). The 
darker areas correspond to a larger repetition effect.  
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Figure 4.5 
 
Figure 4.5 The N400 repetition effect measured for words and double-digit Arabic numerals. 
Plotted is the difference between first and second presentation of items, as derived from the 
average voltage of 15 centroposterior electrode channels measured over 300-500 milliseconds 
post-stimulus onset. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Experiment 4: Is your favorite number special? Evidence for item-level differences in retrieval of 
information from numerals 
 
Introduction 
Experiment 3 showed that, although N400 repetition effects can be obtained for Arabic 
numerals, such effects are smaller than those obtained for other types of meaningful stimuli, and 
their size seems largely unaffected by the amount of conceptual processing required by the task.  
The N400 repetition effects to Arabic numerals also differed from those seen to words in their 
scalp distribution. These differences raise important questions about how these numerals, as 
compared with other stimulus types, access meaningful representations in long term memory.  
Here, therefore, we ask more directly what happens when people are encouraged to process 
numerals for meaning in a manner more similar to words, and, in that context, whether people’s 
experience with (individual) numbers matters. First, it is useful to examine the range of repetition 
effects that have been obtained in the literature thus far and what variables influence those 
effects. 
One of the most salient features of the repetition effect obtained to numbers in 
Experiment 3 was its small size. Generally, N400 repetition effect sizes for a given stimulus type 
are dependent on a number of factors. Two relatively straightforward modulators of repetition 
effect size are retention duration (fewer intervening items or less delay between repetitions, 
larger effects of repetition) and number of repetitions (larger effects for the first repetition than 
subsequent ones). Other modulators of repetition effect size are relatively more subjective to 
manipulate, and they include task, with larger effects for tasks involving deeper engagement with 
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the critical items, and type of stimulus, with more conceptually rich stimuli (e.g., words) eliciting 
larger repetition effects than conceptually impoverished stimuli (e.g., randomly connected lines) 
(Nagy & Rugg, 1989; Rugg, Furda, & Lorist, 1988; Rugg & Nagy, 1989; Rugg, 1990; Van 
Petten & Senkfor, 1996).  
The most straightforward account of N400 repetition effects is that they are due to a 
reduction in the amount of new semantic activity that occurs as a result of prior semantic long-
term memory access. That is, the semantic state established with the first presentation of an item 
persists to some degree over time (e.g., because semantic features remain active or, on a recent 
computational model of N400 repetition effects, because the influence of inhibitory connectivity 
persists, making it harder to reactivate the same semantics; Laszlo & Armstrong, 2014). With 
time, these influences from the prior presentation decay, making the processing of repetitions at 
increasingly long intervals more and more like that of first presentation. This also explains why 
additional repetitions are less effective at inducing additional facilitation: it might only take one 
exposure to a given stimulus to make strong contact with long-term memory representations, 
such that there is little change of state with additional exposures.  
Under this view, the reason that conceptually driven tasks are more effective at eliciting 
repetition effects is because they encourage readers to fully activate and refine the semantic 
features of the incoming stimulus (including processing that occurs after the N400 at first 
presentation). In the case of words, semantic access seems to be relatively obligatory, such that 
repetition effects are obtained even when words are presented in the context of detection tasks 
targeting physical properties of the word; however, these effects are more substantial in detection 
tasks targeting semantic category membership (e.g., Rugg, Furda, & Lorist, 1988). For other 
classes of stimuli, such as unpronounceable strings of letters (“illegal strings”) like “TXM” and 
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unfamiliar geometric shapes, effects of task on repetition effects are even more striking. In many 
task contexts, repetition effects for such stimulus types are small or not detectable (Rugg & 
Nagy, 1987; Voss & Paller, 2009b; Voss & Paller, 2010). For example, when participants are 
asked to monitor an input stream for a category of items (such as proper names), illegal strings 
fail to elicit N400 repetition effects (Laszlo & Federmeier, 2007), presumably because these 
items are easily dismissed as task irrelevant and thus not processed deeply. However, when task 
demands require that the meaningfulness of these strings at least be considered – i.e., in a 
modified lexical decision task with “yes” responses to meaningful acronyms like “CBS” and 
“DVD” as well as to words -- then such strings also elicit N400 repetition effects (Laszlo, Stites, 
& Federmeier, 2012). In sum, when stimuli can be immediately dismissed as task-irrelevant, a 
decision can be made without full access to associated long-term memories, and, as a 
consequence, smaller (or nonsignificant) N400 repetition effects are obtained.  
Experiment 3 provided evidence that Arabic numerals are an interesting class of stimuli 
that elicit some long-term semantic memory processing under a range of task conditions, but do 
so in a manner that results in a notably smaller amount of repetition-based N400 facilitation than 
for more broadly meaningful stimuli like words. Importantly, although manipulations of task 
failed to modulate repetition effects for numerals as a collective class of stimuli, there is also 
evidence that repetition effects can vary on the level of items within a stimulus class. 
Specifically, one way that researchers have succeeded in finding evidence that otherwise low-
meaningfulness stimuli can elicit stable conceptual representations (and thus elicit repetition 
effects) is through sorting the items by their subjective meaningfulness to a given participant. 
This is possible because even among classes of stimuli that have generally been associated with 
lower levels of rich conceptual information, there can still be items that a given individual finds 
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to be more or less meaningful to them. For example, among illegal strings of letters, some are 
meaningful – e.g., are familiar acronyms – and others are not, and, indeed, the effects obtained 
by Laszlo & Federmeier (2007) were based on person-specific item-level meaningfulness, as 
some acronyms were not familiar to individual people (and thus elicited responses like those to 
non-acronym illegal strings) and some illegal strings were idiosyncratically familiar (for 
example, BWHS might be the acronym for a particular person’s high school), and consequently 
elicited acronym-like repetition effects. Thus, an individual participant’s experience with an item 
can influence the magnitude of his/her N400 repetition effects to that item. 
Similar studies of the flexibility of our conceptual engagement with relatively unfamiliar-
looking items have been performed with item classes outside of letters. For example, novel 
geometric shapes can sometimes appear to be familiar (e.g., what appears to be a random 
“squiggle” to one person might appear to be a sketch of a jumping deer to another person). If 
individuals are not told about this possibility, and are simply asked to memorize these items or to 
judge them for a low-level visual feature, there is no evidence of semantic processing (i.e., no 
N400 repetition effects; Van Petten & Senkfor, 1996; Voss, Schendan, & Paller, 2010; Voss & 
Paller, 2009b). This is similar to how meaningless illegal strings do not elicit repetition effects 
when surface-level assessments of them (“not a possible word”) render their meaningfulness 
task-irrelevant. However, when individuals are encouraged to think about the possible 
meaningfulness of novel shapes because the task is to rate them as personally familiar or 
unfamiliar, then evidence of conceptual priming emerges, selectively for the shapes that 
individuals rated as familiar (Voss et al., 2010).  
It is important to note that, even in the same task (“rate for meaningfulness”), strings of 
text and novel shapes differ in their pattern of N400 repetition effects. Under these processing 
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conditions, letter strings elicit N400 repetition effects regardless of their meaningfulness ratings, 
whereas shapes only elicit N400 repetition effects if the participant had identified them as 
familiar/meaningful (Laszlo et al., 2012; Voss et al., 2010; c.f., Voss, Lucas, & Paller, 2010, with 
a longer retention interval and more intervening items, which led to only wordforms rated as 
familiar eliciting facilitation on the N400). In general, this work with semantic processing of 
letter strings and geometric shapes suggests a natural readiness for conceptual engagement with 
any class of stimuli – and the strength of this engagement depends on readers’ subjective 
judgment of their meaningfulness. 
This literature raises the interesting possibility that, although manipulations of conceptual 
engagement with numerals as a class was ineffective at modulating the size of N400 repetition 
effects (in Experiment 3), there might be differences in meaningfulness at the level of item – that 
is, some Arabic numerals might themselves carry broader meaningfulness than others. Such a 
possibility could then be uncovered by participants’ subjective judgments. In order to address 
this question, in the present study we had participants read the same double-digit Arabic numbers 
as in Experiment 3, while rating them as either familiar (i.e., meaningful) or not. We then 
examined N400 repetition effects for these items as a function of participants’ own perception of 
them as familiar or unfamiliar. 
In general, this approach of self-rated meaningfulness rests on a relatively new way to 
think about how semantic access for numerals unfolds. The majority of the literature treats the 
learned association between numerals and specific values and/or numerosities as their most 
important feature (i.e., “16” is a symbol that is highly associated with the number word 
“sixteen”, and the primary meaning of “16” is a magnitude of 16 units), given their critical role 
in arithmetic and mathematical processing. Debates over the meaning of numerals have tended to 
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circle whether or not quantity information is automatically activated from numerals (i.e., digits) 
(Henik & Tzelgov, 1982; Pavese & Umiltà, 1998; Ganor-Stern, Tzelgov, & Ellenbogen, 2007; 
Cohen, 2009; Lyons, Ansari, & Beilock, 2012; Goldfarb, Henik, Rubinsten, Bloch-David, & 
Gertner, 2011), whether other aspects of digits influence how they are accessed (e.g., physical 
similarity to each other) (Garcea-Orza, Perea, Mallouh, & Carreiras, 2012), how much of their 
meaning is structured through a representation resembling a number line (Umiltà, Priftis, & 
Zorzi, 2009; Santens & Gevers, 2008; Fias, van Dijck, & Gevers, 2011), and whether or not the 
representation of numerosity engaged by Arabic numerals is shared in an abstract form with the 
representation of numerosity activated by number words and by non-symbolic representations of 
number (Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, & Cohen, 1998; Libertus, Woldorff, & Brannon, 2007; 
Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009).  
With respect to these debates, the results from Experiment 3 were broadly consistent with 
the notion that some kind of meaning is being accessed relatively automatically when numerals 
are read, in the sense that effects emerged on what would seem to be the N400, which is a 
relatively automatic index of meaning access (i.e., N400 responses are elicited to potentially 
meaningful stimuli essentially whenever they are encountered, even when participants are unable 
to report having perceived the stimuli; Vogel, Luck, & Shapiro, 1998). Additionally, the results 
were consistent with the possibility that the specific meaning could be numerical in nature, since 
the distribution of the effect is different from words – and, thus, the nature/source of the 
semantics could be different. Finally, the consistently small magnitude of the effect could be 
consistent with the idea that the set of information being accessed from memory is fairly 
restricted (e.g., limited to size or number value), at least relative to the concepts associated with 
other stimulus types like words. What the present experiment proposes to uncover, then, is a 
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relatively independent possibility that, under circumstances wherein participants are encouraged 
to think about the meaning of numbers more broadly, the semantic network that is activated by 
numerals could additionally include other types of (more word-like) meaningfulness, beyond the 
more specific concepts that they otherwise seem to bring to mind.  
The most direct form of evidence for this would be if items subjectively rated as familiar 
elicited substantially larger N400 repetition effects than items rated as unfamiliar. If, in contrast, 
items rated as familiar and items rated as unfamiliar elicit similarly small N400 repetition effects, 
then that would suggest that our relatively automatic semantic access for numerals is strikingly 
consistent across items (as well as across task, as seen in Experiment 3). In sum, whereas in 
Experiment 3 we attempted find evidence that different tasks could modulate the amount of 
semantic access a class of items received, in the present experiment we attempt to find evidence 
for differences in semantic access across items within the same (familiarity judgment) task.  
Another feature of the N400 repetition effect that could reveal a change in what people 
are accessing when they view Arabic numerals (rather than just how much semantic content they 
are accessing) is the scalp topography of the effect itself. Notably, N400 repetition effects for 
more broadly meaningful pictures and letter strings tend to have centroparietal distributions. In 
Experiment 3, we observed a different distribution – more frontal and left-lateralized. It is 
possible that if we ask participants to think about the broader potential meaningfulness of these 
numerals, then we might find a more canonical (word-like) distribution of the N400 repetition 
effect. This would suggest that numerals can elicit access the same kind of broad meaningfulness 
as other conceptually rich items like words and pictures.	
Although N400 repetition effect patterns are a primary focus of this experiment, there are 
other ERP responses that may also be affected by our manipulation. These additional effects 
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offer the opportunity to further assess how numbers may be treated similarly or differently from 
other potentially meaningful stimuli. Specifically, in repetition paradigms, beyond effects on the 
N400 (which are thought to reflect relatively automatic and effortless semantic access), there are 
also frequent reports of differences on late positivities (conventionally referred to as a “late 
positive complex” or LPC), which are instead thought to reflect more explicit and conscious 
recollective processing of stimuli (e.g., Paller & Kutas, 1992; Paller, Kutas, & McIsaac, 1995; 
Voss & Paller, 2009a). The strongest evidence for a distinction between N400 and LPC 
repetition effects comes from patients with hippocampal damage, who have severe impairments 
in the ability to form and explicitly recall new memories of items and events, although they often 
retain the ability to learn subconsciously (e.g., there is evidence for implicit priming in amnesic 
patients) (e.g., Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1970; for review, see Schacter, 1987). In these 
hippocampal patients, repetition effects can be obtained on the N400, but LPC effects are 
eliminated (Olichney et al., 2000; Duzel, Vargha-Khadem, Heinze, & Mishkin, 2001). Also 
consistent with the interpretation of LPC effects as being dependent on intact hippocampal 
function and associated with declarative memory, larger LPC effects are typically associated 
with better behavioral performance (e.g., more successful recollection of the source of a given 
memory) in recognition tasks (Curran & Cleary, 2003; Duzel, Yonelinas, Mangun, Heinze, & 
Tulving, 1997; Woodruff, Hayama, & Rugg, 2006; Woroch & Gonsalves, 2010). 
These LPC effects have been studied both in incidental repetition paradigms – wherein 
explicit old/new categorization is not required – as well as in paradigms in which the second 
presentation of the item takes place in the context of a memory test (i.e., distinguishing between 
old and new items). In explicit testing paradigms, larger LPCs are typically obtained for correctly 
recognized old items compared to new or missed (incorrectly rejected old) items (e.g., Van 
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Petten & Senkfor, 1996; Voss & Paller, 2009a,b). Interestingly, the same geometric shapes that 
failed to elicit N400 repetition effects when they were judged to be unfamiliar also failed to elicit 
these LPC recollection effects, suggesting that the presence of the LPC is not just due to 
remembering that the item was previously presented, but reflects explicit retrieval of details 
about that item (Voss, Schendan, & Paller, 2010). 
In the present experiment, participants are rating their own subjective familiarity with 
each numeral, and it seems likely that, in order to make these judgments about the personal 
relevance of a numeral due to prior experiences, recollective processes necessarily occur. In 
Experiment 3, which did not obtain any LPC effects, processes of recollection (and decision-
making in general) were purposefully delayed until the test probe occurred. Thus, even though 
previously these stimuli did not elicit late positivities, it is possible that they might in the current 
paradigm, particularly since participants are being asked to engage in explicit retrieval. 
On the basis of the prior literature, then, if LPC effects for numerals are obtained, we 
expect to see enhanced LPC responses (more positivity, beginning around 500 ms and continuing 
for a few hundred milliseconds) for repeated items (which are similar to “old” items in explicit 
memory paradigms). A key novel question, then, is whether this potential LPC enhancement will 
also be selective (or at least enhanced) to numerals that were rated as subjectively familiar. Such 
a finding would be consistent with an interpretation that our long term memories for the subset of 
Arabic numerals that are uniquely meaningful to us can be deliberately retrieved and impact our 
subsequent reading of them. An additional possibility is that, on the measure of the N400, no 
difference between numerals rated familiar and unfamiliar might emerge, but instead an 
interaction might occur selectively on the LPC. This was the case in a study involving complex 
visual shapes (Voss & Paller, 2009b), in which stimuli were too conceptually impoverished to 
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elicit facilitated N400 responses but still elicited enhanced LPCs during recognition. Therefore, 
failures to find evidence that Arabic numerals are processed for their distinctive amount of 
meaningfulness on the N400 would not immediately indicate that there is no additional 
information about aspects of their meaning (e.g., to learned associations beyond numeracy) in 
long term memory, only that accessing this extra meaning is not fast and obligatory.  
In general, the pattern of N400 and LPC repetition effects for numerals rated as familiar 
and unfamiliar will help us better understand how people engage with the meaning and long-term 
memory representation of these numerals outside of their utilization as a representation of 
specific numerical value.  
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
Thirty-two participants were included for analysis in this study. All were right-handed 
native monolingual English speakers (half female) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no 
early exposure to a second language, history of brain trauma, or current use of psychoactive 
medications. Participants’ average age was 21 (range: 18 – 29), their mean laterality quotient on 
the Edinburgh handedness inventory (Oldfield, 1971) was 0.82 (range: 0.43 - 1.00, with 1.0 
indicating strongly right-handed and -1.0 strongly left-handed), and 9 reported having a left-
handed biological family member. Informed consent was received from all participants in 
accordance with the Institutional Review Board at the University of Illinois. 
 
Stimuli 
The critical stimuli were the same as from Experiment 3 (double-digit numbers, repeating 
after a 2-3 intervening trials), and each participant saw one of three list orders.  
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Procedure  
The basic procedure was the same as in Experiment 3. The critical numbers were 
presented for 500ms, followed by a blank data collection period of 800ms, after which subjects 
were prompted by a question mark to enter their response categorizing the item as Familiar or 
Unfamiliar to them. Once their response to a numeral was registered, they proceeded to the next 
trial. For a numeral to be categorized as Familiar, participants were instructed to use a liberal and 
subjective definition of either having specific life experiences with the numeral and/or more 
generally having a high degree of personal familiarity with it (that did not necessarily need to be 
linked to a concrete reason). This relatively open description was necessary to generate enough 
endorsements of meaningfulness to have sufficient trial counts for each subject: under more 
restrictive criteria, most subjects would not endorse many numerals as meaningful.  
All subjects were provided the following specific examples of how to think about 
concrete meaningfulness: apartment numbers, people’s ages, dates/years, and athlete jersey 
numbers. Responses were monitored during the experiment to ensure compliance with 
instructions, and some participants had to be encouraged to be more liberal with their 
verifications (i.e., they started out rating every numeral as Unfamiliar). Response hand was 
counterbalanced with participant sex and stimulus list (with half responding Familiar with their 
right hand and Unfamiliar with their left hand).  
 
EEG Recording 
Brainwaves were recorded using 26 silver/silver-chloride electrodes mounted in an elastic 
cap. All electrode impedances were kept below 5kΩ, and electrodes were evenly distributed over 
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the scalp (see Figure 2.1 for the configuration). The data were referenced on-line to the left 
mastoid and re-referenced offline to an average of the right and left mastoids. A separate frontal 
electrode acted as ground. The vertical electrooculogram (EOG) signal was monitored with an 
electrode just below the eye (on the infraorbital ridge) and horizontal EOG was monitored with 
electrodes placed on the outer canthus of each eye. The EEG signal was sampled at a 250 Hz and 
was subjected to an analog bandpass of 0.02 to 100 Hz during online amplification by Sensorium 
amplifiers.  
Raw waveforms were assessed for inclusion on a trial-by-trial basis with artifact 
thresholds separately calibrated by visual inspection for each subject. Trials were excluded from 
averaging if they included blinks, movement artifacts, signal drift, blocking, or a horizontal eye 
gaze movement. After artifact rejection, for items rated familiar consistently (endorsed on both 
first and second instance), there were 26 trials on average (range: 8 – 41; median: 27), and for 
items rated unfamiliar consistently, there were 42 trials on average (range: 14 – 70; median: 39). 
Epochs of EEG data for each trial were taken from 100ms prior to item onset until 920ms 
after item onset, and the baseline acquired over the 100ms preceding the onset of each trial was 
subtracted prior to averaging. ERP mean amplitudes were measured after application of a digital 
bandpass filter of 0.1 to 20 Hz.  For all tests with more than 1 degree of freedom in the 
numerator, the Huynh-Feldt corrected P-value is reported. In all of the results below, interactions 
and effects of electrode-related factors are only reported for those of theoretical relevance.  
 
Results 
 
Behavior 
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Familiarity ratings 
Although most numbers had a bias towards overall familiarity/unfamiliarity, there was 
across-subject disagreement: the top 30% of numbers consistently rated as Familiar were still 
rated as Unfamiliar more than 25% of the time. All numbers received mixed ratings across 
participants. There was a tendency for numbers that were more consistently rated as Familiar to 
be lower in value. 4  
 
Event-related potentials 
N400 timewindow 
 Analysis of the latency of the N400, as measured by identifying the peak of the negativity 
in the timewindow from 250 to 500ms, found that it was maximum at 372ms (SE = 1.3ms) post-
stimulus onset. There were no effects of Familiarity or Repetition on its latency. In the analyses 
that follow, N400 amplitude was measured from 300 – 500ms (as in Expt. 3). 
To assess effects of Repetition and Familiarity on the N400 and to characterize the scalp 
distribution of any such effects, we performed an omnibus ANOVA with 2 levels of Familiarity 
(Familiar, Unfamiliar), 2 levels of Repetition (First Presentation, Second Presentation), 2 levels 
of Hemisphere (Left Hemisphere, Right Hemisphere), 2 levels of Laterality (Lateral, Midline), 
and 4 levels of Anteriority (from front to back) on the 16 electrode sites that could be classified 
along all three dimensions. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of Familiarity 
																																																								4	This is to be expected given that numerals were not an experimentally generated random set of 
stimuli, but instead were stimuli that participants had a lifetime of experience using, and lower 
numbers are more frequent in the world. However, the average value of the top-third most 
consistently rated Familiar numbers (38) was still higher than would be expected if the numbers 
had simply been ranked by value (24.5). Similarly, the average value of numbers most 
consistently rated Unfamiliar (64) was lower than what would be expected by a simple ranking 
of the 30 highest-value numbers in the sample (75.5). 	
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(F(1,31) = 14.92, p < 0.001), which interacted with the distributional variables of Laterality 
(F(1,31) = 12.32, p < 0.01) and Anteriority (F(3,93) = 10.93, p < 0.01), as well as with Laterality 
and Anteriority together (F(3,93) = 4.0, p < 0.05). There was no main effect of Repetition 
(F(1,31) = 1.67, p > 0.05), but there were interactions between Repetition and the distributional 
variables of Laterality (F(1,31) = 5.57, p < 0.05) and Anteriority (F(3,93) = 4.38, p < 0.05). 
Finally, there was an interaction between Familiarity, Repetition, and the three distributional 
factors (F(3,93) = 3.06, p < 0.05).  
The reported interactions between critical factors and the distributional factors reflected 
effects were generally larger at medial sites (generating effects of Laterality) and that there were 
differences in how these effects patterned across frontal and posterior channels (generating 
effects of Anteriority). Such effects of Laterality are not surprising, given the use of a mastoid 
references which results in smaller effects at temporal (lateral) sites. However, effects of 
Anteriority are likely more substantive. Therefore, to better characterize the effects of Familiarity 
and Repetition across levels of Anteriority, separate analyses of these factors were performed 
with the 11 frontal channels and with 15 posterior channels.  
In frontal channels, there was only a main effect of Familiarity (F(1,31) = 18.23, p < 
0.001), and no effect of Repetition (F(1,31) = 0.01, p > 0.50) or interaction between Repetition 
and Familiarity (F(1,31) = 0.46, p > 0.50). The main effect of Familiarity was due a more 
positive response to items rated as Familiar (3.64µV, SE = 0.15) compared to items rated as 
Unfamiliar (2.30µV, SE = 0.12).  
In posterior channels, however, there were both main effects of Familiarity (F(1,31) = 
9.33, p < 0.01) and Repetition (F(1,31) = 7.67, p < 0.01). There was no interaction between 
Familiarity and Repetition (F(1,31) = 0.82, p > 0.50). The main effect of Familiarity was due to a 
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more positive response to items rated as Familiar (5.22µV, SE = 0.15) compared to items rated 
as Unfamiliar (4.50µV, SE = 0.10), and the main effect of Repetition was due to Second 
Presentation items (5.28, SE = 0.11) being more positive than First Presentation items (4.53, SE 
= 0.10).  
In sum, both frontal and posterior channels had an effect of Familiarity that was unrelated 
to Repetition, with more positivity (or less negativity) for items rated as Familiar than items rated 
as Unfamiliar, whereas posterior channels revealed an additional effect of Repetition that was 
unrelated to Familiarity (with facilitation for repeated items). The leftmost plots in Figure 5.3 
display topographical maps of the distribution of the N400 repetition effect, separately for items 
rated Familiar and Unfamiliar. Raw waveforms of the N400 repetition effect from two 
representative channels are plotted in Figure 5.2. 
 
LPC timewindow 
Analysis of the latency of the late positivity, as measured by identifying the maximum of 
the positivity in the timewindow from 500 to 900ms, found that it was maximum at 611ms (SE = 
2.1ms) post-stimulus onset. There were no effects of Familiarity or Repetition on its latency. In 
the analyses that follow, LPC amplitude was measured from 500 – 800ms. 
To assess effects of Repetition and Familiarity on the LPC and to characterize its scalp 
distribution, we performed an omnibus ANOVA with 2 levels of Familiarity (Familiar, 
Unfamiliar), 2 levels of Repetition (First Presentation, Second Presentation), 2 levels of 
Hemisphere (Left Hemisphere, Right Hemisphere), 2 levels of Laterality (Lateral, Midline), and 
4 levels of Anteriority (from front to back). This analysis revealed a main effect of Familiarity 
(F(1,31) = 29.73, p < 0.001), which interacted with the distributional variable of Laterality 
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(F(1,31) = 16.56, p < 0.001), and with both Laterality and Anteriority (F(3,93) = 3.81, p < 0.05). 
There was no main effect of Repetition (F(1,31) = 0.29, p > 0.50), but this factor interacted with 
the distributional variable of Anteriority (F(3,93) = 16.27, p < 0.001), as well as with Laterality 
and Anteriority (F(3,93) = 3.23, p < 0.05) and Hemisphere and Laterality (F(1,31) = 2.07, p < 
0.05). Additionally, Repetition and Familiarity interacted with the distributional variable of 
Anteriority (F(3,93) = 6.60, p < 0.05), as well as all three distributional factors (F(3,93) = 2.83, p 
< 0.05).  
To examine the effects of Familiarity and Repetition and their interactions with 
Anteriority, separate analyses were performed over the frontal 11 channels and the posterior 15 
channels. Over posterior channels, there were main effects of Familiarity (F(1,31) = 21.32, p < 
0.001) and Repetition (F(1,31) = 5.53, p < 0.05), and an interaction between Familiarity and 
Repetition (F(1,31) = 5.53, p < 0.05). Over frontal channels, there was only a main effect of 
Familiarity (F(1,31) = 31.87, p < 0.001). Thus, in the omnibus ANOVA, the interactions 
between Familiarity and Repetition with Anteriority largely reflected that, in posterior channels, 
there was an interaction between Familiarity and Repetition, whereas in frontal channels, there 
was a main effect of Familiarity that was not impacted by Repetition.  
Planned comparisons of the effect of Repetition on Familiar and Unfamiliar items were 
performed over the posterior channels, where LPC effects typically emerge. For items that were 
rated Unfamiliar, there was no effect of Repetition (F(1,31) = 0.53, p > 0.10). However, for 
items that were rated as Familiar, there was an effect of Repetition (F(1,31) = 7.90, p < 0.01), 
with Familiar Second Presentation (repeated) items being more positive (6.07µV, SE = 0.17) 
than Familiar First Presentation (unrepeated) items (4.82µV, SE = 0.18). The rightmost plots in 
Figure 5.3 display topographical maps of the distribution of the LPC effect, separately for items 
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rated Familiar and Unfamiliar. Raw waveforms of the LPC effect from two representative 
channels are plotted in Figure 5.2. 
The same analysis performed over the frontal 11 channels found no effect of Repetition 
either for items rated Familiar (F(1,31) = 1.95, p > 0.10) or items rated Unfamiliar (F(1,31) = 
1.02, p > 0.10). Over these channels, there was (as in the N400 timewindow), a main effect 
(F(1,31) = 22.38, p < 0.001) wherein items rated as Familiar were more positive / less negative 
(5.34µV, SE = 0.21) than were items rated as Unfamiliar (3.81µV, SE = 0.17). Figure 5.1 
displays this frontal effect of Familiarity.  
 
Discussion 
 Our primary goals were to assess how subjective ratings of familiarity of double-digit 
Arabic numerals affected participants’ (1) conceptual processing of them (indexed by N400 
repetition effects), and (2) explicit retrieval of detailed information about them (indexed by LPC 
repetition effects). Importantly, these effects were assessed within-subject (based on their 
subjective ratings of personal experience with Arabic numerals), so that, across participants, any 
particular numeral varied in whether it was categorized as familiar or unfamiliar. 
 Our findings for the effect of repetition in the N400 timewindow are as follows. First, we 
found a significant N400 repetition effect. Strikingly, this effect had the canonical 
(centroparietal) distribution, suggesting that we succeeded in shifting the kind of semantics 
people engage with when reading numerals to a more word and picture-like representation. 
Interestingly, this effect was also numerically larger than that seen in Experiment 3 (around 
0.75µV versus the prior 0.30µV). In general, the features of the N400 effect we observed (i.e., its 
canonical distribution and at least numerically more substantial size) seem to collectively 
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indicate that the demands of the familiarity judgment task shifted the nature and/or amount of 
semantic information obtained from numerals. However, critically, there was not a difference in 
this effect across familiarity. 
Numerals rated familiar and numerals rated unfamiliar elicited indistinguishable (small) 
N400 repetition effects (see Figure 5.2 for these waveforms). This replicates findings from a 
similar task with words and letter strings (Laszlo et al., 2012). There, even unpronounceable 
strings of letters rated as unfamiliar (“TXQ”) elicited N400 repetition effects when participants 
were judging whether or not they were meaningful (i.e., whether or not they were an acronym). 
Further, this is not what has been observed when participants rated novel shapes (squiggles) – 
there, only shapes rated as familiar elicited N400 repetition effects (Voss et al., 2010). That is, 
unlike truly pre-experimentally novel geometric shapes, double-digit numbers were similarly 
processed for their meaningfulness regardless of how participants eventually subjectively rated 
them. This might indicate that having long-term, pre-experimental experience extracting 
meaning from a stimulus class renders even those items rated as unfamiliar more meaningful 
than items similarly that are similarly rated as unfamiliar but for which participants have no pre-
experimental experience. The mechanisms resulting in this outcome might differ across stimulus 
class, however: whereas strings of letters might be more inherently meaningful (than novel 
shapes) due to their confusability with real words and acronyms, a different process is likely 
unfolding when encountering Arabic numerals and accessing their semantics. 
Importantly, under many assumptions of Arabic numeral reading, some kind of numerical 
magnitude or value information is obligatorily accessed every time a numeral is encountered, in 
a mostly task-independent way (and whether these representations are for the exact number value 
or for a more abstract conceptual numerosity is contentious). Under this view, it would be 
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expected that even numbers being rated as unfamiliar should convey some kind of stable 
conceptual magnitude/value representation to the viewer, which would suggest there should not 
be a huge difference in N400 repetition effects for items rated familiar and unfamiliar. Indeed, 
this is what we observed. But does this necessarily mean that the N400 repetition effect we found 
for Arabic numerals subjectively rated as unfamiliar reflects facilitation of the processing of 
numeracy-related concepts?  
We suspect that the shift of the N400 effect from the unusual frontal-left scalp 
distribution in Experiment 3 (where the semantic representations being engaged might have been 
number value or numeracy alone) to the more canonical centroposterior scalp distribution in the 
present experiment might argue against such a consistent uniformity in the precise type of 
semantics being accessed. At the very least, something about the neural source of the N400 
repetition effects across these experiments differed, and the sources responsible for repetition 
effects in the present experiment seem more similar to those that typically give rise to N400 
repetition effects in more richly meaningful contexts than did the sources of the effects observed 
in Experiment 3.  
One possibility is that concepts related to numeracy were indeed uniformly being 
activated, but additional semantic activations were encouraged by the current experimental 
paradigm that both caused the effect to be somewhat larger and to shift in distribution into 
posterior regions. The size of the effect over left frontocentral sites that were the focus of the 
prior experiment remains similar here (first presentation: 2.79 µV, SE = 0.19; second 
presentation: 3.15 µV, SE =0.20), making it especially tempting to interpret the present effect as 
at least somewhat of an augmentation of the prior effect. While this is possible, having different 
participants across studies precludes any strong interpretation of this kind. Further, any apparent 
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numerical facilitation over these sites in the present study could simply reflect residual spreading 
of the N400 effect away from its posterior maximum (see Figure 5.3). A within-subject design 
with more a targeted approach to addressing this issue might be able to better disentangle these 
possibilities.  
Regardless of what the precise source of the semantic activity across these studies was, it 
is clear that the N400 repetition effect itself was not affected by ratings of subjective familiarity. 
However, there was an effect of familiarity that began at the same time as the N400. This 
frontally-distributed long-lasting effect was present during both first and second presentation of 
numerals, and took the form of a sustained negativity for numerals that participants self-rated as 
unfamiliar compared to numerals that they self-rated as familiar (see Figure 5.1). A first-pass 
interpretation of this effect might attribute it to the “FN400” commonly reported in studies of 
memory. In these reports, words recognized as old at test (familiar words) elicit less negative-
going ERPs over frontal channels compared to words categorized as new at test (unfamiliar 
words). This is essentially a frontally distributed N400 repetition effect, which appears likely to 
reflect conceptual priming (Voss & Paller, 2009b; Voss & Federmeier, 2011). Additionally, the 
effect can be extended beyond the N400 timewindow (as in the present study), and it is less clear 
what that continued facilitation signifies (see, e.g., Wilding & Rugg, 1996; Woodruff, Hayama, 
& Rugg, 2006).  
Two major issues with interpreting the present effect as a frontally-distributed N400 of 
the type reported in the memory literature is that the effect was not impacted by repetition (which 
would be expected of an N400 effect), and that we obtained it on first presentation (whereas in 
memory paradigms it is always reported on second presentation, during recall tests). That is, if 
the obtained effect truly reflected the kind of conceptual priming thought to be giving rise to the 
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FN400 effect in memory paradigms, then it should have been similarly affected by the priming 
induced by repetition. Because it was not, we suspect the difference between numerals rated 
familiar and unfamiliar must instead be caused by a different mechanism. 
One possibility is that the frontal negativity for unfamiliar items is related to the family of 
sustained negativities that are often associated with differences in working memory load (with 
larger sustained negativities for larger loads) that are often reduced in age (e.g., Ruchkin, 
Canoune, Johnson, & Ritter, 2007; Chao & Knight, 1997). For example, sustained negativities 
are also a feature of difficult-to-parse sentences compared to less demanding sentences (King & 
Kutas, 1995). An additional domain that has shown similar ERP effects is studies of word 
ambiguity. Words that are ambiguous both in class (noun/verb) and semantic meaning (e.g., 
“duck”, which could be utilized as a noun or verb, and neither interpretation conveys semantic 
overlap with the other) elicit larger frontally-distributed negativities as compared to words that 
are unambiguous in both their class and meaning (e.g., the noun “beer”) (Federmeier, Segal, 
Lombrozo, & Kutas, 2000; Lee & Federmeier, 2006). Under this interpretation, then, numerals 
that are ultimately rated as unfamiliar might be read similarly to how ambiguous words are read 
(since both elicit frontally distributed negativities). It would also suggest that reading numerals 
with the aim of sorting them into meaningfulness categories involves a similar disambiguation 
process as is induced by word reading.  
Clearly, more work is necessary to fully assess the possible relationship between word 
ambiguity effects, working memory processes, and the presently reported effects of familiarity 
judgment. Nevertheless, it is the case that one broadly applicable interpretation of our finding is 
that judging items that will ultimately be rated as unfamiliar is somehow more taxing. Whether 
this process is ultimately found to be related to working memory or not, perhaps the most 
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interesting feature of the mechanisms involved in this effect is that they are independent of item 
repetition. That is, to the extent that this measure indicates some kind of processing effort, it is 
just as demanding to categorize unfamiliar items the second time as it was the first time they 
were encountered.   
In contrast, there was a different effect that was both influenced by repetition and that 
distinguished between items rated familiar and items rated unfamiliar: the late positive complex 
(LPC). This effect was selectively enhanced (i.e., more positive) for second presentation of 
numerals rated as familiar (see Figure 5.2 for waveforms and Figure 5.3 for the topography of 
this effect). Items that were rated as unfamiliar only had an effect of repetition on the N400. One 
way to view the distinction between this pattern of N400 repetition effects (which were present 
regardless of how the item was rated) and LPC repetition effects (which were present only for 
numerals rated familiar) is that, whereas the N400 repetition effect measure primarily reflected 
an attempt to access numeral meaning, the LPC instead reflected actual retrieval success.  
This perspective is consistent with the interpretation of LPC effects in memory 
paradigms, where ERPs are recorded during a test in which old (previously viewed) and new 
(previously unseen) items are classified by subjects. There, larger LPCs are typically associated 
with more successful recollection of old (repeated) items, especially when compared with 
successfully rejected new items or falsely rejected old items. Additionally, retrieval efforts which 
yield more explicit details about previously viewed items (e.g., which list they were seen on), 
and retrieval effects which result in higher-confidence judgments of an item being old, are 
associated with larger LPCs (see Voss & Paller, 2008, for review).  
Our current finding is also strikingly similar to what has previously been observed when 
participants performed familiarity ratings for novel shapes: only novel shapes rated as familiar 
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elicited LPC effects during a subsequent memory test (Voss et al., 2010). Of note is that there is 
a substantial difference between our paradigm and these memory paradigms. Whereas traditional 
memory paradigms clearly require more recollection and retrieval during the test (which is 
always second presentation) than during the encoding phase (first presentation), in our paradigm, 
first and second presentations both involved a memory test of sorts (to the extent that generating 
a rating of familiar/unfamiliar involved explicit long-term memory retrieval).  
It is therefore interesting to see that this enhanced LPC selective to the second 
presentation of familiar items still persisted. This suggests that the recollection processes that 
occurred during first presentation for numerals that people rated as familiar somehow selectively 
facilitated the same retrieval processes at second presentation – either by augmenting the amount 
of information recollected or by rendering the judgment more confident (both of which are 
mechanisms that are associated with increased LPC size). Given that trials were only included if 
participants’ judgments were consistent (e.g., if a participant only rated an item as familiar on 
second encounter, it was dropped from analysis), both interpretations (confidence/increased 
retrieval) are plausible – it seems unlikely that one would retrieve less information or be less 
confident when rating a numeral as familiar for the second time (especially in a relatively short 
amount of time). Most importantly, to our knowledge, this is the first piece of evidence linking a 
traditional measure of recollection (LPC) to not only to numerals, but to numerals that are 
specifically perceived by individuals as familiar due to personal (and not explicitly numerical) 
experience.   
In sum, we found evidence that people are able to use numerals to access a different set 
of information than is typically studied (i.e., not specifically related to the numerosity or number 
value associated with the numeral as a symbol), manifesting across multiple effects when 
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numerals were sorted by participants’ subjective ratings of familiarity. There was a sustained 
frontal negativity larger for numerals rated unfamiliar, an LPC repetition effect larger for 
numerals rated familiar, and there was also an N400 repetition effect whose overall scalp 
distribution did not resemble the distribution previously observed during numeral reading in 
tasks wherein numeral familiarity was not being judged. However, some aspects of numeral 
processing were not sensitive to the act of making these familiarity judgments. Specifically, the 
size of the N400 repetition effect was unaffected by whether people rated the numerals as 
familiar or not, suggesting that the amount of meaning that is more effortlessly accessed from 
numerals is stable at an item level, even as a large-scale task manipulation might be able to 
impact the nature of the information being accessed (suggested by the distributional shift across 
experiments). These findings more broadly suggest that potentially non-numerical information 
related to our personal experience with Arabic numerals (e.g., apartment numbers, legally 
relevant age markers like 18 and 21, and numbers associated with sports figures) importantly 
shapes how we use numbers in everyday life, which is a relatively unexplored domain of 
numerical cognition. 
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Figures 
Figure 5.1 
 
Figure 5.1 The average response to the first presentation of numerals, sorted by their subjective 
rating of familiarity. In frontal channels (top of figure), an effect of familiarity can be seen 
whereby numerals that were rated as unfamiliar across presentations elicited a long-lasting 
negativity compared to numerals that were rated familiar.  
Items rated familiar
Items rated unfamiliar
Initial presentation of numbers
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Figure 5.2 
  
Figure 5.2 Left and right posterior channels are plotted (starred on the channel configuration plot 
at left). The solid box denotes the N400 timewindow, whereas the dashed box denotes the 
timewindow of the late positive complex (LPC). The top plot corresponds to repetition effects 
for numerals subjectively rated as familiar, reflected in the difference between second 
presentation compared to first presentation, and the bottom plot shows the same effects for 
numerals subjectively rated as unfamiliar. The LPC for second presentation is only for numerals 
rated as familiar, not numerals rated unfamiliar. The N400 repetition effect is small but present 
in all plots. 
 
Repetition eﬀects by familiarity ratings
First Presentation
Second Presentation
Rated Familiar
Rated Unfamiliar
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Figure 5.3 
 
Figure 5.3 Topographical maps of the distribution of the effect of repetition, as measured by the 
subtraction of the first presentation of numerals from second presentation (viewed over the top of 
the head). Darker areas correspond to more substantial effects of repetition. On the left are 
repetition effects for the N400 timewindow (measured from 300 – 500ms post stimulus onset). 
On the right are repetition effects during the LPC timewindow (measured from 500 – 800ms post 
stimulus). It can be seen that there is an effect of repetition in N400 timewindow for numerals 
rated familiar and unfamiliar, but that in the LPC timewindow there is only a repetition effect for 
numerals rated familiar.  
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Repetition eﬀect distributions by familiarity ratings 
-0.88
-0.80
-0.71
-0.62
-0.53
-0.44
-0.35
-0.27
-0.18
-0.09
0.00
0.09
0.18
0.27
0.35
0.44
0.53
0.62
0.71
0.80
0.88
-1.0
-0.9
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
rated familiar
rated unfamiliar
rated familiar
rated unfamiliar
	 136	
CHAPTER 6 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Across four sets of experiments, we examined the flexible and task-specific utilization of 
multiple systems of memory during online reading of numerals in both neural and behavioral 
measures. The first two experiments focused on the processing of numerals in the context of their 
use in arithmetic problems, which depends on having built associations between numerals and 
arithmetic problems/operations in order to recognize whether a provided answer was correct or 
not. The third experiment looked at how people initially access the meaning of numerals across 
three tasks, measuring the benefit that prior access afforded incidental subsequent attempts of 
semantic access. Finally, a fourth experiment looked at how item-level experience might play a 
role in how people access and retrieve the meaning of numerals. 
 In Experiment 1, we tested how the hemispheres evaluated arithmetic problems by 
measuring brain responses (ERPs) to provided answers across levels of visual field (LH/RVF, 
RH/LVF, and Central VF). We expected that there should be differences across the hemispheres, 
particularly with respect to sensitivity to more detailed properties of answers than just whether 
they were correct or incorrect, given analogous research in the language domain (Federmeier & 
Kutas, 1999b). Indeed, we found that, although both hemispheres (individually and jointly) were 
sensitive to whether answers were correct or not in the same time frame (as measured on the 
P300 component, in the form of an amplitude difference), the hemispheres diverged in their 
responses to other aspects of answer type. In particular, only the RH/LVF distinguished between 
incorrect answers that were table-related to the correct answer and incorrect answers that were 
unrelated to the correct answer, in the form of a difference on a late positivity. We interpreted 
this as evidence that both hemispheres are involved in answer evaluation processes, and that the 
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RH/LVF may specifically perform additional deliberative processes beyond the initial 
categorization of an answer as matching what was expected or not.  
However, what we could not know from this data was how these processing differences – 
which led to effects of correctness and relatedness effects on different componentry – might 
manifest in behavior. To address this question, in Experiment 2, we used the same materials from 
Experiment 1, but instead required participants to provide behavioral responses (respond as 
quickly as possible without sacrificing accuracy). In our analysis of these behavioral responses, 
we separately examined effects of the modal shift of the reaction time distribution from effects 
that altered the rightward skew of the underlying reaction time distribution. This revealed an 
interesting distinction between effects of correctness (which were selectively reflected on the 
modal parameter µ) and effects of relatedness (which were selectively reflected on the skewness 
parameter τ), which, in conjunction with the evidence from ERPs, support the idea that these two 
effects are not the result of identical processes. There were no effects of VF on any measure, 
despite the earlier finding that relatedness effects were only present in the RH/LVF. This 
suggests that the RH’s special processing of these answer types (found in ERPs) is functionally 
relevant for behavior, and that, indeed, it is transferred to the other hemisphere (at least when 
motor responses from either hand are required by the task). 
Together, Experiments 1 and 2 examined and identified evidence for explicit memory 
processing of arithmetic-related knowledge of numerals. What was still unclear from these 
experiments, however, was how semantic memory access (especially at a relatively automatic 
level) proceeded for numerals. Although this access presumably occurred in Experiment 1 as 
well, it was not possible to measure unambiguously because the ERP signal whose amplitude is 
typically taken as an index of initial semantic access (the N400) was obscured by the co-
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occurrence of the P300 effect. This left unclear whether initial semantic access for numerals was 
similar to that for words, and whether it could be facilitated by prior contextual support. 
To this end, in Experiment 3, we examined the effect of implicit priming (as measured on 
N400 repetition effects) across multiple tasks that emphasized accessing different potential 
aspects or amounts of meaningfulness for numerals (visual appreciation of numeral content in 
the matching task, knowledge of arithmetic facts in the divisor task, and knowledge of everyday 
use of numerals in the quantifier task). There were three main findings: (1) a significant (but 
notably small) N400 repetition effect was obtained; (2) this effect’s distribution across the scalp 
was atypical; and (3) the size of the effect of repetition was not affected by task. From these 
results, we inferred that, indeed, initial access of semantic meaning for numerals can be 
influenced by prior context (i.e., exposure at first presentation), and, further, that the benefit of 
prior access is not influenced by the amount/type of cognitive processing that occurred during 
initial presentation. The atypical scalp distribution of the effect that the scalp distribution of the 
effect suggested that the nature of the semantic information being accessed during numeral 
reading is potentially unique. 
The small (but reliable) size of the effect, its atypical distribution, and its lack of 
interaction with task raised additional questions. If we changed the type of semantic access to be 
more similar to what occurs when we are trying to make deliberate connections with our broader 
semantic knowledge base (e.g., as we naturally do during word reading), could the distribution of 
the N400 change to be more canonical? Further, although the N400 effect was not affected by 
task manipulations, it was still possible that, at an item level, certain subsets of numerals elicited 
more consistent links to a broader sense of long-term semantic memory, which might emerge as 
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larger N400 repetition effects compared to the subset of numerals that do not resonate as much 
with broader semantics.  
Experiment 4 was conducted to address these possibilities. The same materials were used 
as in Experiment 3, with the only difference being that the task was now to classify items as 
personally meaningful or not. We obtained three additional findings in this study: (1) the scalp 
distribution of the N400 repetition effect for numerals shifted to what is typically observed in 
language studies; (2) the size of the N400 repetition effect was not influenced by item-level 
ratings of familiarity; and (3) there was an additional signature of recollection (LPC), specifically 
for repeated items that participants rated as familiar. We take the distributional shift across 
Experiments 3 and 4 as evidence that it is possible to alter the nature of the semantics that is 
being accessed when reading numerals, given that different processes would be necessary to 
manifest the observed effects. That the size of the N400 repetition effect itself was not impacted 
by self-rated familiarity with individual items implies that the amount of initial access of 
meaning for numerals is remarkably stable – consistent with the results of Experiment 3, where 
N400 repetition effect sizes were relatively stable across tasks. The overall smallness of these 
N400 effects across tasks and studies also is informative for interpretation of contextual effects 
in arithmetic – it seems likely that a considerable portion of the observed congruency effects 
arise from P300 activity rather than N400, as has been reported.  
While initial access of meaning for items rated familiar and unfamiliar appears to have 
been the same, the enhanced LPC selectively for items rated familiar indicates that more 
confident recollection and explicit memory retrieval processes nevertheless occurred for these 
items at a later stage. Thus, when encountering numerals, multiple memory processes unfold – 
sometimes simultaneously. This is reminiscent of Experiment 1, where positivities revealed 
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differences across types of numerals as a function of their contextual fit with preceding 
arithmetic contexts. There, numerals were similarly being explicitly judged and assessed.  
There is an ongoing debate in the ERP literature about the nature and classification of 
these sorts of positivities (i.e., whether or not LPCs and other late positivities are members of a 
broad family of P300s) (Coulson, King, & Kutas, 1998; Van Petten & Luka, 2012). While our 
results cannot directly speak to this debate, we have shown that it is critical to be conscious of 
whether or not explicit decision-making-related componentry, which often manifest as 
positivities, might emerge in a study. This is particularly important if what is of greatest interest 
are relatively more automatic semantic memory access processes (as measured best by the 
N400).  
In general, using a variety of tasks and paradigms that deliberately vary on how much 
they rely on implicit/automatic versus explicit/controlled memory access has helped to better 
delineate the possible meaning people can extract from, or appreciate in, numerals. This is 
particularly true of the experiments presented here because the measurements were taken largely 
on well-defined components from across the broader ERP literature (N400, P300, LPC), whose 
links to automatic and controlled processing mechanisms are well documented. Even so, some 
unexpected results we obtained and reported were on components that are not as well understood 
(e.g., a frontal negativity for numerals rated unfamiliar). Using numerals as stimuli can thus 
inform how generalizable effects – and interpretations of those effects – are across different 
domains (e.g., maybe frontal negativities that have been attributed to word ambiguity reflect 
other kinds of uncertainty in stimulus evaluation as well).  
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In sum, our work has made important contributions to differentiating between how we 
initially, effortless access the meaning of numerals and how we can later go on to utilize 
deliberately retrieved memories for them when rendering explicit judgments. 
	 142	
REFERENCES 
 
Anderson, S. W., Damasio, A. R., & Damasio, H. (1990). Troubled letters but not numbers: 
domain specific cognitive impairments following focal damage in frontal cortex. Brain, 
113(3), 749-766.  
Andres, M., Pelgrims, B., Michaux, N., Olivier, E., & Pesenti, M. (2011). Role of distinct 
parietal areas in arithmetic: An fMRI-guided TMS study. Neuroimage, 54(4), 3048-3056.  
Andres, M., Seron, X., & Olivier, E. (2005). Hemispheric lateralization of number comparison. 
Cognitive Brain Research, 25(1), 283-290.  
Ashcraft, M. H. (1992). Cognitive arithmetic: A review of data and theory. Cognition, 44(1), 75-
106.  
Ashcraft, M. H. (1995). Cognitive psychology and simple arithmetic: A review and summary of 
new directions. Mathematical Cognition, 1(1), 3-34.  
Ashcraft, M. H., & Battaglia, J. (1978). Cognitive arithmetic: Evidence for retrieval and decision 
processes in mental addition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and 
Memory, 4(5), 527-538.  
Ashcraft, M. H., & Christy, K. S. (1995). The frequency of arithmetic facts in elementary texts: 
Addition and multiplication in grades 1-6. Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 
26(5), 396-421.  
Ashcraft, M. H., Fierman, B. A., & Bartolotta, R. (1984). The production and verification tasks 
in mental addition: An empirical comparison. Developmental Review, 4(2), 157-170.  
Ashcraft, M. H., Yamashita, T. S., & Aram, D. M. (1992). Mathematics performance in left and 
right brain-lesioned children and adolescents. Brain and Cognition, 19(2), 208-252.  
	 143	
Babkoff, H., & Faust, M. (1988). Lexical decision and visual hemifield: An examination of the 
RT—Accuracy relationship. Neuropsychologia, 26(5), 711-725.  
Balota, D. A., & Spieler, D. H. (1999). Word frequency, repetition, and lexicality effects in word 
recognition tasks: Beyond measures of central tendency. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 128(1), 32-55.  
Balota, D. A., & Yap, M. J. (2011). Moving beyond the mean in studies of mental chronometry 
the power of response time distributional analyses. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 20(3), 160-166.  
Balota, D. A., Yap, M. J., Cortese, M. J., & Watson, J. M. (2008). Beyond mean response 
latency: Response time distributional analyses of semantic priming. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 59(4), 495-523.  
Banich, M. T. (2002). The divided visual field technique in laterality and interhemispheric 
integration. In K. Hugdahl (Ed.), Experimental methods in neuropsychology (pp. 47-64) 
Boston, MA: Klewer.  
Barnett, K. J., & Corballis, M. C. (2005). Speeded right-to-left information transfer: The result of 
speeded transmission in right-hemisphere axons? Neuroscience Letters, 380(1), 88-92.  
Barrett, S. E., & Rugg, M. D. (1990). Event-related potentials and the semantic matching of 
pictures. Brain and Cognition, 14(2), 201-212.  
Barrouillet, P., Fayol, M., & Lathulière, E. (1997). Selecting between competitors in 
multiplication tasks: An explanation of the errors produced by adolescents with learning 
difficulties. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 21(2), 253-275.  
Bentin, S., & Peled, B. (1990). The contribution of task-related factors to ERP repetition effects 
at short and long lags. Memory & Cognition, 18(4), 359-366.  
	 144	
Besson, M., & Macar, F. (1987). An Event-Related potential analysis of incongruity in music 
and other Non-Linguistic contexts. Psychophysiology, 24(1), 14-25.  
Binder, J. R., Swanson, S. J., Hammeke, T. A., Morris, G. L., Mueller, W. M., Fischer, M., et al. 
(1996). Determination of language dominance using functional MRI: A comparison with the 
Wada test. Neurology, 46(4), 978-984.  
Bishop, D. V. (2013). Cerebral asymmetry and language development: Cause, correlate, or 
consequence? Science (New York, NY), 340(6138), 1230531.  
Blankenberger, S., & Vorberg, D. (1997). The single-format assumption in arithmetic fact 
retrieval. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 23(3), 
721-738.  
Brannon, E. M., & Roitman, J. D. (2003). Nonverbal representations of time and number in 
animals and human infants. In W. Meck (Ed.), Functional and neural mechanisms of 
interval timing (pp. 143-182). Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.  
Broca, P. (1865). Sur le siège de la faculté du langage articulé. Bulletins De La Société 
d'Anthropologie De Paris, 6(1), 377-393.  
Brunia, C. H., van Boxtel, G. M., & Böcker, K. B. (2012). Negative slow waves as indices of 
anticipation: The bereitschaftspotential, the contingent negative variation, and the stimulus-
preceding negativity. In E. S. Kappenman, & S. J. Luck (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Event-Related Potential Components (pp. 189-207). New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 
Brysbaert, M. (2005). Number recognition in different formats. In J. I. Campbell (Ed.), 
Handbook of Mathematical Cognition (pp. 23-42). New York, NY: Psychology Press.  
	 145	
Campbell, J. I. (1987a). Network interference and mental multiplication. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 13(1), 109-123.  
Campbell, J. I. (1987b). Production, verification, and priming of multiplication facts. Memory & 
Cognition, 15(4), 349-364.  
Campbell, J. I., & Graham, D. J. (1985). Mental multiplication skill: Structure, process, and 
acquisition. Canadian Journal of Psychology/Revue Canadienne De Psychologie, 39(2), 
338-366.  
Cappelletti, M., Butterworth, B., & Kopelman, M. (2001). Spared numerical abilities in a case of 
semantic dementia. Neuropsychologia, 39(11), 1224-1239.  
Cappelletti, M., Butterworth, B., & Kopelman, M. (2012). Numeracy skills in patients with 
degenerative disorders and focal brain lesions: A neuropsychological investigation. 
Neuropsychology, 26(1), 1-19.  
Cappelletti, M., & Cipolotti, L. (2010). The neuropsychology of acquired calculation disorders. 
In J. M. Gurd, U. Kischka, & J. C. Marshall (Eds.), Handbook of Clinical Neuropsychology 
(pp. 401-417). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Cappelletti, M., Kopelman, M. D., Morton, J., & Butterworth, B. (2005). Dissociations in 
numerical abilities revealed by progressive cognitive decline in a patient with semantic 
dementia. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 22(7), 771-793.  
Castro, A., Sumich, A., Premkumar, P., & Jones, G. (2014). How do incorrect results change the 
processing of arithmetic information? evidence from a divided visual field experiment. 
Laterality: Asymmetries of Body, Brain and Cognition, 19(3), 340-353.  
Chao, L. L., & Knight, R. T. (1997). Prefrontal deficits in attention and inhibitory control with 
aging. Cerebral Cortex (New York, N.Y.: 1991), 7(1), 63-69.  
	 146	
Chochon, F., Cohen, L., Van De Moortele, P., & Dehaene, S. (1999). Differential contributions 
of the left and right inferior parietal lobules to number processing. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 11(6), 617-630.  
Christman, S., Kitterle, F. L., & Hellige, J. (1991). Hemispheric asymmetry in the processing of 
absolute versus relative spatial frequency. Brain and Cognition, 16(1), 62-73.  
Cipolotti, L. (1995). Multiple routes for reading words, why not numbers? evidence from a case 
of arabic numeral dyslexia. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 12(3), 313-342.  
Cipolotti, L., Warrington, E. K., & Butterworth, B. (1995). Selective impairment in manipulating 
Arabic numerals. Cortex, 31(1), 73-86.  
Cohen, L., Dehaene, S., Chochon, F., Lehericy, S., & Naccache, L. (2000). Language and 
calculation within the parietal lobe: A combined cognitive, anatomical and fMRI study. 
Neuropsychologia, 38(10), 1426-1440.  
Colvin, M. K., Funnell, M. G., & Gazzaniga, M. S. (2005). Numerical processing in the two 
hemispheres: Studies of a split-brain patient. Brain and Cognition, 57(1), 43-52.  
Corina, D., Grosvald, M., & Lachaud, C. (2011). Perceptual invariance or orientation specificity 
in american sign language? evidence from repetition priming for signs and gestures. 
Language and Cognitive Processes, 26(8), 1102-1135.  
Coulson, S. (1998). ERPs and domain specificity: Beating a straw horse. Language and 
Cognitive Processes, 13(6), 653-672.  
Coulson, S., Federmeier, K. D., Van Petten, C., & Kutas, M. (2005). Right hemisphere 
sensitivity to word-and sentence-level context: Evidence from event-related brain potentials. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 31(1), 129-147.  
	 147	
Coulson, S., King, J. W., & Kutas, M. (1998). Expect the unexpected: Event-related brain 
response to morphosyntactic violations. Language and Cognitive Processes, 13(1), 21-58.  
Crutch, S. J., & Warrington, E. K. (2002). Preserved calculation skills in a case of semantic 
dementia. Cortex, 38(3), 389-399.  
Curran, T., & Cleary, A. M. (2003). Using ERPs to dissociate recollection from familiarity in 
picture recognition. Cognitive Brain Research, 15(2), 191-205.  
Dale, A. M. (1994). Source localization and spatial discriminant analysis of event-related 
potentials: linear approaches. Unpublished Dissertation, University of California, San 
Diego, La Jolla, CA. 
Daltrozzo, J., & Schön, D. (2009). Conceptual processing in music as revealed by N400 effects 
on words and musical targets. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21(10), 1882-1892.  
De Rammelaere, S., Stuyven, E., & Vandierendonck, A. (1999). The contribution of working 
memory resources in the verification of simple mental arithmetic sums. Psychological 
Research, 62(1), 72-77.  
Dehaene, S., Bossini, S., & Giraux, P. (1993). The mental representation of parity and number 
magnitude. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 122(3), 371-396.  
Dehaene, S., & Changeux, J. (1993). Development of elementary numerical abilities: A neuronal 
model. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 5(4), 390-407.  
Dehaene, S., & Cohen, L. (1995). Towards an anatomical and functional model of number 
processing. Mathematical Cognition, 1(1), 83-120.  
Dehaene, S., Dehaene-Lambertz, G., & Cohen, L. (1998). Abstract representations of numbers in 
the animal and human brain. Trends in Neurosciences, 21(8), 355-361.  
	 148	
Dehaene, S., Dupoux, E., & Mehler, J. (1990). Is numerical comparison digital? analogical and 
symbolic effects in two-digit number comparison. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 16(3), 626-641.  
Dehaene, S., Spelke, E., Pinel, P., Stanescu, R., & Tsivkin, S. (1999). Sources of mathematical 
thinking: Behavioral and brain-imaging evidence. Science (New York, N.Y.), 284(5416), 
970-974.  
Delazer, M., Girelli, L., Semenza, C., & Denes, G. (1999). Numerical skills and aphasia. Journal 
of the International Neuropsychological Society, 5(3), 213-221.  
Dickson, D. S., & Federmeier, K. D. (2014). Hemispheric differences in orthographic and 
semantic processing as revealed by event-related potentials. Neuropsychologia, 64, 230-239.  
Diesfeldt, H. F. (1993). Progressive decline of semantic memory with preservation of number 
processing and calculation. Behavioural Neurology, 6(4), 239-242.  
Domahs, F., Delazer, M., & Nuerk, H. (2006). What makes multiplication facts difficult: 
Problem size or neighborhood consistency? Experimental Psychology, 53(4), 275-282.  
Domahs, F., Domahs, U., Schlesewsky, M., Ratinckx, E., Verguts, T., Willmes, K., et al. (2007). 
Neighborhood consistency in mental arithmetic: Behavioral and ERP evidence. Behavioral 
and Brain Functions, 3(1), 66.  
Donchin, E., & Coles, M. G. (1988). Is the P300 component a manifestation of context updating. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 11(3), 357-427.  
Duzel, E., Vargha-Khadem, F., Heinze, H. J., & Mishkin, M. (2001). Brain activity evidence for 
recognition without recollection after early hippocampal damage. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 98(14), 8101-8106.  
	 149	
Duzel, E., Yonelinas, A. P., Mangun, G. R., Heinze, H. J., & Tulving, E. (1997). Event-related 
brain potential correlates of two states of conscious awareness in memory. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 94(11), 5973-5978.  
Eddy, M., Schmid, A., & Holcomb, P. J. (2006). Masked repetition priming and event-related 
brain potentials: A new approach for tracking the time-course of object perception. 
Psychophysiology, 43(6), 564-568.  
Fayol, M., & Seron, X. (2005). About numerical representations: Insights from 
neuropsychological, experimental, and developmental studies. In J. I. Campbell (Ed.), 
Handbook of Mathematical Cognition (pp. 3-22). New York, NY: Psychology Press.  
Federmeier, K. D. (2007). Thinking ahead: The role and roots of prediction in language 
comprehension. Psychophysiology, 44(4), 491-505.  
Federmeier, K. D., & Kutas, M. (1999a). A rose by any other name: Long-term memory 
structure and sentence processing. Journal of Memory and Language, 41(4), 469-495.  
Federmeier, K. D., & Kutas, M. (1999b). Right words and left words: Electrophysiological 
evidence for hemispheric differences in meaning processing. Cognitive Brain Research, 
8(3), 373-392.  
Federmeier, K. D., & Kutas, M. (2001). Meaning and modality: Influences of context, semantic 
memory organization, and perceptual predictability on picture processing. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27(1), 202-224.  
Federmeier, K. D., & Kutas, M. (2002). Picture the difference: Electrophysiological 
investigations of picture processing in the two cerebral hemispheres. Neuropsychologia, 
40(7), 730-747.  
	 150	
Federmeier, K. D., Kutas, M., & Dickson, D. S. (2015). A common neural progression to 
meaning in about a third of a second. In G. S. Hickok, & S. L. Small (Eds.), Neurobiology of 
language (pp. 557-568). Holland: Elsevier. 
Federmeier, K. D., Mai, H., & Kutas, M. (2005). Both sides get the point: Hemispheric 
sensitivities to sentential constraint. Memory & Cognition, 33(5), 871-886.  
Federmeier, K. D., McLennan, D. B., Ochoa, E., & Kutas, M. (2002). The impact of semantic 
memory organization and sentence context information on spoken language processing by 
younger and older adults: An ERP study. Psychophysiology, 39(2), 133-146.  
Federmeier, K. D., Segal, J. B., Lombrozo, T., & Kutas, M. (2000). Brain responses to nouns, 
verbs and class-ambiguous words in context. Brain, 123(12), 2552-2566.  
Fias, W., Brysbaert, M., Geypens, F., & D'ydewalle, G. (1996). The importance of magnitude 
information in numerical processing: Evidence from the SNARC effect. Mathematical 
Cognition, 2(1), 95-110.  
Fias, M. & Fischer, M. H. (2005). Spatial representation of numbers. In J. I. Campbell (Ed.), The 
Handbook of Mathematical Cognition (pp. 43-54). New York, NY: Psychology Press.  
Fias, W., van Dijck, J., & Gevers, W. (2011). How number is associated with space?: The role of 
working memory. In S. Dehaene & E. M. Brannon (Eds.), Space, Time and Number in 
the Brain: Searching for the Foundations of Mathematical Thought (pp. 133-148). 
Amsterdam: Academic Press – Elsevier. 
Fischer-Baum, S., Dickson, D. S., & Federmeier, K. D. (2014). Frequency and regularity effects 
in reading are task dependent: Evidence from ERPs. Language, Cognition and 
Neuroscience, 29(10), 1342-1355.  
	 151	
Funnell, M. G., Colvin, M. K., & Gazzaniga, M. S. (2007). The calculating hemispheres: Studies 
of a split-brain patient. Neuropsychologia, 45(10), 2378-2386.  
Gaber, D., & Schlimm, D. (2015). Basic mathematical cognition. Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Cognitive Science, 6(4), 355-369.  
Gallistel, C. R., & Gelman, R. (1992). Preverbal and verbal counting and computation. 
Cognition, 44(1), 43-74.  
Ganis, G., & Kutas, M. (2003). An electrophysiological study of scene effects on object 
identification. Cognitive Brain Research, 16(2), 123-144.  
Ganis, G., Kutas, M., & Sereno, M. E. (1996). The search for “common sense”: An 
electrophysiological study of the comprehension of words and pictures in reading. Cognitive 
Neuroscience, Journal of, 8(2), 89-106.  
Ganor-Stern, D., Tzelgov, J., & Ellenbogen, R. (2007). Automaticity and two-digit numbers. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 33(2), 483-496.  
García-Orza, J., Perea, M., Mallouh, R. A., & Carreiras, M. (2012). Physical similarity (and not 
quantity representation) drives perceptual comparison of numbers: Evidence from two 
Indian notations. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 19(2), 294-300.  
Gazzaniga, M. S., & Smylie, C. S. (1984). Dissociation of language and cognition. A 
psychological profile of two disconnected right hemispheres. Brain, 107(1), 145-153.   
Gelman, R., & Butterworth, B. (2005). Number and language: How are they related? Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 9(1), 6-10.  
Geschwind, N., & Levitsky, W. (1968). Human brain: Left-right asymmetries in temporal speech 
region. Science (New York, N.Y.), 161(3837), 186-187.  
	 152	
Geyer, A., Holcomb, P., Kuperberg, G., & Perlmutter, N. (2006, April). Plausibility and sentence 
comprehension. An ERP study. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Cognitive 
Neuroscience Society, San Francisco, CA.  
Goldfarb, L., Henik, A., Rubinsten, O., Bloch-David, Y., & Gertner, L. (2011). The numerical 
distance effect is task dependent. Memory & Cognition, 39(8), 1508-1517.  
Gross-Tsur, V., Manor, O., & Shalev, R. S. (1996). Developmental dyscalculia: Prevalence and 
demographic features. Developmental Medicine & Child Neurology, 38(1), 25-33.  
Hamann, M. S., & Ashcraft, M. H. (1986). Textbook presentations of the basic addition facts. 
Cognition and Instruction, 3(3), 173-202.  
Henik, A., & Tzelgov, J. (1982). Is three greater than five: The relation between physical and 
semantic size in comparison tasks. Memory & Cognition, 10(4), 389-395.  
Holcomb, P. J., & McPherson, W. B. (1994). Event-related brain potentials reflect semantic 
priming in an object decision task. Brain and Cognition, 24(2), 259-276.  
Holcomb, P. J., Grainger, J., & O'Rourke, T. (2002). An electrophysiological study of the effects 
of orthographic neighborhood size on printed word perception. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 14(6), 938-950.  
Holcomb, P. J., & Grainger, J. (2006). On the time course of visual word recognition: An event-
related potential investigation using masked repetition priming. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 18(10), 1631-1643.  
Holcomb, P. J., & Grainger, J. (2007). Exploring the temporal dynamics of visual word 
recognition in the masked repetition priming paradigm using event-related potentials. Brain 
Research, 1180, 39-58.  
	 153	
Holloway, I. D., & Ansari, D. (2010). Developmental specialization in the right intraparietal 
sulcus for the abstract representation of numerical magnitude. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 22(11), 2627-2637.  
Jackson, J. D., Balota, D. A., Duchek, J. M., & Head, D. (2012). White matter integrity and 
reaction time intraindividual variability in healthy aging and early-stage Alzheimer disease. 
Neuropsychologia, 50(3), 357-366.  
Jackson, M., & Warrington, E. K. (1986). Arithmetic skills in patients with unilateral cerebral 
lesions. Cortex, 22(4), 611-620.  
Jasinski, E. C., & Coch, D. (2012). ERPs across arithmetic operations in a delayed answer 
verification task. Psychophysiology, 49(7), 943-958.  
Johnson, R. (1986). For distinguished early career contribution to psychophysiology: Award 
address, 1985. Psychophysiology, 23(4), 367-384.  
Jordan, T. R., Patching, G. R., & Milner, A. D. (2000). Lateralized word recognition: Assessing 
the role of hemispheric specialization, modes of lexical access, and perceptual asymmetry. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 26(3), 1192-
1208.  
Jordan, T. R., Patching, G. R., & Thomas, S. M. (2003). Assessing the role of hemispheric 
specialisation, serial-position processing, and retinal eccentricity in lateralised word 
recognition. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 20(1), 49-71.  
Joseph B. Hellige. (1993). Hemispheric asymmetry: What's right and what's left. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.  
Joyce, C. A., Paller, K. A., Schwartz, T. J., & Kutas, M. (1999). An electrophysiological analysis 
of modality-specific aspects of word repetition. Psychophysiology, 36(5), 655-665.  
	 154	
Jung-Beeman, M. (2005). Bilateral brain processes for comprehending natural language. Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences, 9(11), 512-518.  
Kadosh, R. C., Kadosh, K. C., Schuhmann, T., Kaas, A., Goebel, R., Henik, A., et al. (2007). 
Virtual dyscalculia induced by parietal-lobe TMS impairs automatic magnitude processing. 
Current Biology, 17(8), 689-693.  
Kadosh, R. C., Tzelgov, J., & Henik, A. (2008). A synesthetic walk on the mental number line: 
The size effect. Cognition, 106(1), 548-557.  
Kadosh, R. C., & Walsh, V. (2009). Numerical representation in the parietal lobes: Abstract or 
not abstract? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(3-4), 313-328.  
Kandhadai, P., & Federmeier, K. D. (2007). Multiple priming of lexically ambiguous and 
unambiguous targets in the cerebral hemispheres: The coarse coding hypothesis revisited. 
Brain Research, 1153, 144-157.  
Kandhadai, P., & Federmeier, K. D. (2008). Summing it up: Semantic activation processes in the 
two hemispheres as revealed by event-related potentials. Brain Research, 1233, 146-159.  
Kandhadai, P., & Federmeier, K. D. (2010). Automatic and controlled aspects of lexical 
associative processing in the two cerebral hemispheres. Psychophysiology, 47(4), 774-785.  
Kandhadai, P., & Federmeier, K. D. (2010). Hemispheric differences in the recruitment of 
semantic processing mechanisms. Neuropsychologia, 48(13), 3772-3781.  
Katz, A. N. (1980). Cognitive arithmetic: Evidence for right hemispheric mediation in an 
elementary component stage. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 32(1), 69-84.  
King, J. W., & Kutas, M. (1995). Who did what and when? using word-and clause-level ERPs to 
monitor working memory usage in reading. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 7(3), 376-
395.  
	 155	
Klein, R., & McInnes, J. (1988). Visual field differences in the processing of numerical stimuli. 
Brain and Cognition, 7(3), 247-256.  
Koelsch, S., Kasper, E., Sammler, D., Schulze, K., Gunter, T., & Friederici, A. D. (2004). Music, 
language and meaning: Brain signatures of semantic processing. Nature Neuroscience, 7(3), 
302-307.  
Kutas, M., & Federmeier, K. D. (2011). Thirty years and counting: Finding meaning in the N400 
component of the event-related brain potential (ERP). Annual Review of Psychology, 62, 
621-647.  
Kutas, M., McCarthy, G., & Donchin, E. (1977). Augmenting mental chronometry: The P300 as 
a measure of stimulus evaluation time. Science (New York, N.Y.), 197(4305), 792-795.  
Laszlo, S., & Armstrong, B. C. (2014). PSPs and ERPs: Applying the dynamics of post-synaptic 
potentials to individual units in simulation of temporally extended event-related potential 
reading data. Brain and Language, 132, 22-27.  
Laszlo, S., & Federmeier, K. D. (2007). Better the DVL you know: Acronyms reveal the 
contribution of familiarity to single-word reading. Psychological Science, 18(2), 122-126.  
Laszlo, S., & Federmeier, K. D. (2009). A beautiful day in the neighborhood: An event-related 
potential study of lexical relationships and prediction in context. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 61(3), 326-338.  
Laszlo, S., & Federmeier, K. D. (2011). The N400 as a snapshot of interactive processing: 
Evidence from regression analyses of orthographic neighbor and lexical associate effects. 
Psychophysiology, 48(2), 176-186.  
	 156	
Laszlo, S., & Federmeier, K. D. (2014). Never seem to find the time: Evaluating the 
physiological time course of visual word recognition with regression analysis of single-item 
event-related potentials. Language, Cognition and Neuroscience, 29(5), 642-661.  
Laszlo, S., Stites, M., & Federmeier, K. D. (2012). Won't get fooled again: An event-related 
potential study of task and repetition effects on the semantic processing of items without 
semantics. Language and Cognitive Processes, 27(2), 257-274.  
Lau, E. F., Phillips, C., & Poeppel, D. (2008). A cortical network for semantics:(de) constructing 
the N400. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9(12), 920-933.  
Lee, C., & Federmeier, K. D. (2006). To mind the mind: An event-related potential study of 
word class and semantic ambiguity. Brain Research, 1081(1), 191-202.  
Lee, C., & Federmeier, K. D. (2008). To watch, to see, and to differ: An event-related potential 
study of concreteness effects as a function of word class and lexical ambiguity. Brain and 
Language, 104(2), 145-158.  
LeFevre, J., Bisanz, J., Daley, K. E., Buffone, L., Greenham, S. L., & Sadesky, G. S. (1996). 
Multiple routes to solution of single-digit multiplication problems. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 125(3), 284-306.  
LeFevre, J., Smith-Chant, B. L., Hiscock, K., Daley, K. E., & Morris, J. (2003). Young adults’ 
strategic choices in simple arithmetic: Implications for the development of mathematical 
representations. In E. J. Baroody, & A. Dowker (Eds.), The development of arithmetic 
concepts and skills: Constructive adaptive expertise (pp. 203-228). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Lemaire, P., & Reder, L. (1999). What affects strategy selection in arithmetic? the example of 
parity and five effects on product verification. Memory & Cognition, 27(2), 364-382.  
	 157	
Libertus, M. E., Woldorff, M. G., & Brannon, E. M. (2007). Electrophysiological evidence for 
notation independence in numerical processing. Behavioral and Brain Functions, 3(1), 1.  
Lochy, A., Seron, X., Delazer, M., & Butterworth, B. (2000). The odd-even effect in 
multiplication: Parity rule or familiarity with even numbers? Memory & Cognition, 28(3), 
358-365.  
Lyons, I. M., Ansari, D., & Beilock, S. L. (2012). Symbolic estrangement: Evidence against a 
strong association between numerical symbols and the quantities they represent. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 141(4), 635-641.  
Martin, M. (1979). Hemispheric specialization for local and global processing. 
Neuropsychologia, 17(1), 33-40.  
Marzi, C. A., Bisiacchi, P., & Nicoletti, R. (1991). Is interhemispheric transfer of visuomotor 
information asymmetric? evidence from a meta-analysis. Neuropsychologia, 29(12), 1163-
1177.  
McCarthy, G., & Donchin, E. (1981). A metric for thought: A comparison of P300 latency and 
reaction time. Science (New York, N.Y.), 211(4477), 77-80.  
McCloskey, M. (1992). Cognitive mechanisms in numerical processing: Evidence from acquired 
dyscalculia. Cognition, 44(1), 107-157.  
McCloskey, M., Caramazza, A., & Basili, A. (1985). Cognitive mechanisms in number 
processing and calculation: Evidence from dyscalculia. Brain and Cognition, 4(2), 171-196.  
McPherson, W. B., & Holcomb, P. J. (1999). An electrophysiological investigation of semantic 
priming with pictures of real objects. Psychophysiology, 36(1), 53-65.  
	 158	
McVay, J. C., & Kane, M. J. (2012). Drifting from slow to “d'oh!”: Working memory capacity 
and mind wandering predict extreme reaction times and executive control errors. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 38(3), 525-549.  
Nagy, M. E., & Rugg, M. D. (1989). Modulation of Event-Related potentials by word repetition: 
The effects of Inter-Item lag. Psychophysiology, 26(4), 431-436.  
Niedeggen, M., & Rösler, F. (1999). N400 effects reflect activation spread during retrieval of 
arithmetic facts. Psychological Science, 10(3), 271-276.  
Niedeggen, M., Rösler, F., & Jost, K. (1999). Processing of incongruous mental calculation 
problems: Evidence for an arithmetic N400 effect. Psychophysiology, 36(03), 307-324.  
Nieder, A., Freedman, D. J., & Miller, E. K. (2002). Representation of the quantity of visual 
items in the primate prefrontal cortex. Science (New York, N.Y.), 297(5587), 1708-1711.  
Nigam, A., Hoffman, J. E., & Simons, R. F. (1992). N400 to semantically anomalous pictures 
and words. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 4(1), 15-22.  
Nuerk, H., Weger, U., & Willmes, K. (2001). Decade breaks in the mental number line? putting 
the tens and units back in different bins. Cognition, 82(1), B25-B33.  
Núñez, R. E. (2011). No innate number line in the human brain. Journal of Cross-Cultural 
Psychology, 42(4), 651-668.  
Oldfield, R. C. (1971). The assessment and analysis of handedness: The Edinburgh inventory. 
Neuropsychologia, 9(1), 97-113.  
Olichney, J. M., Van Petten, C., Paller, K. A., Salmon, D. P., Iragui, V. J., & Kutas, M. (2000). 
Word repetition in amnesia. electrophysiological measures of impaired and spared memory. 
Brain, 123(9), 1948-1963.  
	 159	
Paller, K. A., Kutas, M., & McIsaac, H. K. (1995). Monitoring conscious recollection via the 
electrical activity of the brain. Psychological Science, 6(2), 107-111.  
Paller, K. A., McCarthy, G., & Wood, C. C. (1992). Event-Related potentials elicited by deviant 
endings to melodies. Psychophysiology, 29(2), 202-206.  
Pavese, A., & Umiltà, C. (1998). Symbolic distance between numerosity and identity modulates 
stroop interference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 24(5), 1535-1545.  
Payne, B. R., Lee, C., & Federmeier, K. D. (2015). Revisiting the incremental effects of context 
on word processing: Evidence from single-word event-related brain potentials. 
Psychophysiology, 52(11), 1456-1469. 
Payne, B. R., & Stine-Morrow, E. A. (2014). Adult age differences in wrap-up during sentence 
comprehension: Evidence from ex-Gaussian distributional analyses of reading time. 
Psychology and Aging, 29(2), 213-228.  
Price, C. J. (2012). A review and synthesis of the first 20years of PET and fMRI studies of heard 
speech, spoken language and reading. Neuroimage, 62(2), 816-847.  
Ragot, R., & Renault, B. (1981). P300, as a function of S—R compatibility and motor 
programming. Biological Psychology, 13, 289-294.  
Ranganath, C., & Paller, K. A. (1999). Frontal brain potentials during recognition are modulated 
by requirements to retrieve perceptual detail. Neuron, 22(3), 605-613.  
Ratcliff, R., & Hacker, M. J. (1981). Speed and accuracy of same and different responses in 
perceptual matching. Perception & Psychophysics, 30(3), 303-307.  
Ratcliff, R., & Rouder, J. N. (1998). Modeling response times for two-choice decisions. 
Psychological Science, 9(5), 347-356.  
	 160	
Reingold, E. M., Sheridan, H., & Reichle, E. D. (2015). 18 direct lexical and nonlexical control 
of fixation duration in reading. In A. Pollatsek & R. Treiman (Eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of Reading (pp. 261-276). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Reynvoet, B., & Brysbaert, M. (1999). Single-digit and two-digit arabic numerals address the 
same semantic number line. Cognition, 72(2), 191-201.  
Ritter, W., Simson, R., & Vaughan, H. G. (1972). Association cortex potentials and reaction time 
in auditory discrimination. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 33(6), 
547-555.  
Rosenberg-Lee, M., Chang, T. T., Young, C. B., Wu, S., & Menon, V. (2011). Functional 
dissociations between four basic arithmetic operations in the human posterior parietal 
cortex: A cytoarchitectonic mapping study. Neuropsychologia, 49(9), 2592-2608.  
Rosselli, M., & Ardila, A. (1989). Calculation deficits in patients with right and left hemisphere 
damage. Neuropsychologia, 27(5), 607-617.  
Rossor, M. N., Warrington, E. K., & Cipolotti, L. (1995). The isolation of calculation skills. 
Journal of Neurology, 242(2), 78-81.  
Ruchkin, D. S., Canoune, H. L., Johnson, R., & Ritter, W. (1995). Working memory and 
preparation elicit different patterns of slow wave event-related brain potentials. 
Psychophysiology, 32(4), 399-410.  
Rugg, M. D. (1990). Event-related brain potentials dissociate repetition effects of high-and low-
frequency words. Memory & Cognition, 18(4), 367-379.  
Rugg, M. D., & Doyle, M. C. (1994). Event-related potentials and stimulus repetition in direct 
and indirect tests of memory. In H. -J. Heinze, T. F. Münte, & G. R. Mangun (Eds.), 
Cognitive Electrophysiology (pp. 124-148). Cambridge, MA: Birkhäuser Boston.  
	 161	
Rugg, M. D., Doyle, M. C., & Melan, C. (1993). An event-related potential study of the effects 
of within-and across-modality word repetition. Language and Cognitive Processes, 8(4), 
357-377.  
Rugg, M. D., Furda, J., & Lorist, M. (1988). The effects of task on the modulation of event-
related potentials by word repetition. Psychophysiology, 25(1), 55-63.  
Rugg, M. D., & Nagy, M. E. (1987). Lexical contribution to nonword-repetition effects: 
Evidence from event-related potentials. Memory & Cognition, 15(6), 473-481.  
Rugg, M. D., & Nagy, M. E. (1989). Event-related potentials and recognition memory for words. 
Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 72(5), 395-406.  
Sandrini, M., Rossini, P. M., & Miniussi, C. (2004). The differential involvement of inferior 
parietal lobule in number comparison: A rTMS study. Neuropsychologia, 42(14), 1902-
1909.  
Santens, S., & Gevers, W. (2008). The SNARC effect does not imply a mental number line. 
Cognition, 108(1), 263-270.  
Schacter, D. L. (1987). Implicit expressions of memory in organic amnesia: Learning of new 
facts and associations. Human Neurobiology, 6(2), 107-118. 
Schendan, H. E., & Kutas, M. (2003). Time course of processes and representations supporting 
visual object identification and memory. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 15(1), 111-
135.  
Schendan, H. E., & Kutas, M. (2007). Neurophysiological evidence for the time course of 
activation of global shape, part, and local contour representations during visual object 
categorization and memory. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19(5), 734-749.  
	 162	
Schendan, H. E., & Lucia, L. C. (2010). Object-sensitive activity reflects earlier perceptual and 
later cognitive processing of visual objects between 95 and 500ms. Brain Research, 1329, 
124-141.  
Schirmer, A., Soh, Y. H., Penney, T. B., & Wyse, L. (2011). Perceptual and conceptual priming 
of environmental sounds. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(11), 3241-3253.  
Schmiedek, F., Oberauer, K., Wilhelm, O., Süß, H., & Wittmann, W. W. (2007). Individual 
differences in components of reaction time distributions and their relations to working 
memory and intelligence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 136(3), 414-429.  
Schweinberger, S. R., Huddy, V., & Burton, A. M. (2004). N250r: A face-selective brain 
response to stimulus repetitions. Neuroreport, 15(9), 1501-1505.  
Schweinberger, S. R., Pickering, E. C., Jentzsch, I., Burton, A. M., & Kaufmann, J. M. (2002). 
Event-related brain potential evidence for a response of inferior temporal cortex to familiar 
face repetitions. Cognitive Brain Research, 14(3), 398-409.  
Sergent, J., & Hellige, J. B. (1986). Role of input factors in visual-field asymmetries. Brain and 
Cognition, 5(2), 174-199.  
Simmons, F. R., & Singleton, C. (2008). Do weak phonological representations impact on 
arithmetic development? A review of research into arithmetic and dyslexia. Dyslexia, 14(2), 
77-94.  
Sitnikova, T., Kuperberg, G., & Holcomb, P. J. (2003). Semantic integration in videos of real–
world events: An electrophysiological investigation. Psychophysiology, 40(1), 160-164.  
Smith, M. E. (1993). Neurophysiological manifestations of recollective experience during 
recognition memory judgments. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 5(1), 1-13.  
	 163	
Smith, M. E., & Halgren, E. (1987). Event-related potentials during lexical decision: Effects of 
repetition, word frequency, pronounceability, and concreteness. Electroencephalography 
and Clinical Neurophysiology, Supplement, 40, 417-421.  
Spelke, E., & Dehaene, S. (1999). Biological foundations of numerical thinking. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 3(10), 365-366.  
Staub, A., & Benatar, A. (2013). Individual differences in fixation duration distributions in 
reading. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20(6), 1304-1311.  
Stazyk, E. H., Ashcraft, M. H., & Hamann, M. S. (1982). A network approach to mental 
multiplication. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
8(4), 320-335.  
Thornhill, D. E., & Van Petten, C. (2012). Lexical versus conceptual anticipation during 
sentence processing: Frontal positivity and N400 ERP components. International Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 83(3), 382-392.  
Tse, C., Balota, D. A., Yap, M. J., Duchek, J. M., & McCabe, D. P. (2010). Effects of healthy 
aging and early stage dementia of the Alzheimer's type on components of response time 
distributions in three attention tasks. Neuropsychology, 24(3), 300-315.  
Umiltà, C., Priftis, K., & Zorzi, M. (2009). The spatial representation of numbers: Evidence from 
neglect and pseudoneglect. Experimental Brain Research, 192(3), 561-569.  
Van Herten, M., Kolk, H. H., & Chwilla, D. J. (2005). An ERP study of P600 effects elicited by 
semantic anomalies. Cognitive Brain Research, 22(2), 241-255.  
Van Petten, C., & Kutas, M. (1990). Interactions between sentence context and word 
frequencyinevent-related brainpotentials. Memory & Cognition, 18(4), 380-393.  
	 164	
Van Petten, C., & Luka, B. J. (2012). Prediction during language comprehension: Benefits, costs, 
and ERP components. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 83(2), 176-190.  
Van Petten, C., & Senkfor, A. J. (1996). Memory for words and novel visual patterns: 
Repetition, recognition, and encoding effects in the event-related brain potential. 
Psychophysiology, 33(5), 491-506.  
Van Zandt, T. (2000). How to fit a response time distribution. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
7(3), 424-465.  
Verguts, T., & Fias, W. (2005). Interacting neighbors: A connectionist model of retrieval in 
single-digit multiplication. Memory & Cognition, 33(1), 1-16.  
Vogel, E. K., Luck, S. J., & Shapiro, K. L. (1998). Electrophysiological evidence for a 
postperceptual locus of suppression during the attentional blink. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 24(6), 1656-1674.  
Voss, J. L., & Federmeier, K. D. (2011). FN400 potentials are functionally identical to N400 
potentials and reflect semantic processing during recognition testing. Psychophysiology, 
48(4), 532-546.  
Voss, J. L., & Paller, K. A. (2006). Fluent conceptual processing and explicit memory for faces 
are electrophysiologically distinct. The Journal of Neuroscience, 26(3), 926-933.  
Voss, J., & Paller, K. (2008). Neural substrates of Remembering – electroencephalographic 
studies. In J Bryne (Ed.), Learning and Memory: A comprehensive reference (Vol. 3, pp. 79-
97). Oxford: Elsevier.  
Voss, J. L., & Paller, K. A. (2009a). An electrophysiological signature of unconscious 
recognition memory. Nature Neuroscience, 12(3), 349-355.  
	 165	
Voss, J. L., & Paller, K. A. (2009b). Remembering and knowing: Electrophysiological 
distinctions at encoding but not retrieval. Neuroimage, 46(1), 280-289.  
Voss, J. L., Schendan, H. E., & Paller, K. A. (2010). Finding meaning in novel geometric shapes 
influences electrophysiological correlates of repetition and dissociates perceptual and 
conceptual priming. Neuroimage, 49(3), 2879-2889.  
Wada, J., & Rasmussen, T. (1960). Intracarotid injection of sodium amytal for the lateralization 
of cerebral speech dominance: Experimental and clinical observations. Journal of 
Neurosurgery, 17(2), 266-282.  
Warrington, E. K. (1982). The fractionation of arithmetical skills: A single case study. The 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 34(1), 31-51.  
Warrington, E. K., & Weiskrantz, L. (1982). Amnesia: A disconnection syndrome? 
Neuropsychologia, 20(3), 233-248.  
Winkelman, J. H., & Schmidt, J. (1974). Associative confusions in mental arithmetic. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 102(4), 734-736.  
Wlotko, E. W., & Federmeier, K. D. (2007). Finding the right word: Hemispheric asymmetries in 
the use of sentence context information. Neuropsychologia, 45(13), 3001-3014.  
Woodruff, C. C., Hayama, H. R., & Rugg, M. D. (2006). Electrophysiological dissociation of the 
neural correlates of recollection and familiarity. Brain Research, 1100, 125-135.  
Woroch, B., & Gonsalves, B. D. (2010). Event-related potential correlates of item and source 
memory strength. Brain Research, 1317, 180-191.  
Wu, Y. C., & Coulson, S. (2005). Meaningful gestures: Electrophysiological indices of iconic 
gesture comprehension. Psychophysiology, 42(6), 654-667.  
	 166	
Zbrodoff, N. J., & Logan, G. D. (1986). On the autonomy of mental processes: A case study of 
arithmetic. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 115(2), 118-130.  
Zbrodoff, N. J., & Logan, G. D. (2005). What everyone finds: The problem-size effect. In J. I. 
Campbell (Ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Cognition (pp. 331-345). New York, NY: 
Psychology Press.  
Zorzi, M., & Butterworth, B. (1999). A computational model of number comparison.  
In M. Hahn & S. C. Stoness (Eds.), Proceedings of the Twenty First Annual Conference of 
the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 778-783). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
